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149What malapropisms mean: A reply to Donald Davidson (review)Erkenntnis 60 (3): 317-334. 2004.In this paper, I argue against Davidson's (1986) view that our ability to understand malapropisms forces us to re-think the standard construal of literal word meaning as conventional meaning. Specially, I contend that the standard construal is not only intuitive but also well-motivated, for appeal to conventional meaning is necessary to understand why speakers utter the particular words they do. I also contend that, contra Davidson, we can preserve the intuitive distinction between what a speake…Read more
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217The problem of empty namesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4). 2001.This Article does not have an abstract
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63A Defense of De Re Belief ReportsMind and Language 10 (4): 446-463. 1995.In Talk About Beliefs, Mark Crimmins claims that de re belief reports are not nearly as common as they are generally thought to be. In the following paper, I take issue with this claim. I begin with a critique of Crimmins’arguments on behalf of the claim, and then follow with an argument on behalf of the opposing claim: that de re belief reports are indeed quite common. In defending this claim, I make some observations about the nature of tacit reference, a phenomenon central to Crimmins’account…Read more
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67Moral Disorder In the DSM-IV?: The Cluster B Personality DisordersPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (3): 203-215. 2013.
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78Distinguishing Between the Psychiatrically and Philosophically Deluded: Easier Said Than DonePhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4): 341-346. 2010.take leave of one’s senses English, Verb. 1. (idiomatic) To go crazy; to stop behaving rationally A Chief concern in “Only a Philosopher or a Madman” was to draw attention to a number of striking yet underappreciated similarities between paradigm psychiatric delusions and standard philosophical doctrines, “nihilistic” as well as “common sense.” The similarities were presented as illuminating given their potential to inform the debate over whether psychiatric delusions are properly (or usefully) …Read more
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58The wettstein/salmon debate: Critique and resolutionPacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2). 1998.Does Keith Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction have ‘semantic significance’? Howard Wettstein has claimed (in several papers) that it does; Nathan Salmon has responded (in several papers) that it does not. Specifically, while Wettstein has claimed that definite descriptions, used referentially, function semantically as demonstratives, Salmon has responded to Wettstein's claims by defending a unitary Russellian account of such expressions, according to which they invariably function a…Read more
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27Affective Dysfunction and the Cluster B Personality DisordersPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (3): 225-229. 2013.
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24Philosophy of psychiatryIn Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on truth, meaning, and the mental, Oxford University Press. pp. 249. 2012.
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128Incomplete descriptionsErkenntnis 37 (3). 1992.Standard attempts to defend Russell's Theory of Descriptions against the problem posed by incomplete descriptions, are discussed and dismissed as inadequate. It is then suggested that one such attempt, one which exploits the notion of a contextually delimited domain of quantification, may be applicable to incomplete quantifier expressions which are typically treated as quantificational: expressions of the form AllF's, NoF's, SomeF's, Exactly eightF's, etc. In this way, one is able to retain the …Read more
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9What Do Belief Ascrebers Really Mean? A Reply to Stephen SchifferPacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4): 404-423. 2017.Stephen Schiffer has recently claimed that the currently popular “hidden‐indexical” theory of belief reports is an implausible theory of such reports. His central argument for this claim is based on what he refers to as the “meaning‐intention” problem. In this paper, I claim that the meaning‐intention problem is powerless against the hidden‐indexical theory of belief reports. I further contend that the theory is in fact a plausible theory of such reports.
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26Childhood Trauma and the Mentally Ill Parent: Reconciling Moral and Medical Conceptions of" What Really Happened"Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (3): 265-267. 2010.
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111Metaphorical Meanings. Do you see what I mean?The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 3. 2007.My intention in this paper is to propose a conception of metaphorical meaning on which the meaning of a metaphor includes propositional as well as non-propositional features. I will make two general claims on behalf of the proposed account: first, it is intuitive; second, it is of theoretical value. In claiming that the proposed account is of theoretical value, I mean only that its adoption leads to an increased understanding of the nature of metaphor: of metaphorical thought and ofmetaphorical …Read more
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3What Do Belief Ascrebers Really Mean? A Reply to Stephen SchifferPacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4): 404-423. 2017.Stephen Schiffer has recently claimed that the currently popular “hidden‐indexical” theory of belief reports is an implausible theory of such reports. His central argument for this claim is based on what he refers to as the “meaning‐intention” problem. In this paper, I claim that the meaning‐intention problem is powerless against the hidden‐indexical theory of belief reports. I further contend that the theory is in fact a plausible theory of such reports.
Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |