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143MetaphorIn Ernest LePore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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1MetaphorIn Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2005.
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17Understanding First: Exploring Its Scope and Testing Its LimitsPhilosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 30 (3): 205-207. 2023.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Understanding First: Exploring Its Scope and Testing Its LimitsMarga Reimer, PhD (bio)I thoroughly enjoyed reading and reflecting on this provocative, engagingly written, and persuasively argued paper. My commentary focuses on the authors’ “understanding first” principle. I begin by exploring that principle’s scope by appeal to aesthetic analogues to the moral cases of Pete and Jacob; I then explore its limits by appeal to cases invo…Read more
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323MetaphorIn Ernest LePore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 845. 2006.Metaphor has traditionally been construed as a linguistic phenomenon: as something produced and understood by speakers of natural language. So understood, metaphors are naturally viewed as linguistic expressions of a particular type, or as linguistic expressions used in a particular type of way. This linguistic conception of metaphor is adopted in this article. In doing so, the article does not intend to rule out the possibility of non-linguistic forms of metaphor. Many theorists think that non-…Read more
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Exploring Austin's galaxy: searching for truth through the lens of ordinary languageIn Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays, Cambridge University Press. 2017.
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3What Do Belief Ascrebers Really Mean? A Reply to Stephen SchifferPacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4): 404-423. 2017.Stephen Schiffer has recently claimed that the currently popular “hidden‐indexical” theory of belief reports is an implausible theory of such reports. His central argument for this claim is based on what he refers to as the “meaning‐intention” problem. In this paper, I claim that the meaning‐intention problem is powerless against the hidden‐indexical theory of belief reports. I further contend that the theory is in fact a plausible theory of such reports.
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41Review of John Perry, Reference and Reflexivity (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (6). 2002.
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95A Davidsonian perspective on psychiatric delusionsPhilosophical Psychology 24 (5). 2011.A number of philosophers have argued that psychiatric delusions threaten Donald Davidson's rationalist account of intentional agency. I argue that a careful look at both Davidson's account and psychiatric delusions shows that, in fact, the two are perfectly compatible. Indeed, a Davidsonian perspective on psychiatric delusions proves remarkably illuminating
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95Performative utterances: A reply to Bach and Harnish (review)Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (6). 1995.
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78Is the impostor hypothesis really so preposterous? Understanding the capgras experiencePhilosophical Psychology 22 (6). 2009.In his classic paper, “Delusional thinking and perceptual disorder,” Brendan Maher (1974) argues that psychiatric delusions are hypotheses designed to explain anomalous experiences, and are “developed through the operation of normal cognitive processes.” Consider, for instance, the Capgras delusion. Patients suffering from this particular delusion believe that someone close to them—such as a spouse, a sibling, a parent, or a child—has been replaced by an impostor: by someone who bears a striking…Read more
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2Davidsonian holism in recent philosophy of psychiatryIn Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on truth, meaning, and the mental, Oxford University Press. 2012.
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111Could there have been unicorns?International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1). 1997.Kripke and Dummett disagree over whether or not there could have been unicorns. Kripke thinks that there could not have been; Dummett thinks otherwise. I argue that Kripke is correct: there are no counterfactual situations properly describable as ones in which there would have been unicorns. In attempting to establish this claim, I argue that Dummett's critique of an argument (reminiscent of an argument of Kripke's) to the conclusion that there could not have been unicorns, is vitiated by a conf…Read more
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100of (from Philosophy Dissertations Online).
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42Reflections on Insight: Dilemmas, Paradoxes, and PuzzlesPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1): 85-89. 2010.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reflections on InsightDilemmas, Paradoxes, and PuzzlesMarga Reimer (bio)Keywordsinsight, psychosis, treatment adherence, medical model, autonomy, open placebos, rationalityThe Practitioner's DilemmaThe psychiatrist aware of the potential intractability of what Jennifer Radden calls "insightlessness," faces a dilemma. Should she encourage her patient to embrace a medical model of his "troubles," a model whose adoption is likely to mot…Read more
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134Only a Philosopher or a Madman: Impractical Delusions in Philosophy and PsychiatryPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4): 315-328. 2010.Whether your scepticism is as absolute and sincere as you claim is something we shall learn later on, when we end this little meeting: we’ll then see whether you leave the room through the door or the window; and whether you really doubt that your body has gravity and can be injured by its fall—which is what people in general think on the basis of their fallacious senses and more fallacious experience. What Could Be more dissimilar than a well-argued philosophical thesis and a psychiatric delusi…Read more
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45What is meant by 'what is said'? A reply to Cappelen and LeporeMind and Language 13 (4). 1998.In a recent paper Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore challenge an assumption that they rightly claim is pervasive among contemporary philosophers of language. According to this assumption (MA), an adequate semantic theory T for a language L should assign p as the semantic content of a sentence S in L if and only if in uttering S a speaker says that p. I claim that the arguments of Cappelen and Lepore are based upon an uncharitable interpretation of MA. If ‘saying’ is understood in a roughly Gricea…Read more
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156Psychopathy without (the language of) disorderNeuroethics 1 (3): 185-198. 2008.Psychopathy is often characterized in terms of what I call “the language of disorder.” I question whether such language is necessary for an accurate and precise characterization of psychopathy, and I consider the practical implications of how we characterize psychopathy—whether as a biological, or merely normative, disorder.
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142Moral aspects of psychiatric diagnosis: The cluster B personality disordersNeuroethics 3 (2): 173-184. 2010.Medical professionals, including mental health professionals, largely agree that moral judgment should be kept out of clinical settings. The rationale is simple: moral judgment has the capacity to impair clinical judgment in ways that could harm the patient. However, when the patient is suffering from a "Cluster B" personality disorder, keeping moral judgment out of the clinic might appear impossible, not only in practice but also in theory. For the diagnostic criteria associated with these part…Read more
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1Descriptively introduced namesIn Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and beyond, Oxford University Press. pp. 613--629. 2004.
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215Three views of demonstrative referenceSynthese 93 (3). 1992.Three views of demonstrative reference are examined: contextual, intentional, and quasi-intentional. According to the first, such reference is determined entirely by certain publicly accessible features of the context. According to the second, speaker intentions are criterial in demonstrative reference. And according to the third, both contextual features and intentions come into play in the determination of demonstrative reference. The first two views (both of which enjoy current popularity) ar…Read more
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41Russell's anticipation of Donnellan's distinctionAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1). 1993.This Article does not have an abstract
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Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |