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Maksymilian Del Mar

Queen Mary University of London
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    39
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 More details
  • Queen Mary University of London
    Department of Law
    Professor
Homepage
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Law
Aesthetics
Social and Political Philosophy
Normative Ethics
Meta-Ethics
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy
Philosophy of Action
Meta-Ethics
Normative Ethics
Philosophy of Law
Social and Political Philosophy
Social Sciences
Aesthetics
3 more
  • All publications (39)
  •  94
    The Language of Responsibility (review)
    Res Publica 18 (4): 373-377. 2012.
    Value TheoryValue Theory, MiscellaneousMoral Responsibility
  •  13
    Book Review (review)
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (2): 209-212. 2009.
    Philosophy of Law
  •  153
    Marmor’s Social Conventions: The Limits of Practical Reason
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (3): 420-445. 2011.
    This essay argues that the practical reason approach to the study of social conventions (and social normativity more generally) fails to adequately account for the fluency of social action in environments that we experience as familiar. The practical reason approach, articulated most recently in Andrei Marmor’s Social Conventions: From Language to Law (2009) does help us, though not wholly adequately, to understand how we tend to react to, and experience, unfamiliar situations or unfamiliar beha…Read more
    This essay argues that the practical reason approach to the study of social conventions (and social normativity more generally) fails to adequately account for the fluency of social action in environments that we experience as familiar. The practical reason approach, articulated most recently in Andrei Marmor’s Social Conventions: From Language to Law (2009) does help us, though not wholly adequately, to understand how we tend to react to, and experience, unfamiliar situations or unfamiliar behaviors, that is, those situations in which a certain practice becomes problematic or is problematized, or where we are obliged to, or moved to, justify or deliberate. The reason why the practical reason approach is not wholly adequate when it comes to understanding unfamiliar situations or unfamiliar behaviors is that it tends to subsume the unfamiliar under the familiar, that is, it tends to negatively evaluate anything that is deemed to be not in accordance with the rules and reasons already familiar to the observer. This excludes the possibility of the observer having to transform himself or herself, and thus change what is familiar to him or her.
    Philosophy of Social Science, MiscellaneousPratical Reason, MiscPhilosophy of Social Science, Genera…Read more
    Philosophy of Social Science, MiscellaneousPratical Reason, MiscPhilosophy of Social Science, General Works
  •  99
    The Mystery of Capital and the Construction of Social Reality – Edited by Barry Smith, David M. Mark and Isaac Ehrlich
    Dialectica 63 (3): 365-368. 2009.
  •  80
    Introduction (Symposium on the Human Right to Subsistence)
    with Rowan Cruft and Maksymilian Del Mar
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 30 (1): 53-56. 2013.
    Political EthicsHuman RightsHealth Care Rights
  •  140
    Normativism, Anti-Normativism and Humanist Pragmatism: Stephen P. Turner: Explaining the Normative. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010, pbk. $24.95, hbk. $69.95, 228 pp + index
    Human Studies 33 (2-3): 305-323. 2010.
    Review Essay of Stephen P. Turner, Explaining the Normative, 2010.
    Value Theory, Miscellaneous
  •  127
    What Does History Matter to Legal Epistemology?
    Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (3): 383-405. 2011.
    This paper argues that not only does history matter to legal epistemology, but also that understanding legal epistemology can yield a certain understanding of the past. The paper focuses on the common law practice of precedent and argues that there is no set of rules, principles, reasons or material facts that constitute the fixed or foundational content of past decisions, but rather that what is taken by a judge resolving a particular dispute to be the content of past decisions depends on the a…Read more
    This paper argues that not only does history matter to legal epistemology, but also that understanding legal epistemology can yield a certain understanding of the past. The paper focuses on the common law practice of precedent and argues that there is no set of rules, principles, reasons or material facts that constitute the fixed or foundational content of past decisions, but rather that what is taken by a judge resolving a particular dispute to be the content of past decisions depends on the active and creative construal of relevance engaged in by that judge. Precedents are better thought of as `thick resources with dynamic content'. Such content is constrained by a variety of stabilising practices, but never so constrained as to determine how it can be construed to be relevant. This image of law's past may offer a general view of the past as something with which we can actively and creatively relate in the course of coping with the present.
    Philosophy of History
  • Legal Fictions and Legal Change in the Common Law Tradition
    In William Twining & Maksymilian Del Mar (eds.), Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice, Springer Verlag. 2015.
    Legal Positivism
  •  44
    New waves in philosophy of law (edited book)
    Palgrave MacMillan. 2011.
    This book provides a collection of 11 cutting-edge essays by leading young scholars, challenging long-held assumptions and offering new research paradigms in Philosophy of Law, in five parts: 1) methodology/metatheory; 2) reasoning/evaluating; 3) values/the moral life; 4) institutions/the social life; and 5) the global/international dimension.
    Philosophy of Law
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