Brian G. Henning

In this article the work of a recent critic of moral vegetarianism (and veganism) is analyzed: Andrew F. Smith. Smith s work is significant for process thinkers who defend moral vegetarianism for various reasons. One of these is that he forces process thinkers to consider in more depth Whitehead’s view of plant ontology; another is that Smith adds insightfully to the conversation within process thought regarding the relationship between claims regarding animal rights and the ecoholistic concerns of environmental ethicists.

It has been said that new discoveries and developments in the human, social, and natural sciences hang “in the air” (Bowler, 1983; 2008) prior to their consummation. While neo-Darwinist biology has been powerfully served by its mechanistic metaphysic and a reductionist methodology in which living organisms are considered machines, many of the chapters in this volume place this paradigm into question. Pairing scientists and philosophers together, this volume explores what might be termed “the New Frontiers” of biology, namely contemporary areas of research that appear to call an updating, a supplementation, or a relaxation of some of the main tenets of the Modern Synthesis. Such areas of investigation include: Emergence Theory, Systems Biology, Biosemiotics, Homeostasis, Symbiogenesis, Niche Construction, the Theory of Organic Selection (also known as “the Baldwin Effect”), Self-Organization and Teleodynamics, as well as Epigenetics. Most of the chapters in this book offer critical reflections on the neo-Darwinist outlook and work to promote a novel synthesis that is open to a greater degree of inclusivity as well as to a more holistic orientation in the biological sciences.

Alfred North Whitehead’s interpreters usually pay less attention to his later monographs and essays. Process and Reality is taken to be the definitive center of the Whiteheadian universe and the later works, thereby, appear to many only as applications or elaborations of themes already introduced earlier. Yet, is it also possible that the dominance of this perspective has obscured or even distorted further creative developments of Whitehead’s thought? This volume offers a sort of Copernican revolution in Whitehead interpretation, methodologically and conceptually inviting its contributors to observe Whitehead’s work from the perspective of his later works. The aim of this preferencing is meant not to invalidate earlier approaches to Whitehead’s thought nor is the inference that the later works are more authoritative. Yet, just as the first space-based images of our planet forever changed humanity’s understanding of its place in the universe, shifting the alleged center of, or even decentering of the view on, Whitehead’s “philosophy of organism” to the later works, we might discover previously obscured ideas or new vistas of thought relevant not only to our current philosophical landscape, but also to the pressing issues of our fragile and endangered world. This volume invites its contributors and readers to consider whether one thereby also moves beyond metaphysics?

Hierarchical views of nature have for centuries been used to justify the enslaving of peoples perceived as inferior, the often violent and coercive “reeducation” of indigenous peoples, the patriarchal subjugation of women, the cruel use of nonhuman animals for often trivial purposes, and the wanton destruction of the natural world. I join those who condemned the oppressive nature of these forms of hierarchical thinking. Yet, I fear that, in their effort to right past wrongs, too many thinkers are in danger of throwing the axiological baby out with the ontological bathwater. Though the aim at a great ontological leveling is certainly understandable, I fear that, in embracing the opposite extreme and rejecting all hierarchical thinking, some may be in danger of doing violence to the many real and even morally significant differences between individuals. My claim in this paper is that Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy of organism provides a model for how to appreciate the many grades and types of beings in the world, while avoiding an invidious normative hierarchy that inevitably places everything at the whim of human beings. That is, I will argue that it is possible to defend hierarchy without anthroparchy. To provide context, I will begin with a brief analysis of Aristotle’s “Great Chain of Being” and will then contrast it with Whitehead’s process philosophy. Given this context, using the subtle and perceptive work of the ecofeminist Karen J. Warren, I will then present a model for how to recognize a “descriptive hierarchy” while rejecting a simplistic “prescriptive hierarchy.”

This project develops and defends a holistic, organic ethical theory grounded firmly in Whitehead's aesthetico-metaphysics of process. The seminal insight of this ethic, which I refer to as the Ethics of Creativity, is the fundamental sense of beauty and value at the base of existence; there is no vacuous, valueless existence. As a result of this starting point, it is this project's contention that it is not enough for an ethical theory merely to prescribe how we ought to interact with other human beings. Rather, insofar as everything is inherently valuable, ethics must be radically reconceived as directing how we ought to comport ourselves with everything to which we relate. Accordingly, rather than having one ethic for our interaction with inter-human relationships and another for the extra-human world, the Ethics of Creativity is at once an inter-human ethic and an environmental ethic; it is, in this sense, holistic. Thus, with William James, I believe that the aim of a truly adequate ethical theory is "to find an account of the moral relations that obtain among things, which will weave them into the unity of a stable system, and make of the world what one may call a genuine universe from the ethical point of view" . ;As there currently is no systematic development of an ethical theory based on a robust conception of Whitehead's metaphysics and aesthetics, this project has the potential to be a substantial contribution to the field of process philosophy. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, I engage established ethical theories with the hope of transforming their basic presuppositions and indicating the need to move toward a process model. Thus, this project is at once critical and constructive

Since its founding in 1950, the Metaphysical Society of America has remained a pluralistic community dedicated to rigorous philosophical inquiry into the most basic metaphysical questions. At each year’s conference, the presidential address offers original insights into metaphysical questions. Both the insights and the questions are as perennial as they are relevant to contemporary philosophers. This volume collects eighteen of the finest representatives from those presidential addresses, including contributions from George Allan, Richard Bernstein, Norris Clarke, Vincent Colapietro, Frederick Ferré, Jorge J. E. Gracia, Joseph Grange, Marjorie Grene, George Klubertanz, Ivor Leclerc, Ralph McInerny, Ernan McMullin, Joseph Owens, John Herman Randall, Jr., Nicholas Rescher, Stanley Rosen, John E. Smith, and Robert Sokolowski. Also included are Paul Weiss’s inaugural address to the Society, an introduction chronicling the history of the Society, and an original Foreword by William Desmond and Epilogue by Robert Neville

The kernel of this chapter has been lodged in my mind since I was a graduate student at Fordham. As I studied the work of Charles Sanders Peirce and Alfred North Whitehead I was continually struck by the numerous points of conver-gence between their respective projects. Unlike other pragmatists, both of these mathematically trained philosophers were interested in constructing a specula-tive philosophy that rejected the reductive, mechanistic accounts of nature. Instead, both Peirce and Whitehead described an emergent, evolutionary cos-mos that was moved by love. Given these and other deep points of conver-gence, I was, and remain, mystified by Whitehead’s nearly complete lack of discussion of his fellow mathematician’s work.1 Here is how I proceed. First I present a brief exposition of the relevant as-pects of Peirce’s and Whitehead’s systems, focusing in particular on their ac-counts of the developmental role of love. Given this backdrop, I then proceed to consider what Peirce and Whitehead might learn from each other. More specifi-cally, considering the metaphysical nature and role of both local and cosmolog-ical forms of teleology in their respective systems, I suggest that certain short-comings in each philosopher’s conception of teleology are at least partially rem-edied by the others. Finally, wanting not merely to think about, but also to think with Peirce and Whitehead, I consider what their conceptions of creative love may have to offer in contemporary debates at the frontiers of evolutionary biology.

As the collective impact of human activity approaches Earth’s biophysical limits, the ethics of food become increasingly important. Hundreds of millions of people remain undernourished, yet only 60 percent of the global harvest is consumed by humans, while 35 percent is fed to livestock and 5 percent is used for biofuels and other industrial products. This essay considers the ethics of such use of edible nutrition for feedstock and biofuel. How humanity uses Earth’s land is a reflection of its values. The current land-use arrangements, which divert 40 percent of all food to feed animals or create fuels, suggest that dietary and transportation preferences of wealthier individuals are considered more important than feeding undernourished people, or the stability of the wider biotic community.

The opportunity to read and reflect on Presidential Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 1931–1940, the fourth volume of the American Philosophical Association Centennial Series, has been in equal measures rewarding, humbling, and taxing. Having recently completed my own edited volume of presidential addresses of another philosophical society, I have been thoroughly disabused of the notion that there is any particular form or content that defines a philosophical presidential address. Perhaps it should not be surprising that the topics of the addresses are as varied as the field that they represent. Nevertheless, I have endeavored to impose some order on the collection, grouping them into six rough divisions, primarily by their similarity of subject matter or methodology.

The aim of this essay is twofold. First, I examine the role of Alfred North Whitehead and process thinkers in bringing about and shaping the field of environmental ethics. As we will see, our job is not so much to develop the connections between Whitehead and environmental thought as to recover them. Second, given this genealogical work, I invite process scholars to reconsider their generally hostile reception of Aldo Leopold and his land ethic. I suggest that a version of the land ethic grounded in a process axiology could make a significant contribution to contemporary environmental thought.

With the increase of natural disasters, droughts, and superstorms, it’s clear that climate change isn’t coming—it’s here. The ecological crisis of climate change—and how we handle it—is the challenge of this century. Though policy changes or technological advances may help, they’re not enough. We are in need of new ways of thinking and acting; new ways of understanding our relationship to the world. Riders in the Storm assesses the challenges of climate change through an interdisciplinary study, examining the basic scientific, political, economic, and moral dimensions through a framework of philosophical ethics.