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515Probabilistic causation and causal processes: A critique of LewisPhilosophy of Science 56 (4): 642-663. 1989.This paper examines a promising probabilistic theory of singular causation developed by David Lewis. I argue that Lewis' theory must be made more sophisticated to deal with certain counterexamples involving pre-emption. These counterexamples appear to show that in the usual case singular causation requires an unbroken causal process to link cause with effect. I propose a new probabilistic account of singular causation, within the framework developed by Lewis, which captures this intuition
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66Mental causation in the physical worldIn Sophie Gibb, E. J. Lowe & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology, Oxford University Press. 2013.
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2HACKING, I.: "Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science" (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (n/a): 540. 1985.
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24thought-provoking exploration of the role of laws and models in the sciences, with In her alternative metaphysical framework, Cartwright relegates regularities in special emphasis on physics and economics. Cartwright proposes a novel metaphysics..
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36The Role of Counterfactual Dependence in Causal Judgements”In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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253Possibility and conceivability: A response-dependent account of their connectionsIn Roberto Casati (ed.), European Review of Philosophy: Volume 3: Response-Dependence, Stanford: Csli Publications. pp. 255--277. 1998.In the history of modern philosophy systematic connections were assumed to hold between the modal concepts of logical possibility and necessity and the concept of conceivability. However, in the eyes of many contemporary philosophers, insuperable objections face any attempt to analyze the modal concepts in terms of conceivability. It is important to keep in mind that a philosophical explanation of modality does not have to take the form of a reductive analysis. In this paper I attempt to provide…Read more
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78Intrinsic versus extrinsic conceptions of causationIn H. Sankey (ed.), Laws and Causation: Australasian Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 313-329. 1999.
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17Dependence in Causal JudgementsIn Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford University Press. pp. 186. 2011.
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131Review of M aking Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation (review)Mind 115 (459): 821-826. 2006.
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26Current Issues in CausationAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2): 302-302. 2003.Book Information Current Issues in Causation. Current Issues in Causation Wolfgang Spohn Marion Ledwig Michael Esfeld Paderborn Mentis 2001 207 Paperback DM 78 Edited by Wolfgang Spohn; Marion Ledwig; Michael Esfeld. Mentis. Paderborn. Pp. 207. Paperback:DM 78
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43The exclusion problem, the determination relation, and contrastive causationIn Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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38A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, by D. M. Armstrong (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3): 731-734. 1992.
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20Mental Causation on the Program ModelIn Geoffrey Brennan (ed.), Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit, Oxford University Press. 2007.27 page
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1How justified are the humean doubts about intrinsic causal links?Communication and Cognition. Monographies 31 (4): 339-364. 1998.
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1Capacities, natures and pluralism: A new metaphysics for science?Philosophical Books 43 261-270. 2002.
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„The Role of Counterfactual Dependence in Causal Judgements”, u: Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack and Sarah R. BeckIn Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford University Press. pp. 186--207. 2011.
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143The causal efficacy of mental statesIn Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, Imprint Academic. pp. 195--223. 2003.You are asked to call out the letters on a chart during an eyeexamination: you see and then read out the letters ‘U’, ‘R’, and ‘X’. Commonsense says that your perceptual experiences causally control your calling out the letters. Or suppose you are playing a game of chess intent on winning: you plan your strategy and move your chess pieces accordingly. Again, commonsense says that your intentions and plans causally control your moving the chess pieces. These causal judgements are as plain and evi…Read more
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66Platitudes and counterexamplesIn Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 341--367. 2009.27 page
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1450Abductive inference and delusional beliefCognitive Neuropsychiatry 15 (1): 261-287. 2010.Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experiences. We explore this idea in more detail, making the following points. Firstly, the abnormalities of cognition which initially prompt the entertaining of a delusional belief are not always conscious and since we prefer to restrict the term “experience” to consciousness we refer to “abnormal data” rather than “abnormal experience”. Secondly, we argue that in relation to many delusions (we consider eight…Read more
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47Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic StatesPhilosophical Review 103 (1): 159. 1994.
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139Causal models, token causation, and processesPhilosophy of Science 71 (5): 820-832. 2004.Judea Pearl (2000) has recently advanced a theory of token causation using his structural equations approach. This paper examines some counterexamples to Pearl's theory, and argues that the theory can be modified in a natural way to overcome them.
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13The Folk Theory of Colours and the Causes of Colour ExperienceIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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35Reasons and causes revisitedIn Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism and Normativity, Cambridge University Press. 2010.29 page
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127This paper criticizes a recent account of token causation that states that negative causation involving absences of events is of a fundamentally different kind from positive causation involving events. The paper employs the structural equations framework to advance a theory of token causation that applies uniformly to positive and negative causation alike.
Peter Menzies
(1953 - 2015)
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
General Philosophy of Science |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
General Philosophy of Science |