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465Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrumPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June): 453-69. 1984.
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2Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: the 'Open-Question Argument'RevivedPhilosophical Papers 21 153-175. 1992.
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56Resisting the tyranny of terminology: The general dynamical hypothesis in cognitive scienceBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5): 643-643. 1998.What van Gelder calls the dynamical hypothesis is only a special case of what we here dub the general dynamical hypothesis. His terminology makes it easy to overlook important alternative dynamical approaches in cognitive science. Connectionist models typically conform to the general dynamical hypothesis, but not to van Gelder's.
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95Supervenience and cosmic hermeneuticsSouthern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22 (S1): 19-38. 1984.
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12Review of The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain by Paul M. Churchland (review)Philosophy of Science 63 (3): 476-478. 1996.
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356Troubles for new wave moral semantics: The 'open question argument' revivedPhilosophical Papers 21 (3): 153-175. 1992.(1992). TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 153-175. doi: 10.1080/05568649209506380
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124The Transvaluationist Conception of VaguenessThe Monist 81 (2): 313-330. 1998.Transvaluationism makes two fundamental claims concerning vagueness. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: vague discourse is governed by semantic standards that are mutually unsatisfiable. But second, vagueness is viable and legitimate nonetheless; its logical incoherence is benign.
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155Robust vagueness and the forced-March sorites paradoxPhilosophical Perspectives 8 159-188. 1994.I distinguish two broad approaches to vagueness that I call "robust" and "wimpy". Wimpy construals explain vagueness as robust (i.e., does not manifest arbitrary precision); that standard approaches to vagueness, like supervaluationism or appeals to degrees of truth, wrongly treat vagueness as wimpy; that vagueness harbors an underlying logical incoherence; that vagueness in the world is therefore impossible; and that the kind of logical incoherence nascent in vague terms and concepts is benign …Read more
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116Recognitional concepts and the compositionality of concept possessionPhilosophical Issues 9 27-33. 1998.
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1744The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of IntentionalityIn David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oup Usa. pp. 520--533. 2002.
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |