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1148How reasons are sensitive to available evidenceIn Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, Oxford University Press. pp. 90-114. 2018.In this paper, I develop a theory of how claims about an agent’s normative reasons are sensitive to the epistemic circumstances of this agent, which preserves the plausible ideas that reasons are facts and that reasons can be discovered in deliberation and disclosed in advice. I argue that a plausible theory of this kind must take into account the difference between synchronic and diachronic reasons, i.e. reasons for acting immediately and reasons for acting at some later point in time. I provid…Read more
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270The normativity of rationalityDissertation, Humboldt University of Berlin. 2013.Sometimes our intentions and beliefs exhibit a structure that proves us to be irrational. This dissertation is concerned with the question of whether we ought (or have at least good reason) to avoid such irrationality. The thesis defends the normativity of rationality by presenting a new solution to the problems that arise from the common assumption that we ought to be rational. The argument touches upon many other topics in the theory of normativity, such as the form and the content of rational…Read more
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275"Ought" and the Perspective of the AgentJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3): 1-24. 2011.Objectivists and perspectivists disagree about the question of whether what an agent ought to do depends on the totality of facts or on the agent’s limited epistemic perspective. While objectivism fails to account for normative guidance, perspectivism faces the challenge of explaining phenomena (occurring most notably in advice, but also in first-personal deliberation) in which the use of “ought” is geared to evidence that is better than the evidence currently available to the agent. This paper …Read more
Bielefeld, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |