Gordon Hull

Hobbes rejects the Aristotelian political animal, a move that enables a malleable psychology in which we are driven by our passions and responses to external objects. Our psychology is accordingly overdetermined by our socio-cultural environment, and managing that environment becomes a central task of the state. A particular problem is what I call the “ontological illusion,” the constitutive human tendency to ontologize products of the imagination. I argue that Hobbes’s strategies for managing the ontological illusion govern part four of Leviathan. Those chapters are intended to convince elites that crediting ontological illusions in policy is disastrous, as his discussion of demonology and its thinly veiled references to witchcraft persecutions readily illustrates.

The question of nationalism as spoken about in contem porary circles is structurally the same as Marx's 'Jewish Question'. Through a reading of Marx's early writings, particularly the 'Jewish Question' essay, guided by Derrida's Specters of Marx and Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities, it is possible to begin to rethink the nationalist question. In this light, nationalism emerges as the byproduct of the reduction of heterogeneous 'people' into a homo geneous 'state'; such 'excessive' voices occupy an ontological space outside of the categories within which the state operates, and thus return, in Derrida's terms, to 'haunt' it. When the nationalist ques tion is viewed in this way, contemporary solutions that depend on reproducing this reduction are called into question. Key Words: B. Anderson • Derrida • G. Gottlieb • R. Kaplan • Marx • nationalism.

This paper discusses some of the current literature around the precautionary principle in environmental philosophy and law with reference to the possibility of transgenic food in Uganda (GMO bananas specifically). My suggestion is that the distinction between formal and substantive versions of a principle, familiar from legal theory, can be useful in imposing some conceptual clarity on aspects of debates concerning the precautionary principle. In particular, most of the negative critical response to the principle has been to formal versions of it, and follows a pattern not unfamiliar from discussions of how to get from rules to outcomes. For its part, the less-discussed substantive account admits of at least two very different emphases. The first, which I call “Heideggerian,” exhibits a deep distrust of technology. The second, “autonomist,” is less concerned with the fact of technology than with the question of who controls it. As with any exercise of analytic taxonomy, this one will fail to adequately treat many of the objects it studies. However, I hope to illuminate what I take to be serious philosophical differences within the precautionary camp, and to highlight some of the questions they suggest in terms of the differences in political philosophy that might underlie and support them.

Defenders of strong Intellectual Property rights or of a nonutilitarian basis for those rights often turn to Locke for support.1 Perhaps because of a general belief that Locke is an advocate of all things proprietary, this move seldom receives careful scrutiny. That is unfortunate for two reasons. First, as I will argue, Locke does not issue a blank check in support of all property regimes, and the application of his reasoning to intellectual property would actually tend to favor a substantially limited rights regime. Second, the attempt to understand intellectual property as an instance of Lockean property, though admittedly anachronistic, offers an opportunity to further our understanding of Locke's own thought. My major claim will be twofold: on the one hand, intellectual property would be an almost paradigmatic case of Lockean property; on the other hand, Locke's provisos—specifically the widely neglected spoilage proviso—would sharply limit the scope of any entitlements. My secondary claim will accordingly be that the spoilage proviso's neglect is undeserved, and that it deserves a more central place in our understanding of Locke. I will not here address whether Locke provides the right way to think about property, whether IP is a good idea, or whether property rights ought to include a right to destroy; my concern is to elucidate Locke's arguments and then to block this application of them