Gordon Hull

This dissertation is a study of the nature and development of "modern" political thought, typical features of which include the "state of nature" and "social contract." Specifically, I argue that modern thought is constructive, which is to say that thinking is seen as, at least to some extent, generative of its objects. I focus primarily on Hobbes and Marx as liminal thinkers in the development of modern political thought. I begin with a discussion of the nature of construction in modern thought generally, and in Hobbes specifically. I then ground the claim that Hobbes's texts are originary for modern political thought in two ways. First, I show how many of the methodological principles explicitly adopted by Hobbes are implicitly assumed by Locke. Then, I differentiate Hobbesian metaphysical and epistemological assumptions from two alternate sets of assumptions which Hobbes viewed himself as opposing: Machiavellian virtu; and Christian, medieval neo-Platonism. I then read Hobbes's texts in their relation to Bacon's usage of construction and Hobbes's own development of the social contract. I then transition, via Hegel, to a study of Marx. After providing an account of Marx's early reaction to Hegel, I attempt to show that many of the objections Marx makes to Hegelianism are also made against modern political thought in general. I thus read sections of Marx's early works to illustrate his engagement with early modern thought, and to show how he characterizes this thought as a "despotism" because of its reliance on a "manufactured originary state." I then provide readings of Marx's dissertation critique of Democritus to develop more carefully what Marx means by an atomic or originary state; and of sections of the Holy Family to explore Marx's understanding of "history," and to show how that understanding differs from Hegel's. I conclude with an extended reading of sections of Marx's 1844 Manuscripts, in order to develop more fully his critique of modern political thought, and to sketch his early understanding of what an alternative way of thinking politics might incorporate

The emergence of topics such as reprogenetics and genetic testing for hereditary diseases attests to the continued salience of Foucault's analyses of biopolitics. His various discussions pose at least two problems for contemporary appropriation of the work. First, it is unclear what the "life" on which biopolitics operates actually refers to.1 Second, it is unclear how biopolitics relates to the economy, either in the classical form of the family/household (oikos) or in the current form of neoliberalism.2 In what follows, I argue, first, that modern biopolitics is marked less by the entry of biological life into the polis than by a new consideration of the form of life proper to humans. This is because Foucault's ..

In this paper I critically examine recent developments in intellectual property law. In particular, from a point of view informed primarily by Marx and Foucault, I study (a) the rhetoric surrounding the Metallica lawsuit against Napster; (b) a pair of conflicting trademark cases surrounding the ownership of a word on the Internet; and (c) the software industry's move to win approval for “shrink-wrap” or “click here” licenses. I conclude that these developments indicate a new form of disciplinary power, where people are individuated ex ante as consumers. Despite the celebrations of market cyberlibertarians, this move actually masks an increase in overt state power as the state apparatus is invoked to force individuals to agree to behave as disciplined consumers and accede to the system in the first place.

In U.S. v. American Library Association (2003), the Supreme Court upheld the Child Internet Protection Act (CIPA), which mandated that libraries receiving federal funding for public Internet access install content-filtering programs on computers which provide that access. These programs analyze incoming content, and block the receipt of objectionable material, in particular pornography. Thus, patrons at public libraries are protected from unintentionally (or intentionally) accessing objectionable material, and, in the case of minors, from accessing potentially damaging material. At least, that is the official story. In this paper, I develop three points. (1) I argue that CIPA and ALA are better read as examples of the enforcement of a regime of normative sexuality. The question of minors accessing pornography is only relevant to the official story insofar as it provides a rhetorically persuasive example of deviance from that normative regime. CIPAs full target includes information about topics such as homosexuality and contraception. (2) Rather than (or in addition to) punishing deviances directly, CIPA attempts to constitute a “public” in which such deviancy can never occur in the first place. Hence, the designation of a “public” space serves to domesticate alternative sexualities and to sanitize that space of sexual difference. (3) This interaction at the border of the public and private spheres offers an opportunity to reflect on and underscore the ways that subject formation and subjectivity are mediated through technological artifacts like the Internet.