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10Naturalism and DualismIn Kelly James Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism, Wiley-blackwell. 2016.I explore the relations among the doctrines of materialism, dualism, naturalism, and theism. I argue that there are two different versions of naturalism – I call them “narrow” and “broad” – which both derive from a core contrast between the intentional and the nonintentional. While narrow naturalism just is materialism, and so is obviously incompatible with dualism, I argue that dualism is consistent with broad naturalism. In fact, I argue that there are good reasons for dualists to embrace broa…Read more
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On Phenomenal AccessIn Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, Mit Press. 2019.
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1Gedanken űber QualiaIn Michael Pauen & Achim Stephan (eds.), Phanomenales Bewusstsein-Ruckkehr Zur Identitatstheorie?,, Paderborn. 2002.
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Troubles with Modern LocalismIn Dunja Jutronic (ed.), The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics, Pedagoska Fakulteta Maribor. pp. 59-72. 1997.
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16Quality and Content: Essays on Consciousness, Representation, and ModalityOxford University Press. 2018.Joseph Levine draws together a series of essays in which he has developed his distinctive approach to philosophy of mind. He defends a materialist view of the mind against various challenges, and offers illuminating studies of consciousness, phenomenal concepts, mental representation, demonstrative thought, and cognitive phenomenology.
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240Color and Color Experience: Colors as Ways of AppearingDialectica 60 (3): 269-282. 2006.In this paper I argue that color is a relational feature of the distal objects of perception, a way of appearing. I begin by outlining three constraints any theory of color should satisfy: physicalism about the non‐mental world, consistency with what is known from color science, and transparency about color experience. Traditional positions on the ontological status of color, such as physicalist reduction of color to spectral reflectance, subjectivism, dispositionalism, and primitivism, fail, I …Read more
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109Demonstrative ConceptsCroatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3): 328-336. 2008.Recently philosophers have appealed to the notion of a “demonstrative concept” to solve various puzzles. McDowell employs it to support his view that perceptual experience is conceptual, and Loar and others use it to provide an account of phenomenal concepts. The idea is that some concepts acquire their contents through demonstrations. I argue that there is no legitimate notion of demonstrative concept that can do this job.
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Quine on Psychology in Naturalistic Epistemology: A Symposium of Two DecadesBoston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 100 259-298. 1987.
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24Giambattista Vico and the Quarrel between the Ancients and the ModernsNew Vico Studies 9 118-119. 1991.
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1Perspectives on socially shared cognitionIn Lauren Resnick, Levine B., M. John, Stephanie Teasley & D. (eds.), Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition, American Psychological Association. 1991.
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1Perspectives on socially shared cognitionIn Lauren Resnick, Levine B., M. John, Stephanie Teasley & D. (eds.), Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition, American Psychological Association. 1991.
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14Listening time and the short-term perceptual deprivation effectBulletin of the Psychonomic Society 1 (1): 10-11. 1973.
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23Clustering effects on the recall of unrelated wordsBulletin of the Psychonomic Society 15 (6): 399-401. 1980.
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1647Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gapPacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October): 354-61. 1983.
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102Phenomenal consciousness and the first-personPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7. 2001.Siewert's book revolves around three theses: that there is a distinctive style of epistemic warrant associated with the first-person point of view, that if we pay close attention to the deliverances of this first-person point of view, we will see that phenomenal consciousness is both real and yet neglected by many current theories that purport to explain consciousness, and that phenomenal consciousness is inherently intentional; one cannot divorce what phenomenal character presents to us from wh…Read more
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83Recent work on consciousnessAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4): 379-404. 1997.This paper surveys current theories on the nature of conscious experience, from traditional central state identity theories and functionalism, to more recent higher-order and representationalist theories. It is concluded that no current theory really solves the fundamental problem of how to incorporate conscious experience into the physical world, though much progress has been made
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40Anti-materialist arguments and influential repliesIn Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Blackwell. pp. 371--380. 2007.
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157On the Phenomenology of ThoughtIn Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 103. 2011.
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99Intentional ChemistryGrazer Philosophische Studien 46 (1): 103-134. 1993.This paper discusses the debate between atomists and molecularists regarding the nature of mental content. A molecularist believes that some, but not all, of a mental symbol's inferential connections to other mental symbols, are at least partly constitutive of that symbol's intentional content. An atomist believes that none of the symbol's inferential connections play such a constitutive role. The paper is divided into two principal parts. First, attempts by Michael Devitt and Georges Rey to def…Read more
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57Thoughts on sensory representation: A commentary on Austen Clark's a theory of sentiencePhilosophical Psychology 17 (4): 541-551. 2004.This Article does not have an abstract
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25Review of mark Rowlands, The Nature of Consciousness (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (10). 2002.
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155Phenomenal concepts and the materialist constraintIn Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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91Matters of mind: Consciousness, reason, and nature Scott SturgeonBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3): 629-634. 2001.