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45What is meant by 'what is said'? A reply to Cappelen and LeporeMind and Language 13 (4). 1998.In a recent paper Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore challenge an assumption that they rightly claim is pervasive among contemporary philosophers of language. According to this assumption (MA), an adequate semantic theory T for a language L should assign p as the semantic content of a sentence S in L if and only if in uttering S a speaker says that p. I claim that the arguments of Cappelen and Lepore are based upon an uncharitable interpretation of MA. If ‘saying’ is understood in a roughly Gricea…Read more
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44Treatment Adherence in the Absence of Insight: A Puzzle and a Proposed SolutionPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1): 65-75. 2010.Patients with psychosis often have poor insight into their illness. Poor insight into illness is, at least among patients with psychosis, a good predictor of treatment non-adherence. This is no mystery, for as Xavier Amador asks, "Who would want to take medicine for an illness they did not believe they had?" What is curious is that some patients with psychosis do adhere to treatment despite a lack of insight. Why do these patients adhere to treatment, given that they do not believe they are ill …Read more
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42Reflections on Insight: Dilemmas, Paradoxes, and PuzzlesPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1): 85-89. 2010.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reflections on InsightDilemmas, Paradoxes, and PuzzlesMarga Reimer (bio)Keywordsinsight, psychosis, treatment adherence, medical model, autonomy, open placebos, rationalityThe Practitioner's DilemmaThe psychiatrist aware of the potential intractability of what Jennifer Radden calls "insightlessness," faces a dilemma. Should she encourage her patient to embrace a medical model of his "troubles," a model whose adoption is likely to mot…Read more
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41Russell's anticipation of Donnellan's distinctionAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1). 1993.This Article does not have an abstract
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41Review of John Perry, Reference and Reflexivity (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (6). 2002.
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27Affective Dysfunction and the Cluster B Personality DisordersPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (3): 225-229. 2013.
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26Childhood Trauma and the Mentally Ill Parent: Reconciling Moral and Medical Conceptions of" What Really Happened"Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (3): 265-267. 2010.
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25Ordinary proper namesIn Gerhard Preyer Georg Peter (ed.), Logical Form and Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 444--466. 2002.
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24Philosophy of psychiatryIn Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on truth, meaning, and the mental, Oxford University Press. pp. 249. 2012.
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16Understanding First: Exploring Its Scope and Testing Its LimitsPhilosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 30 (3): 205-207. 2023.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Understanding First: Exploring Its Scope and Testing Its LimitsMarga Reimer, PhD (bio)I thoroughly enjoyed reading and reflecting on this provocative, engagingly written, and persuasively argued paper. My commentary focuses on the authors’ “understanding first” principle. I begin by exploring that principle’s scope by appeal to aesthetic analogues to the moral cases of Pete and Jacob; I then explore its limits by appeal to cases invo…Read more
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9What Do Belief Ascrebers Really Mean? A Reply to Stephen SchifferPacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4): 404-423. 2017.Stephen Schiffer has recently claimed that the currently popular “hidden‐indexical” theory of belief reports is an implausible theory of such reports. His central argument for this claim is based on what he refers to as the “meaning‐intention” problem. In this paper, I claim that the meaning‐intention problem is powerless against the hidden‐indexical theory of belief reports. I further contend that the theory is in fact a plausible theory of such reports.
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3What Do Belief Ascrebers Really Mean? A Reply to Stephen SchifferPacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4): 404-423. 2017.Stephen Schiffer has recently claimed that the currently popular “hidden‐indexical” theory of belief reports is an implausible theory of such reports. His central argument for this claim is based on what he refers to as the “meaning‐intention” problem. In this paper, I claim that the meaning‐intention problem is powerless against the hidden‐indexical theory of belief reports. I further contend that the theory is in fact a plausible theory of such reports.
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2Davidsonian holism in recent philosophy of psychiatryIn Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on truth, meaning, and the mental, Oxford University Press. 2012.
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1MetaphorIn Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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1Descriptively introduced namesIn Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and beyond, Oxford University Press. pp. 613--629. 2004.
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Exploring Austin's galaxy: searching for truth through the lens of ordinary languageIn Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays, Cambridge University Press. 2017.
Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |