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11Naturalism and DualismIn Kelly James Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism, Wiley-blackwell. 2016.I explore the relations among the doctrines of materialism, dualism, naturalism, and theism. I argue that there are two different versions of naturalism – I call them “narrow” and “broad” – which both derive from a core contrast between the intentional and the nonintentional. While narrow naturalism just is materialism, and so is obviously incompatible with dualism, I argue that dualism is consistent with broad naturalism. In fact, I argue that there are good reasons for dualists to embrace broa…Read more
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On Phenomenal AccessIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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1Gedanken űber QualiaIn Michael Pauen & Achim Stephan (eds.), Phanomenales Bewusstsein-Ruckkehr Zur Identitatstheorie?,, Paderborn. 2002.
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Troubles with Modern LocalismIn Dunja Jutronic (ed.), The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics, Pedagoska Fakulteta Maribor. pp. 59-72. 1997.
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Color and QualiaIn Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Genealogy to Iqbal, Routledge. 1998.
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16Quality and Content: Essays on Consciousness, Representation, and ModalityOxford University Press. 2018.Joseph Levine draws together a series of essays in which he has developed his distinctive approach to philosophy of mind. He defends a materialist view of the mind against various challenges, and offers illuminating studies of consciousness, phenomenal concepts, mental representation, demonstrative thought, and cognitive phenomenology.
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240Color and Color Experience: Colors as Ways of AppearingDialectica 60 (3): 269-282. 2006.In this paper I argue that color is a relational feature of the distal objects of perception, a way of appearing. I begin by outlining three constraints any theory of color should satisfy: physicalism about the non‐mental world, consistency with what is known from color science, and transparency about color experience. Traditional positions on the ontological status of color, such as physicalist reduction of color to spectral reflectance, subjectivism, dispositionalism, and primitivism, fail, I …Read more
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109Demonstrative ConceptsCroatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3): 328-336. 2008.Recently philosophers have appealed to the notion of a “demonstrative concept” to solve various puzzles. McDowell employs it to support his view that perceptual experience is conceptual, and Loar and others use it to provide an account of phenomenal concepts. The idea is that some concepts acquire their contents through demonstrations. I argue that there is no legitimate notion of demonstrative concept that can do this job.
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Quine on Psychology in Naturalistic Epistemology: A Symposium of Two DecadesBoston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 100 259-298. 1987.
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25Giambattista Vico and the Quarrel between the Ancients and the ModernsNew Vico Studies 9 118-119. 1991.
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1Perspectives on socially shared cognitionIn Lauren Resnick, Levine B., M. John, Stephanie Teasley & D. (eds.), Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition, American Psychological Association. 1991.
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1Perspectives on socially shared cognitionIn Lauren Resnick, Levine B., M. John, Stephanie Teasley & D. (eds.), Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition, American Psychological Association. 1991.
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14Listening time and the short-term perceptual deprivation effectBulletin of the Psychonomic Society 1 (1): 10-11. 1973.
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24Clustering effects on the recall of unrelated wordsBulletin of the Psychonomic Society 15 (6): 399-401. 1980.
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1652Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gapPacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October): 354-61. 1983.
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103Phenomenal consciousness and the first-personPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7. 2001.Siewert's book revolves around three theses: that there is a distinctive style of epistemic warrant associated with the first-person point of view, that if we pay close attention to the deliverances of this first-person point of view, we will see that phenomenal consciousness is both real and yet neglected by many current theories that purport to explain consciousness, and that phenomenal consciousness is inherently intentional; one cannot divorce what phenomenal character presents to us from wh…Read more
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84Recent work on consciousnessAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4): 379-404. 1997.This paper surveys current theories on the nature of conscious experience, from traditional central state identity theories and functionalism, to more recent higher-order and representationalist theories. It is concluded that no current theory really solves the fundamental problem of how to incorporate conscious experience into the physical world, though much progress has been made
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40Anti-materialist arguments and influential repliesIn Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Blackwell. pp. 371--380. 2007.
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82Review of Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3). 2010.
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349Conscious awareness and representationIn Kenneth Williford & Uriah Kriegel (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 173--198. 2006.
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20Reduction with autonomy: Mental causation, reduction and superveniencePhilosophical Perspectives 11 83-105. 1997.
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20Holism: A Consumer UpdateGrazer Philosophische Studien 46 103-134. 1993.This paper discusses the debate between atomists and molecularists regarding the nature of mental content. A molecularist believes that some, but not all, of a mental symbol's inferential connections to other mental symbols, are at least partly constitutive of that symbol's intentional content. An atomist believes that none of the symbol's inferential connections play such a constitutive role. The paper is divided into two principal parts. First, attempts by Michael Devitt and Georges Rey to def…Read more
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46Two kinds of accessBehavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6): 514-515. 2007.I explore the implications of recognizing two forms of access that might be constitutively related to phenomenal consciousness. I argue, in support of Block, that we don't have good reason to think that the link to reporting mechanisms is the kind of access that distinguishes an experience from a mere state