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Experience and representationIn Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2002.
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1Conscious awareness and self-representationIn Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. 2006.
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36Conscious Awareness and (self-)representationIn Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 173--198. 2006.
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1The Explanatory GapIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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1The nomic and the robustIn Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Blackwell. 1991.
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On Baker on the first personIn Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker, Routledge. 2020.
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14The Mind–Body Relation: Problem, Mystery, or What?In Nicholas Allott, Terje Lohndal & Georges Rey (eds.), A Companion to Chomsky, Wiley. 2021.In this chapter, the author wants to respond to Noam Chomsky's claim, repeated often in different ways. He argues both that Chomsky's own position suffers from inconsistency – he dismisses the apparent problem while at the same time promoting it as a “mystery” – and that his principal reason for maintaining his position, that there is no clear conception of body, or the physical, with which to contrast the mind, or the mental, does not really dispense with the issue that rightfully worries philo…Read more
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4Anti‐materialist Arguments and Influential RepliesIn Susan Schneider & Max Velmans (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Wiley. 2017.This chapter discusses the anti‐materialist arguments that purport to show that conscious phenomena are genuinely new, nonphysical features of reality. The anti‐materialist claims that zombies are indeed conceivable. To see why this might make trouble for the materialist, the chapter considers again what is supposed to distinguish materialism from property dualism. Given the characterization of the difference between the materialist and the property dualist, it becomes clear why the conceivabili…Read more
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673The modal status of materialismPhilosophical Studies 145 (3). 2009.Argument that Lewis and others are wrong that physicalism is if true then contingently true.
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33The Metaphysics and Epistemology of AcquaintanceProtoSociology 38 15-34. 2021.Phenomenal consciousness comprises both qualitative character and subjectivity. The former provides the proprietary contents of conscious experiences – determining what they are like – and the latter is that feature that renders those contents “for the subject”, so there is something it is like at all. I have developed a theory of consciousness as “acquaintance” which I dub the “Cartesian Theater” model, on which there is a fundamental psycho-physical law that takes the output of cognitive and p…Read more
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19On the proper treatment of the connection between connectionism and symbolismBehavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1): 23-24. 1988.
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The explanatory gapIn Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy), Polity. 2014.
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On Leaving Out What It’s LikeIn Martin Ed Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), On Leaving Out What It’s Like, Blackwell. pp. 121-136. 1993.
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107On the Meta-ProblemJournal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10): 148-159. 2019.According to Chalmers (2018), the meta-problem of consciousness is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness'. In this paper I argue that the key to understanding both consciousness itself and addressing the meta-problem is to understand what acquaintance is and what its objects are. Unfortunately, I think there are still some serious mysteries lurking here, which I present briefly in this commentary. In particular, on the view of acquaintance I favour, it …Read more
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2The Character of Consciousness David Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness, Oxford University Press, 2010, 596pp., $29.95 (pbk), ISBN 9780195311112. (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011. 2011.
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Consciousness Located: You’ll Wonder Where the Yellow Went- Book Review of Hardcastle on Locating-Consciousness (review)Psycoloquy 8 (4). 1997.I identify two morals in Hardcastle's book (1995). The main moral is that scientific investigation can provide an illuminating, explanatory theory of conscious experience. The subsidiary one is that the best way for such investigation to proceed is to combine psychological and neurophysiological research, incorporating more dynamical models and relying less on strictly classical computational models. I focus my critical attention on the main moral, but also briefly discuss the subsidiary one.
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10The Representation of Knowledge and Belief. Arizona Colloquium in Cognition by Myles Brand, Robert M. HarnishAmerican Scientist 77 (2): 193. 1989.
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13Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.),Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, Bruntrup, G and Jaskolla, L, eds.Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017. 2017.
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SubjectivityIn Donald M. Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2nd edition. vol. 3, Thomson Gale. pp. 290-293. 2006.
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QualiaIn Donald M. Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2nd edition. vol. 3, Thomson Gale. pp. 191-195. 2006.
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What It's LikeIn Robert A. Wilson & Frank C. Keil (eds.), MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, Mit Press. pp. 883-884. 1999.
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31Explanatory GapIn Robert A. Wilson & Frank C. Keil (eds.), MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, Mit Press. pp. 304-305. 1999.