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19Holism: A Consumer UpdateGrazer Philosophische Studien 46 103-134. 1993.This paper discusses the debate between atomists and molecularists regarding the nature of mental content. A molecularist believes that some, but not all, of a mental symbol's inferential connections to other mental symbols, are at least partly constitutive of that symbol's intentional content. An atomist believes that none of the symbol's inferential connections play such a constitutive role. The paper is divided into two principal parts. First, attempts by Michael Devitt and Georges Rey to def…Read more
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46Two kinds of accessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6): 514-515. 2007.I explore the implications of recognizing two forms of access that might be constitutively related to phenomenal consciousness. I argue, in support of Block, that we don't have good reason to think that the link to reporting mechanisms is the kind of access that distinguishes an experience from a mere state
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49Phenomenal access: A moving targetBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 261-261. 1995.Basically agreeing with Block regarding the need for a distinction between P- and A-consciousness, I characterize the problem somewhat diflerently, relating it more directly to the explanatory gap. I also speculate on the relation between the two forms of consciousness, arguing that some notion of access is essentially involved in phenomenal experience.
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4Materialism and QualiaIn John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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64Books reviewed in this article: José Luis Bermú dez, The Paradox of Self‐Conciousness Lawrence Weiskrantz, Conciousness Lost and Found: A Neuropsychological Exploration.
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154Review: Daniel Stoljar: Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness (review)Mind 117 (465): 228-231. 2008.
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254Purple Haze: The Puzzle of ConsciousnessOxford University Press USA. 2001.In this wide-ranging study, Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ideas on the How does one explain the physical nature of an experience? This puzzle, the "explanatory gap" between mind and body, is the focus of this work by an influential scholar in the field.
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455On Leaving Out What It's LikeIn Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological an Philosophical Essays, Mit Press. pp. 543--557. 1993.
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39The nature of psychological explanation by Robert Cummins: A critical noticePhilosophical Review 96 (2): 249-274. 1987.
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51Raw FeelingPhilosophical Review 105 (1): 94. 1996.Kirk’s aim in this book is to bridge what he calls “the intelligibility gap,” expressed in the question, “How could complex patterns of neural firing amount to this?”. He defends a position that he describes as “broadly functionalist,” which consists of several theses. I will briefly review them.
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149Experience and representationIn Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2002.
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13Review of Scott Sturgeon: Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason and Nature (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3): 629-634. 2001.
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218Conceivability and the metaphysics of mindNoûs 32 (4): 449-480. 1998.Materialism in the philosophy of mind is the thesis that the ultimate nature of the mind is physical; there is no sharp discontinuity in nature between the mental and the non-mental. Anti-materialists asser t that, on the contrary, mental phenomena are different in kind from physical phenomena. Among the weapons in the arsenal of anti-materialists, one of the most potent has been the conceivability argument. When I conceive of the mental, it seems utterly unlike the physical. Anti-materialists i…Read more
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242Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality MeetThe Monist 91 (2): 215-236. 2008.
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157On the Phenomenology of ThoughtIn Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 103. 2011.
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99Intentional ChemistryGrazer Philosophische Studien 46 (1): 103-134. 1993.This paper discusses the debate between atomists and molecularists regarding the nature of mental content. A molecularist believes that some, but not all, of a mental symbol's inferential connections to other mental symbols, are at least partly constitutive of that symbol's intentional content. An atomist believes that none of the symbol's inferential connections play such a constitutive role. The paper is divided into two principal parts. First, attempts by Michael Devitt and Georges Rey to def…Read more