Emrys Westacott

From Socrates to Thoreau, most philosophers, moralists, and religious leaders have seen frugality as a virtue and have associated simple living with wisdom, integrity, and happiness. But why? And are they right? Is a taste for luxury fundamentally misguided? If one has the means to be a spendthrift, is it foolish or reprehensible to be extravagant? In this book, Emrys Westacott examines why, for more than two millennia, so many philosophers and people with a reputation for wisdom have been advocating frugality and simple living as the key to the good life. He also looks at why most people have ignored them, but argues that, in a world facing environmental crisis, it may finally be time to listen to the advocates of a simpler way of life. The Wisdom of Frugality explores what simplicity means, why it's supposed to make us better and happier, and why, despite its benefits, it has always been such a hard sell. The book looks not only at the arguments in favor of living frugally and simply, but also at the case that can be made for luxury and extravagance, including the idea that modern economies require lots of getting and spending. A philosophically informed reflection rather than a polemic, The Wisdom of Frugality ultimately argues that we will be better off—as individuals and as a society—if we move away from the materialistic individualism that currently rules.

In this work I examine the nature of, the motivations for, and some important objections to a relativistic conception of truth and rationality. I define relativism, in its most general form, as consisting of two claims: the truth value of all judgements is relative to some particular standpoint; no standpoint is supremely privileged over all others. These theses constitute the doctrinal kernel of most forms of contemporary relativism, and understood properly, I argue, they represent a coherent philosophical position. But critics of relativism often charge that relativists, because they refuse to grant a privileged status to the epistemic norms and standards which they employ, cannot consistently adopt a critical attitude to the beliefs and practices of any community, including their own. I examine this line of reasoning as it is advanced in different ways by two leading contemporary thinkers, Hilary Putnam and Jurgen Habermas. I agree with Putnam and Habermas that the concept of rationality is irreducible normative, that normative judgements can be objective in much the same way as factual judgements, and that social theorists should not try to render their analyses value-free. But I argue that they are mistaken in supposing that relativism entails the denial of any of these claims. Historically, because of the way it emerged in modern thought, relativism may have been associated with a distrust of normative judgements, but the form of relativism I wish to defend can accommodate them. ;Showing relativism to be theoretically coherent, however, is not the same thing as giving everyone a compelling reason to adopt it as their own position. Ultimately, I believe, inducements to embrace relativism have to be practical rather than theoretical. And while relativists can produce such arguments to justify their position, these are not usually powerful enough to persuade those who have no initial predisposition towards a relativistic outlook