Bonjour (1985: 101 and 1999: 124) and other coherence theorists of justification before him (e.g. Ewing, 1934: 246) have complained that we do not
have a satisfactory analysis of the notion of coherence. The problem with
existing accounts of coherence is that they try to bring precision to our intuitive notion of coherence independently of the particular role that it is
meant to play within the coherence theory of justification (e.g Lewis, 1946:
338). This is a mistake: it does not make any …
Read moreBonjour (1985: 101 and 1999: 124) and other coherence theorists of justification before him (e.g. Ewing, 1934: 246) have complained that we do not
have a satisfactory analysis of the notion of coherence. The problem with
existing accounts of coherence is that they try to bring precision to our intuitive notion of coherence independently of the particular role that it is
meant to play within the coherence theory of justification (e.g Lewis, 1946:
338). This is a mistake: it does not make any sense to ask what precisely
makes for a more coherent information set independently of the particular
role that coherence is supposed to play within the context in question. What
is this context and what is this role? The coherence theory of justification
rides on a particular common sense intuition: when we gather information
from less than fully reliable sources, then the more coherent the story that
materializes is, the more confident we may be, ceteris paribus. Within the
context of information gathering from certain types of sources, coherence is
a property of stories which plays a confidence boosting role. But what features should the information sources have, so that the coherence of the information set is indeed a determinant of our degree of confidence in question? And what goes into the ceteris paribus clause? In other words, what
other factors affect our confidence in the information set in question?