Jiri Raclavsky

In his conception of worlds 1-3 Popper did not make clear how the world 3 can influence on world 2 or 1 . On example of music we can see that any human invention of “new” tone combination cannot affect already given tone combinatorics which is in world 3 . Similarily “new” scientific theory cannot make any change in world 3 where all theories are – according to Popper – settled. Opposite direction of influence seems neither possible: human mind can only feel that it is somehow touched by abstract object during its creative activity; to all appearance abstract objects cannot causaly affect on – presumably material – medium of human thinking

In the first part of continuation of our study we classify and analyze passive forms which belong to four kinds of findings. Further we investigate cases of unsuccessful finding; they do not trivially correspond to kinds of succesful finding. We can distinguish: 1) not-finding for the reason of not-seeking, 2) not-finding for the reason of not finished seeking, 3) not-finding for the reason of stopped seeking whereas a) an instance of the respective seeked intension is not existing, b) an agent was not enough skilful and the question of existence of an instance of the respective seeked intension remains open.

A bare individual was conceived by Tichý as an individual such as if the property the individual instantiates is non-trivial , it is possible for the individual to lack it ; and for any trivial property that it cannot lack this kind of property. The exact readings of Tichý’s original formulations of are subjected to a detailed analysis to reveal that any of them is refutable by means of Cmorejian objection that there exist contingent properties which are partly essential . To avoid such objection, the present paper attempts to rebuild Tichý’s definitions into viable ones

It is sometimes objected that Tichý’s logic is not a logic because it underestimates deduction, providing only logical analyses of expressions. I argue that this opinion is wrong. First of all, to detect valid arguments, which are formulated in a language, there needs to be logical analysis to ascertain which semantical entities are involved. Entailment is defined as an extralinguistic affair relating those constructions. The validity of an argument, composed of propositional constructions, stems from the properties of the constructions. Such properties are displayed by the derivation rules of Tichý’s system of deduction

The paper describes the solution to semantic paradoxes pioneered by Pavel Tichý and further developed by the present author. Its main feature is an examination (and then refutation) of the hidden premise of paradoxes that the paradox-producing expression really means what it seems to mean. Semantic concepts are explicated as relative to language, thus also language is explicated. The so-called ‘explicit approach’ easily treats paradoxes in which language is explicitly referred to. The residual paradoxes are solved by the ‘implicit approach’ which employs ideas made explicit by the former one.