University of California, Irvine
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1995
CV
Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Deception
  •  338
    Epistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology
    Episteme 2 (3): 177-188. 2006.
    In order to guide the decisions of real people who want to bring about good epistemic outcomes for themselves and others, we need to understand our epistemic values. In Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman has proposed an epistemic value theory that allows us to say whether one outcome is epistemically better than another. However, it has been suggested that Goldman's theory is not really an epistemic value theory at all because whether one outcome is epistemically better than another part…Read more
  •  242
    There are many philosophical questions surrounding the notion of lying. Is it ever morally acceptable to lie? Can we acquire knowledge from people who might be lying to us? More fundamental, however, is the question of what, exactly, constitutes the concept of lying. According to one traditional definition, lying requires intending to deceive (Augustine. (1952). Lying (M. Muldowney, Trans.). In R. Deferrari (Ed.), Treatises on various subjects (pp. 53?120). New York, NY: Catholic University of A…Read more
  •  93
    Taking the Two Envelope Paradox to the Limit
    Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (2): 95-111. 2009.
  •  163
    Privacy and lack of knowledge
    Episteme 10 (2): 153-166. 2013.
    Two sorts of connections between privacy and knowledge (or lack thereof) have been suggested in the philosophical literature. First, Alvin Goldman has suggested that protecting privacy typically leads to less knowledge being acquired. Second, several other philosophers (e.g. Parent, Matheson, Blaauw and Peels) have claimed that lack of knowledge is definitive of having privacy. In other words, someone not knowing something is necessary and sufficient for someone else having privacy about that th…Read more
  •  177
    Introduction: Social epistemology and information science
    Social Epistemology 16 (1). 2002.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  199
    Collective epistemic goals
    Social Epistemology 21 (3). 2007.
    We all pursue epistemic goals as individuals. But we also pursue collective epistemic goals. In the case of many groups to which we belong, we want each member of the group - and sometimes even the group itself - to have as many true beliefs as possible and as few false beliefs as possible. In this paper, I respond to the main objections to the very idea of such collective epistemic goals. Furthermore, I describe the various ways that our collective epistemic goals can come into conflict with ea…Read more
  •  73
    Several philosophers have used the framework of means/ends reasoning to explain the methodological choices made by scientists and mathematicians (see, e.g., Goldman 1999, Levi 1962, Maddy 1997). In particular, they have tried to identify the epistemic objectives of scientists and mathematicians that will explain these choices. In this paper, the framework of means/ends reasoning is used to study an important methodological choice made by mathematicians. Namely, mathematicians will only use deduc…Read more
  •  106
    Toward an Epistemology of Intellectual Property
    Journal of Information Ethics 16 (2): 34-51. 2007.
    An important issue for information ethics is how much control people should have over the dissemination of information that they have created. Since intellectual property policies have an impact on our welfare primarily because they have a huge impact on our ability to acquire knowledge, there is an important role for epistemology in resolving this issue. This paper discusses the various ways in which intellectual property policies can impact knowledge acquisition both positively and negatively.…Read more