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12Connectionism and the Philosophy of PsychologyMIT Press. 1996.In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition.
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54Evidentially embedded epistemic entitlementSynthese 197 (11): 4907-4926. 2020.Some hold that beliefs arising out of certain sources such as perceptual experience enjoy a kind of entitlement—as one is entitled to believe what is thereby presented as true, at least unless further evidence undermines that entitlement. This is commonly understood to require that default epistemic entitlement is a non-evidential kind of epistemic warrant. Our project here is to challenge this common, non-evidential, conception of epistemic entitlement. We will argue that although there are ind…Read more
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142What does it take to be a true believer? Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialismIn Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object, Oxford University Press. 2005.
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2Supervenience and cosmic hermeneuticsSouthern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22 (S1): 19-38. 1984.
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13Review of The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain by Paul M. Churchland (review)Philosophy of Science 63 (3): 476-478. 1996.
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35Troubles for new wave moral semantics: The 'open question argument' revivedPhilosophical Papers 21 (3): 153-175. 1992.(1992). TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 153-175. doi: 10.1080/05568649209506380
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12The Transvaluationist Conception of VaguenessThe Monist 81 (2): 313-330. 1998.Transvaluationism makes two fundamental claims concerning vagueness. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: vague discourse is governed by semantic standards that are mutually unsatisfiable. But second, vagueness is viable and legitimate nonetheless; its logical incoherence is benign.
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Nonreductive materialismIn Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate, Blackwell. 1994.
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19Recognitional concepts and the compositionality of concept possessionPhilosophical Issues 9 27-33. 1998.
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14Robust vagueness and the forced-March sorites paradoxPhilosophical Perspectives 8 159-188. 1994.I distinguish two broad approaches to vagueness that I call "robust" and "wimpy". Wimpy construals explain vagueness as robust (i.e., does not manifest arbitrary precision); that standard approaches to vagueness, like supervaluationism or appeals to degrees of truth, wrongly treat vagueness as wimpy; that vagueness harbors an underlying logical incoherence; that vagueness in the world is therefore impossible; and that the kind of logical incoherence nascent in vague terms and concepts is benign …Read more
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88The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of IntentionalityIn David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oup Usa. pp. 520--533. 2002.
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8Token physicalism, supervenience, and the generality of physicsSynthese 49 (December): 395-413. 1981.
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2Josep Corbi raises several worries about the metaethical position that Mark Timmons and I have articulated and defended, which we call “nondescriptivist cognitivism.â€â€¦ His remarks prompt some points of clarification…. Timmons and I characterize descriptive content as “way-the-world-might-be†content. We maintain that “base case†beliefs—roughly, those non-evaluative and evaluative beliefs whose contents have the simplest kinds of logical form—are of two types: a non-evaluative b…Read more
Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |