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62Humean Causation and Kim’s Theory of EventsCanadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (4). 1980.In recent years Jaegwon Kim has propounded and elaborated an influential theory of events. He takes an event to be the exemplification of an empirical property by a concrete object at a time. He also has proposed and endorsed a version of the “Humean” tradition concerning causation: the view that causal relations between concrete events depend upon general "covering laws." But although his explication of the covering-law conception of causation seems quite natural within the framework of his the…Read more
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46Braving the Perils of an Uneventful WorldGrazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1): 179-186. 1988.Philosophers who advocate an ontology without events must show how sentences containing apparent reference to events can be systematically paraphrased, or "regimented," into sentences which avoid ontological commitment to these putative entities. Two alternative proposals are set forth for regimenting statements containing putatively event-denoting definite descriptions. Both proposals eliminate the apparent reference to events, while still preserving the validity of inferences sanctioned by the…Read more
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76Analytical moral functionalism meets moral twin earthIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. pp. 221--236. 2009.
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26Pr cis of connectionism and the philosophy of psychologyPhilosophical Psychology 10 (3). 1997.Connectionism was explicitly put forward as an alternative to classical cognitive science. The questions arise: how exactly does connectionism differ from classical cognitive science, and how is it potentially better? The classical “rules and representations” conception of cognition is that cognitive transitions are determined by exceptionless rules that apply to the syntactic structure of symbols. Many philosophers have seen connectionism as a basis for denying structured symbols. We, on the ot…Read more
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2Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the MindIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 512--537. 2007.
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106Metaphysical realism and psychologistic semanticsErkenntnis 34 (3): 297--322. 1991.I propose a metaphysical position I call 'limited metaphysical realism', and I link it to a position in the philosophy of language I call 'psychologistic semantics'. Limited metaphysical realism asserts that there is a mind-independent, discourse-independent world, but posits a sparse ontology. Psychologistic semantics construes truth not as direct word/world correspondence, and not as warranted assertibility (or Putnam's "ideal" warranted assertibility), but rather as 'correct assertibility'. I…Read more
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21From supervenience to superdupervenienceIn Jaegwon Kim (ed.), Supervenience, Ashgate. pp. 113--144. 2002.
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Abundant Truth in an Austere WorldIn Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and realism, Clarendon Press. 2006.
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4Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal ConsciousnessIn Kriegel Uriah & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-representational Approaches to Consciousness, Bradford. 2006.
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155Truth as Mediated CorrespondenceThe Monist 89 (1): 28-49. 2006.We will here describe a conception of truth that is robust rather than deflationist, and that differs in important ways from the most familiar robust conceptions.' We will argue that this approach to truth is intrinsically and intuitively plausible, and fares very well relative to other conceptions of truth in terms of comparative theoretical benefits and costs.
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42The synthetic unity of truthIn Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 180. 2012.
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25Call for Papers for'SORITES'SORITES is a new refereed all-English electronic international quarterly of analytical philosophyAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (2). 1995.
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19Retreat from Non-Being: Graham Priest, Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005, pp. xv + 190, £30 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4): 615-627. 2006.
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The Exchange Continued: Response to Pust's Response to my ReplyIn Essays on Paradoxes, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 226-224. 2017.
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83Core and Ancillary Epistemic VirtuesActa Analytica 33 (3): 295-309. 2018.We argue, primarily by appeal to phenomenological considerations related to the experiential aspects of agency, that belief fixation is broadly agentive; although it is rarely voluntary, nonetheless, it is phenomenologically agentive because of its significant phenomenological similarities to voluntary-agency experience. An important consequence is that epistemic rationality, as a central feature of belief fixation, is an agentive notion. This enables us to introduce and develop a distinction be…Read more
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102Gripped by authorityCanadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4): 313-336. 2018.Moral judgments are typically experienced as being categorically authoritative – i.e. as having a prescriptive force that is motivationally gripping independently of both conventional norms and one's pre-existing desires, and justificationally trumps both conventional norms and one's pre-existing desires. We argue that this key feature is best accommodated by the meta-ethical position we call ‘cognitivist expressivism’, which construes moral judgments as sui generis psychological states whose di…Read more
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56Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic, by Gila SherMind 127 (507): 881-890. 2018.© Mind Association 2018Gila Sher’s Epistemic Friction is a bold and ambitious book, with many interesting things to say not only about knowledge, truth, and logic but also about matters ontological. It often requires the reader to construe it hermeneutically, but repays the effort of doing so.She coins the expression ‘epistemic friction’ to refer to constraints on a system of knowledge, coming from both the world and the mind. She says, ‘The world as the object or target of our theories restrict…Read more
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37The Soritical CentipedeNoûs 53 (2): 491-510. 2017.Two philosophical questions arise about rationality in centipede games that are logically prior to attempts to apply the formal tools of game theory to this topic. First, given that the players have common knowledge of mutual rationality and common knowledge that they are each motivated solely to maximize their own profits, is there a backwards-induction argument that employs only familiar non-technical concepts about rationality, leads to the conclusion that the first player is rationally oblig…Read more
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198Troubles for Bayesian Formal EpistemologyRes Philosophica 94 (2): 1-23. 2017.I raise skeptical doubts about the prospects of Bayesian formal epistemology for providing an adequate general normative model of epistemic rationality. The notion of credence, I argue, embodies a very dubious psychological myth, viz., that for virtually any proposition p that one can entertain and understand, one has some quantitatively precise, 0-to-1 ratio-scale, doxastic attitude toward p. The concept of credence faces further serious problems as well—different ones depending on whether cred…Read more
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2The Phenomenology of Agency and Freedom: Lessons from Introspection and Lessons from Its LimitsHumana Mente 4 (15). 2011.
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30Epistemic Virtues and Cognitive DispositionsIn Horgan Terry & Henderson David (eds.), Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 296-319. 2009.
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Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of MindWalter de Gruyter. 2009.
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95Attention, Morphological Content and Epistemic JustificationCroatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1): 73-86. 2011.In the formation of epistemically justified beliefs, what is the role of attention, and what is the role (if any) of non-attentional aspects of cognition? We will here argue that there is an essential role for certain nonattentional aspects. These involve epistemically relevant background information that is implicit in the standing structure of an epistemic agent’s cognitive architecture and that does not get explicitly represented during belief-forming cognitive processing. Since such “morphol…Read more
Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |