Martin Davies

Obsessed by the cases where things go wrong, we pay too little attention to the vastly more numerous cases where they go right, and where it is perhaps easier to see that the descriptive content of the expression concerned is wholly at the service of this function [of identifying reference], a function which is complementary to that of predication and contains no element of predication in itself (Strawson [1974], p. 66).An earlier version of the paper was written during an enjoyable year spent as a Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne.

Consciousness is, perhaps, the aspect of our mental lives that is the most perplexing for both psychologists and philosophers. Daniel Dennett has described it as 'both the most obvious and the most mysterious feature of our minds' and attempts at definition often seem to move in circles. Thomas Nagel famously remarked that 'without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless.' These observations might suggest that consciousness - indefinable and mysterious - falls outside the scope of rational enquiry, defying both scientific and philosophical investigation. In reality, however, the topic has been a focus of psychological investigation since William James and is increasingly vital in philosophical research. This book illustrates the various, interdisciplinary approaches to the problem, providing both pointers to a solution and a summary of the key positions.

Self-executing treaties like the Salvage Convention 1989 automatically become "the supreme law of the land" in the United States under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.They require no legislation to make them operative but they have the same force and effect as an Article I legislative enactment.The fact that no implementing legislation is needed often leads to the paradoxical result that a self-executing treaty is more easily forgotten, perhaps for the simple reason that such treaties do not always appear in the U.S. Code and so are not always easy to find. Perhaps that is the explanation of the curious fate of the Salvage Convention 1989, which does not appear anywhere in the U.S. Code. There can be no doubt, however, that when the provisions of a treaty prescribe a rule by which private rights may be determined, as the Salvage Convention 1989 does, a court must resort to the treaty for rules of decision, just as it would to a statute. A court may only refer to the law that would govern in the absence of the treaty - in the present context, general maritime law - when the treaty leaves an issue unresolved. In short, it is not acceptable for courts to continue to apply the general maritime law of salvage simply because it is broadly equivalent to the Salvage Convention 1989. Even when the general maritime law and the Salvage Convention 1989 would produce identical results, courts should apply the Salvage Convention 1989 and not the general maritime law. When the general maritime law and the Salvage Convention 1989 would (or even might) produce different results, which may occur quite often, there is no justification for applying the general maritime law.

Starting from Dennett's distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of description, I consider the relationships amongst three levels: the personal level, the level of information-processing mechanisms, and the level of neurobiology. I defend a conception of the relationship between the personal level and the sub-personal level of information-processing mechanisms as interaction without reduction. Even given a nonreductionist conception of persons, philosophical theorizing sometimes supports downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level. An example of a downward inference is provided and an objection is considered.

In August, Amnesty International and the World Medical Association expressed concern at reports that a judge in Saudi Arabia had asked several hospitals in the country whether they could perform an operation to damage a man's spinal cord as punishment for attacking another man and leaving him paralysed. The man had already been sentenced to seven months imprisonment for the crime, the injured victim requested the further sentence under Sharia Law, which is strictly enforced across Saudi Arabia. According to reports, one of the hospitals approached declined on ethical grounds. Another hospital stated that it was possible to damage the spinal cord in the way requested, but that the procedure would have to be done at a specialised hospital. 1In its statement, Amnesty International urged the authorities not to carry out the sentence, which it argued would be a grave violation of international human rights law and contravene the United Nations convention against Torture, to which Saudi Arabia is a state party. 2 The WMA expressed its support for the physicians who refused to carry out the request by the Saudi court, participation in which would constitute a severe breach of medical ethics. 3 The WMA reminded doctors that the Declaration of Tokyo clearly states that no physician should participate in the practice of torture or any other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading procedures, whatever the offence of which the victim of such procedures is suspected, accused or guilty of. The Declaration also includes a prohibition of participation in the planning or advising for such a procedure. NHS white paperIn July 2010 the government published a White Paper outlining its plans to transform the delivery of National Health Services in England. 4 The White Paper has been described as ‘one of the biggest shake ups of the health system …

Professor Strawson was interviewed on video on location at King's College, London during the Spring of 1992. Professor Strawson discusses his thoughts on a variety of topics on which he has written previously, providing some illuminating insights into how his thoughts has progressed. The text published here is en excerpt from this interview, translated with kind permission of Mr Rudolf V. Fara, the producer, in which prof. Strawson discusses his philosophical views with Martin Davies, Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy at Oxford University, and Mark Sainsbury, Susan Stebbing Professor of Philosophy at King's College, University of London.

Article copyright 2002. We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher's view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the etiology of delusions can be described superficially as a loss of the ability to reject a candidate for belief on the grounds of its implausibility and its inconsistency with everything else that the patient knows, but we point out some problems that confront any attempt to say more about the nature of this second factor.

There has long been debate about the degree to which conventional health professionals should work closely with complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) practitioners, if patients choose treatment from both. Some doctors are trained in conventional and alternative therapies but often, liaison depends on the type of therapy, whether it is regulated by law and whether it supplements conventional methods of diagnosis and treatment or claims to provide an alternative to them. Among the therapies often used by patients to supplement conventional medicine, but which do not claim to have a diagnostic purpose, are aromatherapy, massage, stress therapy, reflexology and hypnotherapy. Chinese medicine and homoeopathy are among those which are not statutorily regulated but claim to provide diagnosis and treatment. Practitioners of conventional medicine are often wary of unregulated treatments that supplant evidence-based therapy—even though not all conventional medicine has been proven by randomised controlled trials. The role of complementary and alternative therapies came under scrutiny in England in February 2010 when the Parliamentary Science and Technology Committee published a critical report on NHS funding for homoeopathy.1 Focusing on whether government policy on homoeopathy was evidence-based, the Committee found a mismatch between the evidence and policy. Its main conclusion was that the evidence indicates that homoeopathy is not efficacious and does not produce results beyond the placebo effect. The Committee said that explanations for why homoeopathy was thought to work were implausible and that further homoeopathic clinical trials could not be justified. The amount that the NHS actually spends on homoeopathic therapies was left unclear and was subject to varying claims from the Society of Homoeopaths (estimating £4 million annually) and the Health Minister (estimating £152 000 annually).2 The Parliamentary report recommended that there should be a clear policy on prescribing placebos, including homoeopathic medicines, but the government has been …

Ever so often in the UK, there is a flurry of activity around the information requirements of donor-conceived individuals. In April 2013, it was the launch of a report from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics that brought the issue back to public consciousness.1Since 1991, information about treatment with donor gametes or embryos has been collected by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. Since then, over 35 000 donor-conceived individuals have been born through treatment in licensed clinics. Medical information and information about donors’ appearance are collected by clinics, and donors are encouraged to put together a ‘pen portrait’ giving information about themselves for any resulting children. One focus of the new report is on improving the quality and quantity of information available about donors.Traditionally, gamete and embryo donations were practised on an anonymous basis, so that those born as a result of such donation may receive only non-identifying information about the donor when they reach the age of 18. This changed in 2005 when donor anonymity was removed so that anyone donating after that time could be identified to individuals born as a result of the treatment. Those who have donated in the past are also able to reregister as identifiable donors. Much concern was expressed at the time that this would exacerbate the shortage of donors although the Nuffield Council on Bioethics reports that, 8 years on, those clinics that actively recruit donors appear to be successful in finding sufficient donors. The report recommends that the option of anonymous donation should not be reintroduced.A big issue of debate in the UK has been, and continues to be, whether parents should tell their …

Mental simulation is the simulation, replication or re-enactment, usually in imagination, of the thinking, decision-making, emotional responses, or other aspects of the mental life of another person. According to simulation theory, mental simulation in imagination plays a key role in our everyday psychological understanding of other people. The same mental resources that are used in our own thinking, decision-making or emotional responses are redeployed in imagination to provide an understanding of the thoughts, decisions or emotions of another.

The rubber hand paradigm is used to create the illusion of self-touch, by having the participant administer stimulation to a prosthetic hand while the Examiner, with an identical stimulus , administers stimulation to the participant’s hand. With synchronous stimulation, participants experience the compelling illusion that they are touching their own hand. In the current study, the robustness of this illusion was assessed using incongruent stimuli. The participant used the index finger of the right hand to administer stimulation to a prosthetic hand while the Examiner used a paintbrush to administer stimulation to the participant’s left hand. The results indicate that this violation of tactile expectations does not diminish the illusion of self-touch. Participants experienced the illusion despite the use of incongruent stimuli, both when vision was precluded and when visual feedback provided clear evidence of the tactile mismatch