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11Materialism: Matters of definition, defense, and deconstructionPhilosophical Studies 131 (1): 157-83. 2006.How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense, especially in light of the infamous “hard problem” of phenomenal consciousness? I will say something about each of these questions.
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8Deconstructing new wave materialismIn Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents, Cambridge University Press. pp. 307--318. 2001.In the first post World War II identity theories (e.g., Place 1956, Smart 1962), mind brain identities were held to be contingent. However, in work beginning in the late 1960's, Saul Kripke (1971, 1980) convinced the philosophical community that true identity statements involving names and natural kind terms are necessarily true and furthermore, that many such necessary identities can only be known a posteriori. Kripke also offered an explanation of the a posteriori nature of ordinary theoretica…Read more
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9Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes From the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2015.How does mind fit into nature? Philosophy has long been concerned with this question. No contemporary philosopher has done more to clarify it than Jaegwon Kim, a distinguished analytic philosopher specializing in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. With new contributions from an outstanding line-up of eminent scholars, this volume focuses on issues raised in Kim's work. The chapters cluster around two themes: first, exclusion, supervenience, and reduction, with attention to the causal exclusion …Read more
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33Troubles on moral twin earth: Moral queerness revivedSynthese 92 (2). 1992.J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relation…Read more
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20Naturalism and intentionalityPhilosophical Studies 76 (2-3): 301-26. 1994.I argue for three principle claims. First, philosophers who seek to integrate the semantic and the intentional into a naturalistic metaphysical worldview need to address a task that they have thus far largely failed even to notice: explaining into- level connections between the physical and the intentional in a naturalistically acceptable way. Second, there are serious reasons to think that this task cannot be carried out in a way that would vindicate realism about intentionality. Third, there i…Read more
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9Wright's Truth and ObjectivityNoûs 29 (1). 1995.In this critical study I first summarize Crispin Wright's "Truth and Objectivity". Wright maintains (1) that truth- aptness of a given discourse is neutral about questions of realism and anti- realism concerning the discourse, but also (2) that such metaphysical questions largely turn on discourse- specific constraints governing the truth- predicate. I urge a distinction between (i) Wright's general approach to truth and objectivity, and (ii) his apparent inclination to implement and the approac…Read more
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11Causal compatibilism and the exclusion problemTheoria 16 (40): 95-116. 2001.Terry Horgan University of Memphis In this paper I address the problem of causal exclusion, specifically as it arises for mental properties (although the scope of the discussion is more general, being applicable to other kinds of putatively causal properties that are not identical to narrowly physical causal properties, i.e., causal properties posited by physics). I summarize my own current position on the matter, and I offer a defense of this position. I draw upon and synthesize relevant discus…Read more
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4Science nominalized properlyPhilosophy of Science 54 (2): 281-282. 1987.Although Hale and Resnik are correct in their specific objection to my proposal for nominalizing science, the proposal can be saved by means of a simple and plausible modification
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18Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrumPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June): 453-69. 1984.
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7Kim on the Mind—Body Problem (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4). 1996.For three decades the writings of Jaegwon Kim have had a major influence in philosophy of mind and in metaphysics. Sixteen of his philosophical papers, together with several new postscripts, are collected in Kim [1993]. The publication of this collection prompts the present essay. After some preliminary remarks in the opening section, in Section 2 I will briefly describe Kim's philosophical 'big picture' about the relation between the mental and the physical. In Section 3 I will situate Kim's ap…Read more
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Structured representations in connectionist systems?In Steven Davis (ed.), Connectionism: Theorye and Practice, Oxford University Press. 1991.
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1Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: the 'Open-Question Argument'RevivedPhilosophical Papers 21 153-175. 1992.
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1Multiple reference, multiple realization, and the reduction of mindIn Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 2001.
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Spindel Conference 1987 Connectionism and the Philosophy of MindDept. Of Philosophy, Memphis State University. 1988.
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Actions, reasons, and the explanatory role of contentIn Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and his critics, Blackwell. 1991.
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5Resisting the tyranny of terminology: The general dynamical hypothesis in cognitive scienceBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5): 643-643. 1998.What van Gelder calls the dynamical hypothesis is only a special case of what we here dub the general dynamical hypothesis. His terminology makes it easy to overlook important alternative dynamical approaches in cognitive science. Connectionist models typically conform to the general dynamical hypothesis, but not to van Gelder's.
Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |