Vincent Blok

Synthetic biology is a highly disruptive technology that particularly affects the agriculture and food production domains. Rather than using farmed animals or crops, synthetic biology allows for ‘cellular agriculture’—the production of agricultural commodities using cell cultures and host micro-organisms. In light of the possibility that cellular agriculture can enable sustainable food production, and considering that most people strongly prefer food that they perceive as natural, this paper is guided by the following research question: how are the values of sustainability and naturalness affected by the disruption of cellular agriculture? We analyze how different stakeholders discuss these values. After demonstrating that the intra-value conflicts evident in sustainability and naturalness are based on different interpretations of these values, we create conceptual clarity in these different interpretations and show how these intra-value conflicts relate to the ongoing divide between ecomodernism and ecology with respect to the future of agriculture and food.

Smart Farming Technologies raise ethical issues associated with the increased corporatization and industrialization of the agricultural sector. We explore the concept of biomimicry to conceptualize smart farming technologies as ecological innovations which are embedded in and in accordance with the natural environment. Such a biomimetic approach of smart farming technologies takes advantage of its potential to mitigate climate change, while at the same time avoiding the ethical issues related to the industrialization of the agricultural sector. We explore six principles of a natural concept of biomimicry and apply these principles in the context of smart farming technologies.

Food and beverage firms are frequently criticised for their impact on the spread of non-communicable diseases like obesity and diabetes type 2. In this article we explore under what conditions the sales and marketing of unhealthy food and beverage products is irresponsible. Starting from the notion of ordinary morality we argue that firms have a duty to respect people’s autonomy and adhere to the principle of non-maleficence in both market and non-market environments. We show how these considerations are relevant when thinking about immoral behaviour in the food and beverage industry, and identify under what conditions sales and marketing of unhealthy foods and beverages to adults and children is wrong. Based on this analysis we argue that firms should take into account: whether consumers are able to identify manipulative marketing, the degree of manipulation, as well as the negative impact a product has on health. We hold that for the food industry to act responsible it should re-evaluate the marketing of unhealthy products to adults and refrain from marketing to children. We conclude this study by making several recommendations on how the food industry should interact with consumers and highlight what changes need to be made in corporate practice.

This book examines the work of Ernst Jünger and its effect on the development of Martin Heidegger’s influential philosophy of technology. Vincent Blok offers a unique treatment of Jünger’s philosophy and his conception of the age of technology, in which both world and man appear in terms of their functionality and efficiency. The primary objective of Jünger’s novels and essays is to make the transition from the totally mobilized world of the 20 th century toward a world in which a new type of man represents the gestalt of the worker and is responsive to this new age. Blok proceeds to demonstrate Jünger’s influence on Heidegger’s analysis of the technological age in his later work, as well as Heidegger’s conceptions of will, work and gestalt at the beginning of the 1930s. At the same time, Blok evaluates Heidegger’s criticism of Jünger and provides a novel interpretation of the Jünger-Heidegger connection: that Jünger’s work in fact testifies to a transformation of our relationship to language and conceptualizes the future in terms of the Anthropocene. This book, which arrives alongside several new English-language translations of Jünger’s work, will interest scholars of 20 th -century continental philosophy, Heidegger, and the history of philosophy of technology.

This paper examines how professionals (N = 32) working on artificial intelligence (AI) view structural AI ethics challenges like injustices and inequalities beyond individual agents' direct intention and control. This paper answers the research question: What are professionals’ perceptions of the structural challenges of AI (in the agri-food sector)? This empirical paper shows that it is essential to broaden the scope of ethics of AI beyond micro- and meso-levels. While ethics guidelines and AI ethics often focus on the responsibility of designers and the competencies and skills of designers to take this responsibility, our results show that many structural challenges are beyond their reach. This result means that while ethics guidelines and AI ethics frameworks are helpful, there is a risk that they overlook more complicated, nuanced, and intersected structural challenges. In addition, it highlights the need to include diverse stakeholders, such as quadruple helix (QH) participants, in discussions around AI ethics rather than solely focusing on the obligations of AI developers and companies. Overall, this paper demonstrates that addressing structural challenges in AI is challenging and requires an approach that considers four requirements: (1) multi-level, (2) multi-faceted, (3) interdisciplinary, and (4) polycentric governance.

In philosophical reflections on geoethics, it is primarily the question of what it means to be ‘part’ of the Earth system that is critically reflected upon. As the current geological era of the Anthropocene disrupts the dichotomy between Human agency and the Earth system, philosophers criticise a humanist account of geoethics and call for a post-humanist account. In this chapter, we critically engage with one specific proponent of the post-humanist position, Timothy Morton. We introduce his version of the post-humanist position by focussing on his call for the ‘end-of-the-world’ in the Anthropocene. We subsequently criticise Morton’s rejection of the World for three reasons. We show that the emergence of the Anthropocene is primarily an ontological phenomenon, namely a shift in our ‘being-in-the-world’ and that the concept of World is needed to understand the meaning of our ‘being-in-the-Anthropocene’ in contrast with our ‘being-in-the-Holocene’. We introduce a twofold between our ‘being-in-the-world’ as a symmetric relation and our ‘being-on-Earth’ as an asymmetric relation that constitutes our ‘being-in-the-Anthropocene’. This asymmetry disrupts the post-humanist position and calls for a conceptualisation of the human ethos beyond the post-humanist position. This conceptualisation of the human ethos also has consequences for our understanding of geoethics as geo-ethos.

AI can fundamentally shape our society, raising significant ethical, legal, and social aspects that need careful consideration. Therefore, it is important to educate and train engineering students developing and using AI about ethical, legal, and social aspects. However, teaching this to engineering students with no ethics background poses unique challenges, as engineering is more focused on the development of particular technologies. In addition, engineering education often focuses on artefact-level ethical, legal, and social aspects of AI, such as data privacy and transparency, while recent research shows that structural impacts (e.g., surveillance, instrumentalization, and deskilling) should also be included in responsible AI research. So, how can we effectively educate engineers about ethical, legal, and social aspects, particularly when it comes to structural impacts of AI? This article develops an Educational Intervention to help young engineers identify both artefact-level and broader structural ethical, legal, and social aspects of AI. This Educational Intervention includes a series of lectures that provide a theoretical analysis of ethical, legal, and social aspects in AI, and an in-class Product Impact Tool to help students systematically diagnose ethical, legal, and social aspects in an AI case. We suggest that the combination of active/passive learning is important to this Intervention, but what sets it apart is its use of the adjusted Product Impact Tool. This teaching tool integrates a multi-level approach to ethical, legal, and social aspects, allowing engineering students to move beyond artifact-level concerns like transparency and privacy to critically engage with AI’s institutional, sociopolitical, and ontological dimensions.

Artificial intelligence (AI) ethics is undergoing a practical shift towards putting principles into design practices in developing responsible AI. While this practical turn is essential, this paper highlights its potential risk of overly focusing on addressing issues at the level of individual artifacts, which can neglect more profound structural challenges and the need for significant systemic change. Such oversight makes AI ethics lose its strength in addressing some hidden, long-term harms within broader contexts. In this paper, we propose that the reflection on structural issues should be an integral part of AI ethics. To achieve this, we develop a multi-level framework to analyze socio-ethical issues of AI at both the artifact and broader structural levels. This framework can serve as a potentially transformative approach to uncover some unspoken assumptions in current AI ethics discourses and expose some blind spots in AI guidelines, policies, and regulations. Our paper paves the way to develop a practical approach that can effectively integrate this multi-level framework into real-world AI design and policymaking, ultimately bringing about transformative change.

How to understand new encounters between the living and the technological? Exemplary of such new encounters are the biotechnological creations of synthetic biology, where life and technology are increasingly intertwined in complex and intimate ways. This developing biotechnological field frames its novel entities as ‘artificial life’, ‘living technology’, and ‘biohybrid systems’. While synthetic biology too easily uses machine metaphors and technological frames for living entities, traditional philosophical frameworks also risk ontological reductionism in their efforts to understand life and technology in relation to each other. In contrast, Gilbert Simondon’s theory of individuation helps to understand the similarities between life and technology without reducing life forms to machines and without conflating technological objects with living systems. The aim of this article is twofold: first, to shed light on the relationship between life and technology, and second, to examine the emergence of new borderline cases resulting from synthetic biology, all with the help of the theory of individuation. Our hypothesis is that individuation facilitates our understanding of these new encounters between living beings and technologies, and provides conceptual clarity to prevailing dualisms such as life and technology, artificial and natural. We will develop Simondon’s theory into a framework and apply it to the case of synthetic biology, thus opening up the possibility that individuation can also help us to think about future encounters between life and technology.

Praised as a panacea for resolving all societal issues, and self-evidently presupposed as technological innovation, the concept of innovation has become the emblem of our age. This is especially reflected in the context of the European Union, where it is considered to play a central role in both strengthening the economy and confronting the current environmental crisis. The pressing question is how technological innovation can be steered into the right direction. To this end, recent frameworks of Responsible Innovation (RI) focus on how to enable outcomes of innovation processes to become societally desirable and ethically acceptable. However, questions with regard to the technological nature of these innovation processes are rarely raised. For this reason, this paper raises the following research question: To what extent is RI possible in the current age, where the concept of innovation is predominantly presupposed as technological innovation? On the one hand, we depart from a post-phenomenological perspective to evaluate the possibility of RI in relation to the particular technological innovations discussed in the RI literature. On the other hand, we emphasize the central role innovation plays in the current age, and suggest that the presupposed concept of innovation projects a techno-economic paradigm. In doing so, we ultimately argue that in the attempt to steer innovation, frameworks of RI are in fact steered by the techno-economic paradigm inherent in the presupposed concept of innovation. Finally, we account for what implications this has for the societal purpose of RI.

Responsible innovation (RI), also termed Responsible Research and Innovation, has emerged due to increasing concern over how to integrate ethical and societal values into research and innovation policy and governance (Von Schomberg 2013), in response to questioning of the societal role of science as well as populist resurgence in some countries (Long and Blok 2017a). Within a RI approach, innovators must consider three dimensions of responsibility, including the dimensions of (1) ‘avoiding harm’ to people and the planet, (2) ‘doing good’ through the offering of innovations that foster sustainable development, and (3) the development of facilitative global governance schemes (Voegtlin and Scherer 2017).

This paper examines how professionals (N = 32) working on artificial intelligence (AI) view structural AI ethics challenges like injustices and inequalities beyond individual agents' direct intention and control. This paper answers the research question: What are professionals’ perceptions of the structural challenges of AI (in the agri-food sector)? This empirical paper shows that it is essential to broaden the scope of ethics of AI beyond micro- and meso-levels. While ethics guidelines and AI ethics often focus on the responsibility of designers and the competencies and skills of designers to take this responsibility, our results show that many structural challenges are beyond their reach. This result means that while ethics guidelines and AI ethics frameworks are helpful, there is a risk that they overlook more complicated, nuanced, and intersected structural challenges. In addition, it highlights the need to include diverse stakeholders, such as quadruple helix (QH) participants, in discussions around AI ethics rather than solely focusing on the obligations of AI developers and companies. Overall, this paper demonstrates that addressing structural challenges in AI is challenging and requires an approach that considers four requirements: (1) multi-level, (2) multi-faceted, (3) interdisciplinary, and (4) polycentric governance.

To address societal challenges, research and innovation approaches, involving a wide range of actors, are increasingly promoted by policy communities. This paper explores the practice of Quadruple Helix collaborations for responsible innovation and how these implement the theoretical ambition of including actors from different societal sectors in innovation, including actors from the fields of arts, media and civil society, which is conceptualized as the Fourth Helix in this concept. Referring to cross-sector collaboration literature and based on an empirical investigation, we explore which actors, representing the Fourth Helix, actually engage in innovation collaborations, how this engagement plays out in practice, and the institutional and systemic dynamics involved in output and value creation. We rely on data from three Social Labs in Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands, which constitute qualitative, change-oriented research processes, where we researched and engaged with actors from cases constituting- or aiming for a Quadruple Helix collaboration. This was accompanied by a desktop study including qualitative interviews of 51 further cases. We find that the actual engagement of actors from civil society is fragile and that forces beyond Quadruple Helix cases impact these quite firmly in some cases.

During the second half of the twentieth century, several philosophers of technology argued that their predecessors had reflected too abstractly and pessimistically on technology. In the view of these critics, one should study technologies empirically in order to fully understand them. They developed several strategies to empirically inform the philosophy of technology and called their new approach the empirical turn. However, they provide insufficient indications of what exactly is meant by empirical study in their work. This leads to the critical question of what counts as an empirically informed philosophy of technology in the empirical turn. In order to answer this question, we first elaborate on the problems that the empirical turn philosophers tried to address; secondly, we sketch their solutions, and, thirdly, we critically discuss their conceptions of empirical study. Our critical analysis of the empirical turn contributes to new efforts to engage in an empirically informed philosophy of technology.

In this chapter, we propose an ecological hermeneutic phenomenology to study both the ontic and ontological structures of new and emerging technologies. In section 2, we first consult the traditional concept of phenomenology to find an entry point for our methodological considerations. It will become clear that Heidegger provides a progressive concept of hermeneutic phenomenology, although we are critical of his essentialism and linguistic focus in which there seems to be no room for the phenomenological consideration of ontic phenomena. The discussion of Heidegger results in a methodological concept of an empirically informed ecological hermeneutic phenomenology that enables us to research how new and emerging technologies impact the World in which we live and act. Subsequently, we critically reflect on the epoché of phenomenology and show that a methodological concept of ecological hermeneutic phenomenology engages in an ecological transduction from technology as thematic artefact to technology as co-thematic ontological structure in which each and every artefact is grounded.

This paper explores the gap in the literature on social responsibility guidance for start-ups and start-up investors. It begins by evaluating research conducted in two different fields (namely, socially responsible investment (SRI) and responsible research and innovation (RRI)) and how they can guide social responsibility in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) start-ups. To do this, we evaluate an industry-standard SRI catalogue of metrics - the Global Impact Investing Network's (GIIN) Impact Reporting and Investment Standards (IRIS+) - and indicators from 12 EC-funded RRI projects. Based on this analysis, we propose a framework of 24 indicators to assess the social responsibility of start-ups and investors. The purpose of our framework is twofold: firstly, to provide clear guidance for start-ups aiming to implement socially responsible behaviours, and secondly, to provide start-up investors with criteria to identify if start-ups are socially responsible. While the indicators are phrased in a prescriptive way for start-ups, they can also be used by investors to identify if start-ups are implementing the indicators in practice.

When a technology is seen as the right solution to a recognized problem, the development of alternative technologies comes under threat. To secure much-needed resources, proponents of alternative technologies must, in these conditions, restart societal discussion on the status quo, a process at once technological and discursive known as ‘path creation’. In this article, we investigate discussion-restarting strategies employed by supporters of emerging technologies in the field of solar fuels, particularly the advocates of a technology referred to as ‘artificial photosynthesis’. For illustrative purposes we explore four such strategies: revisiting weak spots, resizing the problem, redefining the game, and renegotiating labels. We conclude with a methodological reflection on the empirical study of discursive strategies in a socio-technical system. We further suggest a more systematic application of discourse-analytical and argumentation-theoretical insights that can complement current scholarship on path dependence and path creation.

The concept of innovation has entered a turbulent age. On the one hand, it is uncritically understood as ‘technological innovation’ and ‘commercialized innovation.’ On the other hand, ongoing research under the heading responsible research and innovation (RRI) suggests that current global issues require innovation to go beyond its usual intent of generating commercial value. However, little thought goes into what innovation means conceptually. Although there is a focus on enabling outcomes of innovation processes to become more responsible and desirable, the technological and commercial nature of these processes is rarely questioned. For these reasons, this paper poses the following research question: what concept of innovation is implicitly taken up by the RRI discourse and what implications does this concept have for the societal purpose of RRI? As a first step, we analyze the extent to which the concept of innovation in the RRI literature is uncritically presupposed to be technological. Subsequently, we examine the diverse meanings innovation has had over time and argue that while innovation originally had a political connotation it is only recently restricted to the meaning of technological innovation. We go on to show that even though the concept of technological innovation can contribute to the societal purpose of RRI, this requires certain conditions that are difficult to guarantee. Consequentially, we argue that future research should explore alternative understandings of innovation that better enable the overall feasibility of the emerging frameworks of RRI.

Ethical oaths for bankers, economists and managers are increasingly seen as successful instruments to ensure more responsible behaviour. In this article, we reflect on the nature of ethical oaths. Based on John Austin's speech act theory and the work of Emmanuel Levinas, we introduce a performative concept of ethical oaths that is characterised by (1) the existential self-performative of the one I want to be, which is (2) demanded by the public context. Because ethical oaths are (3) structurally threatened by the possibility of infelicity or failure, we stress (4) the behavioural aspect of ethical oaths in economics and business. We conclude that a performative concept of ethical oaths can contribute to more ethical behaviour in economics and business, because the performative involves action and behaviour. At the same time, it becomes clear that a radical new perspective on the nature, function and limitation of oaths is needed.

Juist in tijden van dreigende catastrofes wijzen romans ons de weg. Ze slaan ons uit onze groef en zetten ons aan tot denken en handelen. Zo helpen ze ons op weg naar een nieuwe zin van het leven. 00In dit essayistische boek bespreekt filosoof Vincent Blok meer dan tachtig moderne en hedendaagse romans. Hij recenseert ze niet, maar laat zien hoe ze ons aanzetten om ons wereldbeeld te kantelen. De romans tonen ons het einde van de wereld waarvan we afscheid moeten nemen, en wijzen ons de weg naar nieuwe werelden.0.

In this article, we investigate how to explain the difference between traditional design, engineering, and technology—which have exploited nature and put increasing pressure on Earth’s carrying capacity since the industrial revolution—and biomimetic design—which claims to explore nature’s sustainable solutions and promises to be regenerative by design. We reflect on the concept of mimesis. Mimesis assumes a continuity between the natural environment as a regenerative model and measure for sustainable design that is imitated and reproduced in biomimetic design, engineering, and technology. We conceptualize mimesis in terms of two interdependent boundary conditions: differentiation and participation. We subsequently develop four characteristics of biomimicry as regenerative design, engineering, and technology: technological mimesis is 1) a participative differentiation of nature; 2) supplemental to natural mimesis in biomimetic design; 3) the participative differentiation of technological mimesis is constitutive of nature; 4) the participative differentiation of technological mimesis is always limited.

This book deals with the role of international standards for corporate governance in the context of corporate social responsibility. Based on the fundamentals of moral theory, the book examines governance and CSR in general, addressing questions such as: Is "good governance" not affected by moral concerns? How do the principles and practices of CSR standards adhere to or conflict with insights from business ethics and moral theory? To what extent do the standards and governance models provide normative guidance? Do the standards and governance guidelines provide an adequate means of benchmarking and auditing? Are these standards a help or a hindrance to stakeholder engagement and transparency? The book provides insightful and thought-provoking answers to these and many other important questions concerning CSR standards, and offers a valuable resource for practitioners, academics and students at business schools and other institutions.