•  86
    Introduction
    Faith and Philosophy 22 (5): 515-520. 2005.
  •  80
    You can't always get what you want: Evolution and true beliefs
    with Jeffrey P. Schloss
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6): 533-534. 2009.
    McKay & Dennett (M&D) convincingly argue against many proposals for adaptively functioning misbelief, but the conclusion that true beliefs are generally adaptive does not follow. Adaptive misbeliefs may be few in kind but many in number; maladaptive misbeliefs may routinely elude selective pruning; reproductively neutral misbeliefs may abound; and adaptively grounded beliefs may reliably covary with but not truthfully represent reality
  •  177
    Pre-Leibnizian Moral Necessity
    The Leibniz Review 14 1-28. 2004.
    The mature Leibniz frequently uses the phrase “moral necessity” in the context of discussing free choice. In this essay I provide a seventeenth century geneology of the phrase. I show that the doctrine of moral necessity was developed by scholastic philosophers who sought to retain a robust notion of freedom while purging bruteness from their systems. Two sorts of bruteness were special targets. The first is metaphysical bruteness, according to which contingent events or states of affairs occur …Read more
  •  105
    Leibniz - by Nicholas Jolley
    Philosophical Books 49 (1): 50-52. 2008.
  •  299
    Deus absconditus
    In Daniel Howard-Snyder & Paul Moser (eds.), Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 63. 2001.
  •  273
    Neo-Cartesianism and the Problem of Animal Suffering
    Faith and Philosophy 23 (2): 169-190. 2006.
    The existence and extent of animal suffering provides grounds for a serious evidential challenge to theism. In the wake of the Darwinian revolution, this strain of natural atheology has taken on substantially greater significance. In this essay we argue that there are at least four neo-Cartesian views on the nature of animal minds which would serve to deflect this evidential challenge.
  •  145
    Intellect, Will, and Freedom in Leibniz
    The Leibniz Review 4 11-12. 1994.
    In this paper I claim that there are three primary dimensions to the issue of freedom in Leibniz’s work. The first, and most widely discussed, is the logical dimension. When discussing this dimension, Leibniz is concerned primarily about the relationship between freedom and modality: what does it mean for choice to be contingent? The second dimension is the theological one. When discussing this dimension, Leibniz is interested in considering such issues as the relationships between divine knowle…Read more
  •  226
    Ask and It Will Be Given to You
    with Kurt Meyers
    Religious Studies 30 (3). 1994.
    Consider the following situation. It is the first day of school, and the new third-grade students file into the classroom to be shown to their seats for the coming year. As they enter, the third-grade teacher notices one small boy who is particularly unkempt. He looks to be in desperate need of bathing, and his clothes are dirty, torn and tight-fitting. During recess, the teacher pulls aside the boy's previous teacher and asks about his wretched condition. The other teacher informs her that he a…Read more
  •  140
    Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (edited book)
    with Eleanore Stump
    Wiley-Blackwell. 1999.
    This book contains a collection of the essential readings treating both classic and contemporary issues in philosophy of religion.
  •  280
    Spontaneity and Freedom in Leibniz
    In Donald Rutherford & J. A. Cover (eds.), Leibniz: nature and freedom, Oxford University Press. pp. 194--216. 2005.
  •  308
    Leibniz on divine foreknowledge of future contingents and human freedom
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1): 75-108. 1995.
    The Prevolitional Condition: The subjunctive conditionals of human freedom known by God must have their truth value prior to any free decree of God, i.e., be known prevolitionally.
  •  136
    Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz
    The Leibniz Review 4 2-5. 1994.
    While a significant amount of work has been done in recent years on the notion of substance in the seventeenth century, much of this work is narrow in focus and addresses itself only to specialists in the field. With this text, Roger Woolhouse has remedied this deficiency. The book, aimed at an audience at the advanced undergraduate level, provides a clear, comprehensive, and appropriately compact study of the doctrine of substance as it is developed by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz.