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17The Phenomenology of Agency and Freedom: Lessons from Introspection and Lessons from Its LimitsHumana. Mente 15 77-97. 2011.
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17Conceptually Grounded Necessary TruthsIn Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 111. 2013.
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15Josep Corbi raises several worries about the metaethical position that Mark Timmons and I have articulated and defended, which we call “nondescriptivist cognitivism.â€â€¦ His remarks prompt some points of clarification…. Timmons and I characterize descriptive content as “way-the-world-might-be†content. We maintain that “base case†beliefs—roughly, those non-evaluative and evaluative beliefs whose contents have the simplest kinds of logical form—are of two types: a non-evaluative b…Read more
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14‘Could’, Possible Worlds, and Moral ResponsibilitySouthern Journal of Philosophy 17 (3): 345-358. 1979.
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12Review: The Salem Witch Project (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1). 2002.The authors’ central claim, they tell us, is that meaning discourse is radically normative, rather than descriptive. In the Introduction they say
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12Review of The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain by Paul M. Churchland (review)Philosophy of Science 63 (3): 476-478. 1996.
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11Existence monism trumps priority monismIn Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 51--76. 2012.Existence monism is defended against priority monism. Schaffer's arguments for priority monism and against pluralism are reviewed, such as the argument from gunk. The whole does not require parts. Ontological vagueness is impossible. If ordinary objects are in the right ontology then they are vague. So ordinary objects are not included in the right ontology; and hence thought and talk about them cannot be accommodated via fully ontological vindication. Partially ontological vindication is not vi…Read more
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10Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral JudgmentEthical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3): 279-295. 2007.According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model has…Read more
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9Nonreductive materialism and the explanatory autonomy of psychologyIn Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal, University of Notre Dame Press. 1993.
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9Transvaluationism: The Benign Logical Incoherence of VaguenessThe Harvard Review of Philosophy 14 (1): 20-35. 2006.
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7Simulation and epistemic competenceIn H. Kobler & K. Steuber (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences, Westview. 2000.Epistemology has recently come to more and more take the articulate form of an investigation into how we do, and perhaps might better, manage the cognitive chores of producing, modifying, and generally maintaining belief-sets with a view to having a true and systematic understanding of the world. While this approach has continuities with earlier philosophy, it admittedly makes a departure from the tradition of epistemology as first philosophy
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7What’s the Point?In David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 87-114. 2015.The chapter rehearses the main outlines of gatekeeping contextualism—the view that it is central to the concept of knowledge that attributions of knowledge function in a kind of epistemic gatekeeping for contextually salient communities. The case for gatekeeping contextualism is clarified within an extended discussion of the character of philosophical reflection. The chapter argues that normatively valenced, evaluative concepts constitute a broad class of concepts for which a sociolinguistic poi…Read more
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4Essays on ParadoxesOup Usa. 2016.This volume brings together Terence Horgan's essays on paradoxes, both published and new. A common theme unifying these essays is that philosophically interesting paradoxes typically resist either easy solutions or solutions that are formally/mathematically highly technical. Another unifying theme is that such paradoxes often have deep-sometimes disturbing-philosophical morals.
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4Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal ConsciousnessIn Kriegel Uriah & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-representational Approaches to Consciousness, Bradford. 2006.
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4Against the token identity theoryIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Blackwell. 1985.
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4The phenomenology of intentionality and the intentionality of phenomenologyIn David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press. pp. 520--533. 2002.
Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |