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633Strict conditionals: A negative resultPhilosophical Quarterly 56 (225). 2006.Jonathan Lowe has argued that a particular variation on C.I. Lewis' notion of strict implication avoids the paradoxes of strict implication. We show that Lowe's notion of implication does not achieve this aim, and offer a general argument to demonstrate that no other variation on Lewis' notion of constantly strict implication describes the logical behaviour of natural-language conditionals in a satisfactory way.
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832Carnap’s Theory of Descriptions and its ProblemsStudia Logica 94 (3): 355-380. 2010.Carnap's theory of descriptions was restricted in two ways. First, the descriptive conditions had to be non-modal. Second, only primitive predicates or the identity predicate could be used to predicate something of the descriptum . The motivating reasons for these two restrictions that can be found in the literature will be critically discussed. Both restrictions can be relaxed, but Carnap's theory can still be blamed for not dealing adequately with improper descriptions.
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24Nicholas Rescher, Cognitive Harmony. The Role of Systemic Harmony in the Constitution of Knowledge. Pittsburgh (PA), University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005 (review)Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (2): 373-374. 2007.
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312The epistemic significance of numeralsSynthese 198 (Suppl 5): 1019-1045. 2014.The central topic of this article is (the possibility of) de re knowledge about natural numbers and its relation with names for numbers. It is held by several prominent philosophers that (Peano) numerals are eligible for existential quantification in epistemic contexts (‘canonical’), whereas other names for natural numbers are not. In other words, (Peano) numerals are intimately linked with de re knowledge about natural numbers, whereas the other names for natural numbers are not. In this articl…Read more
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613Descriptions and unknowabilityAnalysis 70 (1): 50-52. 2010.In a recent paper Horsten embarked on a journey along the limits of the domain of the unknowable. Rather than knowability simpliciter, he considered a priori knowability, and by the latter he meant absolute provability, i.e. provability that is not relativized to a formal system. He presented an argument for the conclusion that it is not absolutely provable that there is a natural number of which it is true but absolutely unprovable that it has a certain property. The argument depends on a descr…Read more
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20Nicholas Rescher, Epistemic Logic. A Survey of the Logic of Knowledge. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005 (review)Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (3): 644-646. 2006.
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673Being in a Position to Know and ClosureThought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1): 63-67. 2016.The focus of this article is the question whether the notion of being in a position to know is closed under modus ponens. The question is answered negatively.
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2332Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing? A Logical InvestigationErkenntnis 82 (3): 531-559. 2017.From Leibniz to Krauss philosophers and scientists have raised the question as to why there is something rather than nothing. Why-questions request a type of explanation and this is often thought to include a deductive component. With classical logic in the background only trivial answers are forthcoming. With free logics in the background, be they of the negative, positive or neutral variety, only question-begging answers are to be expected. The same conclusion is reached for the modal version …Read more
Leuven, Belgium
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Mathematics |
Formal Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
General Philosophy of Science |