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142What does it take to be a true believer? Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialismIn Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object, Oxford University Press. 2005.
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86How to be realistic about folk psychologyPhilosophical Psychology 1 (1): 69-81. 1988.Folk psychological realism is the view that folk psychology is true and that people really do have propositional attitudes, whereas anti-realism is the view that folk psychology is false and people really do not have propositional attitudes. We argue that anti-realism is not worthy of acceptance and that realism is eminently worthy of acceptance. However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or non-scientific. We argue that non-scientific …Read more
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12Review of The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain by Paul M. Churchland (review)Philosophy of Science 63 (3): 476-478. 1996.
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360Troubles for new wave moral semantics: The 'open question argument' revivedPhilosophical Papers 21 (3): 153-175. 1992.(1992). TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 153-175. doi: 10.1080/05568649209506380
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127The Transvaluationist Conception of VaguenessThe Monist 81 (2): 313-330. 1998.Transvaluationism makes two fundamental claims concerning vagueness. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: vague discourse is governed by semantic standards that are mutually unsatisfiable. But second, vagueness is viable and legitimate nonetheless; its logical incoherence is benign.
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Nonreductive materialismIn Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate, Blackwell. 1994.
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116Recognitional concepts and the compositionality of concept possessionPhilosophical Issues 9 27-33. 1998.
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155Robust vagueness and the forced-March sorites paradoxPhilosophical Perspectives 8 159-188. 1994.I distinguish two broad approaches to vagueness that I call "robust" and "wimpy". Wimpy construals explain vagueness as robust (i.e., does not manifest arbitrary precision); that standard approaches to vagueness, like supervaluationism or appeals to degrees of truth, wrongly treat vagueness as wimpy; that vagueness harbors an underlying logical incoherence; that vagueness in the world is therefore impossible; and that the kind of logical incoherence nascent in vague terms and concepts is benign …Read more
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1752The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of IntentionalityIn David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 520--533. 2002.
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133Token physicalism, supervenience, and the generality of physicsSynthese 49 (December): 395-413. 1981.
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15Josep Corbi raises several worries about the metaethical position that Mark Timmons and I have articulated and defended, which we call “nondescriptivist cognitivism.â€â€¦ His remarks prompt some points of clarification…. Timmons and I characterize descriptive content as “way-the-world-might-be†content. We maintain that “base case†beliefs—roughly, those non-evaluative and evaluative beliefs whose contents have the simplest kinds of logical form—are of two types: a non-evaluative b…Read more
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9Nonreductive materialism and the explanatory autonomy of psychologyIn Steven J. Wagner & Richard Wagner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal, University of Notre Dame Press. 1993.
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44Science nominalizedPhilosophy of Science 51 (4): 529-549. 1984.I propose a way of formulating scientific laws and magnitude attributions which eliminates ontological commitment to mathematical entities. I argue that science only requires quantitative sentences as thus formulated, and hence that we ought to deny the existence of sets and numbers. I argue that my approach cannot plausibly be extended to the concrete "theoretical" entities of science
Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |