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255Purple Haze: The Puzzle of ConsciousnessOxford University Press USA. 2001.In this wide-ranging study, Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ideas on the How does one explain the physical nature of an experience? This puzzle, the "explanatory gap" between mind and body, is the focus of this work by an influential scholar in the field.
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456On Leaving Out What It's LikeIn Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological an Philosophical Essays, Mit Press. pp. 543--557. 1993.
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39The nature of psychological explanation by Robert Cummins: A critical noticePhilosophical Review 96 (2): 249-274. 1987.
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51Raw FeelingPhilosophical Review 105 (1): 94. 1996.Kirk’s aim in this book is to bridge what he calls “the intelligibility gap,” expressed in the question, “How could complex patterns of neural firing amount to this?”. He defends a position that he describes as “broadly functionalist,” which consists of several theses. I will briefly review them.
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13Review of Scott Sturgeon: Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason and Nature (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3): 629-634. 2001.
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149Experience and representationIn Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2002.
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219Conceivability and the metaphysics of mindNoûs 32 (4): 449-480. 1998.Materialism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that the ultimate nature of the mind is physical; there is no sharp discontinuity in nature between the mental and the non-mental. Anti-materialists asser t that, on the contrary, mental phenomena are different in kind from physical phenomena. Among the weapons in the arsenal of anti-materialists, one of the most potent has been the conceivability argument. When I conceive of the mental, it seems utterly unlike the physical. Anti-materialists i…Read more
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243Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality MeetThe Monist 91 (2): 215-236. 2008.
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159On the Phenomenology of ThoughtIn Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 103. 2011.
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99Intentional ChemistryGrazer Philosophische Studien 46 (1): 103-134. 1993.This paper discusses the debate between atomists and molecularists regarding the nature of mental content. A molecularist believes that some, but not all, of a mental symbol's inferential connections to other mental symbols, are at least partly constitutive of that symbol's intentional content. An atomist believes that none of the symbol's inferential connections play such a constitutive role. The paper is divided into two principal parts. First, attempts by Michael Devitt and Georges Rey to def…Read more
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58Thoughts on sensory representation: A commentary on Austen Clark's a theory of sentiencePhilosophical Psychology 17 (4): 541-551. 2004.This Article does not have an abstract
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25Review of mark Rowlands, The Nature of Consciousness (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (10). 2002.
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155Phenomenal concepts and the materialist constraintIn Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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91Matters of mind: Consciousness, reason, and nature Scott SturgeonBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3): 629-634. 2001.
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80Are Qualia Just Representations? A Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Ten Problems of ConsciousnessMind and Language 12 (1): 101-113. 1997.
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69Qualia: Intrinsic, relational, or what?In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 277--292. 1995.
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165Knowing what it's likeIn Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, Ashgate. 2003.