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Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David LewisLanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield. 2001.Reality and Humean Supervenience confronts the reader with central aspects in the philosophy of David Lewis, whose work in ontology, metaphysics, logic, probability, philosophy of mind, and language articulates a unique and systematic foundation for modern physicalism
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212A nonclassical framework for cognitive scienceSynthese 101 (3): 305-45. 1994.David Marr provided a useful framework for theorizing about cognition within classical, AI-style cognitive science, in terms of three levels of description: the levels of (i) cognitive function, (ii) algorithm and (iii) physical implementation. We generalize this framework: (i) cognitive state transitions, (ii) mathematical/functional design and (iii) physical implementation or realization. Specifying the middle, design level to be the theory of dynamical systems yields a nonclassical, alterna…Read more
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4Against the token identity theoryIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Blackwell. 1985.
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3Internal-world skepticism and mental self-presentationIn Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 41-61. 2006.
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51Levels of description in nonclassical cognitive sciencePhilosophy 34 159-188. 1992.David Marr provided an influential account of levels of description in classical cognitive science. In this paper we contrast Marr'ent with some alternatives that are suggested by the recent emergence of connectionism. Marr's account is interesting and important both because of the levels of description it distinguishes, and because of the way his presentation reflects some of the most basic, foundational, assumptions of classical AI-style cognitive science . Thus, by focusing on levels of descr…Read more
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2Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: the 'Open-Question Argument'RevivedPhilosophical Papers 21 153-175. 1992.
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Structured representations in connectionist systems?In S. Davis (ed.), Connectionism: Theorye and Practice, Oxford University Press. 1991.
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Spindel Conference 1987 Connectionism and the Philosophy of MindDept. Of Philosophy, Memphis State University. 1988.
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Actions, reasons, and the explanatory role of contentIn Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and his critics, Blackwell. 1991.
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57Resisting the tyranny of terminology: The general dynamical hypothesis in cognitive scienceBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5): 643-643. 1998.What van Gelder calls the dynamical hypothesis is only a special case of what we here dub the general dynamical hypothesis. His terminology makes it easy to overlook important alternative dynamical approaches in cognitive science. Connectionist models typically conform to the general dynamical hypothesis, but not to van Gelder's.
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95Supervenience and cosmic hermeneuticsSouthern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22 (S1): 19-38. 1984.
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12Review of The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain by Paul M. Churchland (review)Philosophy of Science 63 (3): 476-478. 1996.
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358Troubles for new wave moral semantics: The 'open question argument' revivedPhilosophical Papers 21 (3): 153-175. 1992.(1992). TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 153-175. doi: 10.1080/05568649209506380
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127The Transvaluationist Conception of VaguenessThe Monist 81 (2): 313-330. 1998.Transvaluationism makes two fundamental claims concerning vagueness. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: vague discourse is governed by semantic standards that are mutually unsatisfiable. But second, vagueness is viable and legitimate nonetheless; its logical incoherence is benign.
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Nonreductive materialismIn Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate, Blackwell. 1994.
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116Recognitional concepts and the compositionality of concept possessionPhilosophical Issues 9 27-33. 1998.
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155Robust vagueness and the forced-March sorites paradoxPhilosophical Perspectives 8 159-188. 1994.I distinguish two broad approaches to vagueness that I call "robust" and "wimpy". Wimpy construals explain vagueness as robust (i.e., does not manifest arbitrary precision); that standard approaches to vagueness, like supervaluationism or appeals to degrees of truth, wrongly treat vagueness as wimpy; that vagueness harbors an underlying logical incoherence; that vagueness in the world is therefore impossible; and that the kind of logical incoherence nascent in vague terms and concepts is benign …Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |