Stephan Hartmann

Intertheoretic relations are an important topic in the philosophy of science. However, since their classical discussion by Ernest Nagel, such relations have mostly been restricted to relations between pairs of theories in the natural sciences. In this paper, we present a model of a new type of intertheoretic relation, called 'Montague Reduction', which is assumed in Montague's framework for the analysis and interpretation of natural language syntax. To motivate the adoption of our new model, we show that this model extends the scope of application of the Nagelian (or related) models, and that it shares the epistemological advantages of the Nagelian model. The latter is achieved in a Bayesian framework.

Der Begriff ‘Modell’ leitet sich vom Lateinischen ‘modulus’ (das Maß) ab, im Italienischen existiert seit dem 16. Jh. ‘modello’ und R. Descartes verwendet im 17. Jh. ‘modèlle’. Während der Begriff in Architektur und Kunst schon seit der Renaissance gängig ist, wird er in den Naturwissenschaften erst im 19. Jh. verwendet.1 Dort greifen wissenschaftliche Modelle die für eine gegebene Problemstellung als wesentlich erachteten Charakteristika (Eigenschaften, Beziehungen, etc.) eines Untersuchungsgegenstandes heraus und machen diesen so einem Verständnis bzw. einer weiterführenden Untersuchung zugänglich. Es ist üblich, zwischen Skalenmodellen, Analogmodellen und theoretischen Modellen zu unterscheiden.

Here P is the density operator of the system under consideration, and σ ± and σ 3 are the usual Pauli matrices, acting on atom i whose states are |1 > or |0 >, representing, respectively, the atom being in an excited state or in the ground state. B and C are appropriate decay constants and s has been called the pumping parameter [1]. It varies from s = 0 for pure damping to s = 1 for full laser action. To solve the corresponding quantum master equations, three approaches have been taken: First, one focuses on the case of one atom. Second, one truncates eq. (1) and derives semi-classical models. Third, one employs numerical simulation methods such as the quantum trajectory method. While the latter method is very popular, it should be noted that the numerical complexity of the problem increases exponentially with the number of atoms, and so numerical methods soon become unfeasible.

In a famous experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (Psychol Rev 90:293–315, 1983), featuring Linda the bank teller, the participants assign a higher probability to a conjunction of propositions than to one of the conjuncts, thereby seemingly committing a probabilistic fallacy. In this paper, we discuss a slightly different example featuring someone named Walter, who also happens to work at a bank, and argue that, in this example, it is rational to assign a higher probability to the conjunction of suitably chosen propositions than to one of the conjuncts. By pointing out the similarities between Tversky and Kahneman’s experiment and our example, we argue that the participants in the experiment may assign probabilities to the propositions in question in such a way that it is also rational for them to give the conjunction a higher probability than one of the conjuncts

A federal assembly consists of a number of representatives for each of the nations (states, Länder, cantons,...) that make up the federation. How many representatives should each nation receive? What makes this issue worth quibbling about is that the model of representation that is instituted will have an impact on the welfare distribution over the nations in the federation that will ensue over due course. We will investigate what models of representation yield welfare distributions that score higher on a utilitarian measure. First, we construct a continuum of models of representation ranging from equal to proportional representation. In between these extremes are models of degressive proportionality. We run a Monte-Carlo simulation in which a large number of motions are voted up or down within different contexts of evaluation and investigate how well the resulting welfare distributions score on the utilitarian measure. Subsequently, we will provide matching analytical results for a slightly idealized case. We conclude with a discussion of the significance of our results and of the role of simulations and analytical results and point to further work.

There is a long philosophical tradition of addressing questions in philosophy of science and epistemology by means of the tools of Bayesian probability theory (see Earman (1992) and Howson and Urbach (1993)). In the late '70s, an axiomatic approach to conditional independence was developed within a Bayesian framework. This approach in conjunction with developments in graph theory are the two pillars of the theory of Bayesian Networks, which is a theory of probabilistic reasoning in artificial intelligence. The theory has been very successful over the last two decades and has found a wide array of applications ranging from medical diagnosis to safety systems for hazardous industries.

The variety of evidence thesis in confirmation theory states that more varied supporting evidence confirms a hypothesis to a greater degree than less varied evidence. Under a very plausible interpretation of this thesis, positive test results from multiple independent instruments confirm a hypothesis to a greater degree than positive test results from a single instrument. We invoke Bayesian Networks to model confirmation on grounds of evidence that is obtained from less than fully reliable instruments and show that the variety of evidence thesis is not sacrosanct when testing is conducted with less than fully reliable instruments: under certain conditions, a hypothesis receives more confirmation from evidence that is obtained from one rather than from more independent instruments. In the appendix, we prove certain convergence results for large numbers of positive test results from single versus multiple less than fully reliable instruments.

The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to such a problem as the \textit{discursive dilemma}. In this paper we assume that the decision which the group is trying to reach is factually right or wrong. Hence, we address the question of how good the various approaches are at selecting the right conclusion. We focus on two approaches: distance-based procedures and a Bayesian analysis. They correspond to group-internal and group-external decision-making, respectively. We compare those methods in a probabilistic model, demonstrate the robustness of our results over various generalizations and discuss their applicability in different situations. The findings vindicate (i) that in judgment aggregation problems, reasons should carry higher weight than conclusions and (ii) that considering members of an advisory board to be highly competent is a better strategy than to underestimate their advice.".

The formalism of quantum mechanics provides us with the probabilities for certain events to occur—this much is uncontroversial. But how are we to understand these probabilities? The essays in this special issue approach this question from different angles. The first three contributions take as their point of departure the philosophy of probability and discuss what the two main outlooks—objective and subjective interpretations of probability—have to offer in the context of quantum mechanics. The following five papers explore the question of how probabilities in particular interpretations of quantum mechanics—modal interpretations, relative state interpretations, Bohmian mechanics, and GRW theory—can be interpreted. The last three essays address specific issues: non-standard probability and algebraic quantum field theory, quantum propensities, and the relation between decoherence and the interpretation of probability.

Models are a principle instrument of modern science. They are built, applied, tested, compared, revised and interpreted in an expansive scientific literature. Throughout this paper, I will argue that models are also a valuable tool for the philosopher of science. In particular, I will discuss how the methodology of Bayesian Networks can elucidate two central problems in the philosophy of science. The first thesis I will explore is the variety-of-evidence thesis, which argues that the more varied the supporting evidence, the greater the degree of confirmation for a given hypothesis. However, when investigated using Bayesian methodology, this thesis turns out not to be sacrosanct. In fact, under certain conditions, a hypothesis receives more confirmation from evidence that is obtained from one rather than more instruments, and from evidence that confirms one rather than more testable consequences of the hypothesis. The second challenge that I will investigate is scientific theory change. This application highlights a different virtue of modeling methodology. In particular, I will argue that Bayesian modeling illustrates how two seemingly unrelated aspects of theory change, namely the (Kuhnian) stability of (normal) science and the ability of anomalies to over turn that stability and lead to theory change, are in fact united by a single underlying principle, in this case, coherence. In the end, I will argue that these two examples bring out some metatheoretical reflections regarding the following questions: What are the differences between modeling in science and modeling in philosophy? What is the scope of the modeling method in philosophy? And what does this imply for our understanding of Bayesianism?

In his entry on "Quantum Logic and Probability Theory" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Alexander Wilce (2012) writes that "it is uncontroversial (though remarkable) the formal apparatus quantum mechanics reduces neatly to a generalization of classical probability in which the role played by a Boolean algebra of events in the latter is taken over the 'quantum logic' of projection operators on a Hilbert space." For a long time, Patrick Suppes has opposed this view (see, for example, the paper collected in Suppes and Zanotti (1996). Instead of changing the logic and moving from a Boolean algebra to a non-Boolean algebra, one can also 'save the phenomena' by weakening the axioms of probability theory and work instead with upper and lower probabilities. However, it is fair to say that despite Suppes' efforts upper and lower probabilities are not particularly popular in physics as well as in the foundations of physics, at least so far. Instead, quantum logic is booming again, especially since quantum information and computation became hot topics. Interestingly, however, imprecise probabilities are becoming more and more popular in formal epistemology as recent work by authors such as James Joye (2010) and Roger White (2010) demonstrates.

This book successfully achieves to serve two different purposes. On the one hand, it is a readable physics-based introduction into the philosophy of science, written in an informal and accessible style. The author, himself a professor of physics at the University of Notre Dame and active in the philosophy of science for almost twenty years, carefully develops his metatheoretical arguments on a solid basis provided by an extensive survey along the lines of the historical development of physics. On the other hand, this book supplies one long argument for Cushing´s own attitude in the philosophy of science. While former studies of the author, from which this book draws in part, focused each on one special episode in the history of science, this book gathers case material from many different parts of physics and epochs. The main goal of this book is ”to impress upon the reader the essential and ineliminable role that philosophical considerations have played in the actual practice of science” (p. xv). The book is beautifully edited and produced; it contains a wealth of illustrative figures, well-chosen short quotations from original sources and contemporary commentators (some longer quotations are relegated in an appendix at the end of a chapter) and does not dispense with insightful mathematical arguments in the main text (some advanced deductions are, however, relegated in the appendices). It contains nine parts, whereas only the first and the last one are exclusively devoted to philosophical issues. The seven remaining parts, each subdivided into three chapters, centre around one major episode (a theory, a world view, etc.) in the history of physics. The author presents this material in a clear and philosophically unbiased way so that also readers who do not share Cushing’s subsequent philosophical conclusions will find this inspiring book extremely useful. Part 1 (”The scientific enterprise”) discusses some traditional (”objectivist”) views concerning the status of scientific knowledge, ”the” scientific method, and the relation....

Effective field theories have been a very popular tool in quantum physics for almost two decades. And there are good reasons for this. I will argue that effective field theories share many of the advantages of both fundamental theories and phenomenological models, while avoiding their respective shortcomings. They are, for example, flexible enough to cover a wide range of phenomena, and concrete enough to provide a detailed story of the specific mechanisms at work at a given energy scale. So will all of physics eventually converge on effective field theories? This paper argues that good scientific research can be characterised by a fruitful interaction between fundamental theories, phenomenological models and effective field theories. All of them have their appropriate functions in the research process, and all of them are indispensable. They complement each other and hang together in a coherent way which I shall characterise in some detail. To illustrate all this I will present a case study from nuclear and particle physics. The resulting view about scientific theorising is inherently pluralistic, and has implications for the debates about reductionism and scientific explanation.

Vacuum (leer, frei) bezeichnete bis zum 19. Jahrhundert allein den körperlosen Raum. Unter dem Einfluss physikalischer (Feld-) Theorien meint der Terminus inzwischen diejenige residuale physische Entiät, die einen vorgegebenen Raum ausfüllt bzw. im Prinzip ausfüllen würde, nachdem alles, was mit physikalischen Mitteln entfernt werden kann, aus dem Raum entfernt wurde. Theorien über das V. sind daher eng mit Theorien über die Struktur des Raumes, die Bewegung, die physikalischen Gegenstände und deren Wechselwirkungen verbunden. In der Quantentheorie bezeichnet V. den Zustand niedrigster Energie (Grundzustand) eines Systems.

In den vergangenen Jahren hat die Europäische Union (EU) wiederholt versucht, ihre Institutionen zu reformieren. Als der Entwurf für eine Europäische Verfassung und später der Vertrag von Lissabon ausgehandelt wurden, betraf einer der meistdiskutiertesten Streitpunkte die Frage, nach welcher Entscheidungsregel der EU-Ministerrat abstimmen sollte. Diese Frage ist eine genuin normative Frage. Deshalb sollten auch politische Philosophen und Ethiker etwas zu dieser Frage beitragen können. Im folgenden wollen wir uns dieser Herausforderung stellen und alternative Entscheidungsregeln für den EU-Ministerrat bewerten. Dabei erweisen sich die Methoden der probablistische Modellierung und der Simulation sozialer Prozesse als unerlässlich.1 Damit wird deutlich, wie Simulationen auch innerhalb der angewandten politischen Philosophie als Methode eingesetzt werden können.

Philosophy, perhaps more than any other academic discipline, likes to reflect upon itself. Thus, it is no surprise that philosophers regularly ask questions such as: What is the scope of philosophy, what are its important questions, and what are the proper methods to address them? Asking these questions also means to take stock and to enquire where the discipline is going. This is an especially worthwhile activity in contemporary philosophy of science as this field has been changing rapidly since its institutional consolidation in the 1950s. For present purposes we may very roughly, but still usefully, describe this change as having three phases. In the first phase, which lasted until the mid 1960s, philosophy of science was dominated by Logical Empiricism and formal approaches to philosophically analyzing science. The second phase began in the late 1960s and lasted until the second half of the 1980s. It brought the naturalistic turn, a critique of the Logical Empiricist’s picture of science as too far away from the actual practice of science, a focus on the history and the social structure of science, a shift from theories as the primary target of philosophical analysis to models and experimental practices, and many detailed case studies. While the Logical Empiricists gave us a grand general picture of science, the naturalists’ working assumption has been that aiming at such a picture underappreciates the complexity and diversity of real science. Moreover, the naturalists moved normative questions into the background. In the third phase, which began in the late 1980s, the dichotomy between normative and descriptive approaches in philosophy of science still persists, but the picture has become even more complex. So we can only list a number of novel trends: Metaphysical questions, which were famously dismissed by the Logical Empiricists, are gaining a considerable interest. Philosophies of the special sciences are booming, and more and more subdisciplines are emerging. Formal epistemologists are applying a variety of mathematical methods to address normative questions in general philosophy of science. Social aspects of science are systematically studied and mathematically modeled. Another interesting development is the rise of experimental approaches to problems from philosophy of science (e.g., causation) and its combination with formal approaches. This (incomplete) list shows that contemporary philosophers of science address a large variety of topics. They also use many different methods, quite similar to scientists who often use a combination of methods, or import a method from another field to solve their problems. This is, to our mind, a fruitful way of conducting “scientific philosophy”: a proper combination of conceptual analysis, historical or contemporary case studies, formal modeling, and experimental work that will lead to many new and exciting insights.

If we receive information from multiple independent and partially reliable information sources, then whether we are justified to believe these information items is affected by how reliable the sources are, by how well the information coheres with our background beliefs and by how internally coherent the information is. We consider the following question. Is coherence a separable determinant of our degree of belief, i.e. is it the case that the more coherent the new information is, the more justified we are in believing the new information, ceteris paribus? We show that if we consider sets of information items of any size (Holism), and if we assume that there exists a coherence Ordering over such sets and that coherence is a function of the probability distribution over the propositions in such sets (Probabilism), then Separability fails to hold.

Coherence is a burgeoning topic of research. Diverse methodologies have been applied to shed light on the topic and its relevance to fundamental questions throughout philosophy. The collection brings together the full scope of this research in a single volume. The first group of essays attack the core topic of the book: coherence. Authors in this section take up the challenging and controversial task of measuring the coherence of an information set, while others criticize this endeavor. The second group of papers in the collection relate this foundational research to a wide array of epistemological and metaphysical challenges. For example, some papers consider the relationship between truth and coherence. Is coherence truth conducive, and if yes, under which conditions? A related issue taken up in this volume is the connection between coherence and testimony. Are we justified in believing coherent reports by independent, though only partially reliable witnesses more than a single report? If yes, under which conditions does this claim hold true? By the end of the book, the reader should have a comprehensive understanding of topic of coherence, the controversy surrounding it, and its implications across the discipline of philosophy.

Das Thema dieses Bandes ist die Frage, ob die Wissenschaftstheorie eine normative Disziplin ist. Zunächst überrascht die Frage, denn für viele Wissenschaftstheoretiker ist die Antwort ein klares „Ja“; sie halten es für einen Allgemeinplatz, dass die Wissenschaftstheorie ein normatives Unternehmen ist. Bei genauerem Hinsehen stellt sich jedoch heraus, dass die Frage unterschiedliche Interpretationen zulässt, die einzeln diskutiert werden müssen. Dies geschieht im ersten Abschnitt. Im zweiten Abschnitt suchen wir nach möglichen Erklärungen dafür, warum die Wissenschaftstheorie bisher bei dem Projekt, eine allseits akzeptable Methodologie wissenschaftlichen Schließens zu formulieren und zu begründen, so wenig Erfolg hatte. Eine mögliche Erklärung für den ausbleibenden Erfolg ist der Partikularismus, wonach Methoden keine allgemeine, sondern nur eine lokale, bereichsabhängige Gültigkeit haben. Im dritten Abschnitt wollen wir an Hand des Bayesianismus zeigen, dass die Methodologie doch nicht so schlecht da steht, wie es zunächst den Anschein hat. Der Bayesianismus ist für viele Wissenschaftstheoretiker der aussichtsreichste Kandidat für eine allgemeine Theorie induktiven Räsonierens. Wir besprechen seine Vorzüge, stellen aber auch dar, welche Konzessionen er an den Partikularismus machen muss.