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219Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New MetaethicPhilosophical Papers 29 (2): 121-153. 2000.Abstract We propose a metaethical view that combines the cognitivist idea that moral judgments are genuine beliefs and moral utterances express genuine assertions with the idea that such beliefs and utterances are nondescriptive in their overall content. This sort of view has not been recognized among the standard metaethical options because it is generally assumed that all genuine beliefs and assertions must have descriptive content. We challenge this assumption and thereby open up conceptual s…Read more
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145Expressivism and contrary-forming negationPhilosophical Issues 19 (1): 92-112. 2009.No Abstract
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98Morality without Moral FactsIn James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 6--220. 2006.
Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |