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Plikt att kollektivisera?Tidskrift För Politisk Filosofi 22 (2): 36-46. 2018.En del moraliska dilemman och samhällsproblem uppstår ur många sinsemellan orelaterade individuella handlingar eller underlåtelser, samtidigt som problemen bara kan åtgärdas genom kollektiv handling. Vi kritiserar tre sätt att resonera om ostrukturerade gruppers moraliska plikter och ansvar i sådana situationer. Därefter föreslår vi att intuitionen att en sådan grupp kan ha moraliska plikter och vara ansvarig bäst förklaras med utgångspunkt i att individer åtminstone i småskaliga fall kan identi…Read more
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25Olle Blomberg om Nonideal Social Ontology av Åsa Burman (review)Filosofisk Tidskrift 45 (1): 59-63. 2024.
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36Cooperative activity, shared intention, and exploitationEthics 134 (3): 387-401. 2024.Jules Salomone-Sehr argues that an activity is cooperative if and only if, roughly, it consists of several participants’ actions that are (i) coordinated for a common purpose (ii) in ways that do not undermine any participant’s agency. He argues that guidance by shared intention is neither necessary nor sufficient for cooperation. Thereby, he claims to “topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory." In response, we argue that Salomone-Sehr’s account captures another notion of cooperation than the…Read more
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42Tuomela on Social Norms and Group-Social NormativityIn Miguel Garcia-Godinez & Rachael Mellin (eds.), Tuomela on Sociality, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 219-241. 2023.In everyday life, as members of larger or smaller groups, we hold each other accountable with respect to social norms. For this practice to be intelligible, we must arguably by and large be justified in demanding that other group members comply with these norms. Other things being equal, it seems that we have a group membership-based pro tanto reason to comply with the social norms of our group. In this chapter, I examine how such demands and reasons for compliance can be explained and made inte…Read more
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51Team Reasoning, Mode, and ContentIn Andrés Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster (eds.), Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 39-54. 2023.A “we-intention” is the kind of intention that an individual acts on when participating in joint intentional action. In discussions about what characterises such a we-intention, one fault line concerns whether the “we-ness” is a feature of a we-intention’s mode or content. According to Björn Petersson, it is an agent-perspectival feature of its mode. Petersson argues that content accounts are incompatible with theories of so-called “group identification” and “team reasoning”. Insofar as such gro…Read more
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212Review of Gerald Lang's Strokes of Luck: A Study in Moral and Political Philosophy (review)Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (5): 899-901. 2022.
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180How to be morally responsible for another's free intentional actionJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25 (3): 545-579. 2023.I argue that an agent can be morally responsible and fully (but not necessarily solely) blameworthy for another agent’s free intentional action, simply by intentionally creating the conditions for the action in a way that causes it. This means, I argue, that she can be morally responsible for the other’s action in the relevantly same way that she is responsible for her own non-basic actions. Furthermore, it means that socially mediated moral responsibility for intentional action does not require…Read more
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480Team reasoning and collective moral obligationSocial Theory and Practice. forthcoming.We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents have a moral obligation together only if they each have (i) a context-specific capacity to view their situation from the group’s perspective, and (ii) at least a general capacity to deliberate about what they ought to do together. Such an obligation is irreducibly collective, in that it does not imply that the individuals have any obligations to contribute to what is required of the group. We highlight various …Read more
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71Review of Anne Schwenkenbecher's Getting our Act Together: a Theory of Collective Moral Obligations (review)Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3): 875-877. 2021.
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88Review of Holly Lawford-Smith's Not In Their Name: Are Citizens Culpable For Their States’ Actions? (review)Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (5): 554-557. 2021.
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70What We Ought to Do: The Decisions and Duties of Non-agential GroupsJournal of Social Ontology 6 (1): 101-116. 2020.In ordinary discourse, a single duty is often attributed to a plurality of agents. In "Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals", Stephanie Collins claims that such attributions involve a “category error”. I critically discuss Collins’ argument for this claim and argue that there is a substantive sense in which non-agential groups can have moral duties. A plurality of agents can have a single duty to bring about an outcome by virtue of a capacity of each to practicall…Read more
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155Intentional cooperation and acting as part of a single bodyMind and Language 36 (2): 264-284. 2021.According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of him- or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this notional singularization move fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in action of which they would be parts. T…Read more
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407Collective Responsibility and Acting TogetherIn Saba Bazargan-Forward & Deborah Tollefsen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility, Routledge. 2020.What is the moral significance of the contrast between acting together and strategic interaction? We argue that while collective moral responsibility is not uniquely tied to the former, the degree to which the participants in a shared intentional wrongdoing are blameworthy is normally higher than when agents bring about the same wrong as a result of strategic interaction. One argument for this claim focuses on the fact that shared intentions cause intended outcomes in a more robust manner than t…Read more
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355From Simple to Composite Agency: On Kirk Ludwig’s From Individual to Plural AgencyJournal of Social Ontology 5 (1): 101-124. 2019.According to Kirk Ludwig, only primitive actions are actions in a primary and non-derivative sense of the term ‘action’. Ludwig takes this to imply that the notion of collective action is a façon de parler – useful perhaps, but secondary and derivative. I argue that, on the contrary, collective actions are actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. First, this is because some primitive actions are collective actions. Secondly, individual and collective composites of primitive actions are a…Read more
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66Experimental Philosophy, Ethnomethodology, and Intentional Action: A Textual Analysis of the Knobe EffectHuman Studies 42 (4): 673-694. 2019.In “Intentional action and side-effects in ordinary language” (2003), Joshua Knobe reported an asymmetry in test subjects’ responses to a question about intentionality: subjects are more likely to judge that a side effect of an agent’s intended action is intentional if they think the side effect is morally bad than if they think it is morally good. This result has been taken to suggest that the concept of intentionality is an inherently moral concept. In this paper, we draw attention to the fact…Read more
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37Review of Bennett W. Helm's Communities of Respect – Grounding Responsibility, Authority, and Dignity (review)Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (2): 441-443. 2018.
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30Review of Gregory Mellema's Complicity and Moral Accountability (review)Journal of Social Ontology 3 (1): 139-142. 2017.
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19Review of Matthew Hindman’s The Myth of Digital Democracy (review)Metapsychology Online Reviews 13 (31). 2009.
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26Review of Sherry Turkle’s Simulation and Its Discontents (review)Metapsychology Online Reviews 13 (47). 2009.
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43Review of Wolfgang Prinz’s Open Minds: The Social Making of Agency and Intentionality (review)Metapsychology Online Reviews 17 (4). 2013.
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40Review of Mark Rowlands' The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology (review)Metapsychology Online Reviews 15 (4). 2011.
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42Review of Ian Apperly's Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind" (review)Metapsychology Online Reviews 15 (13). 2011.
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67Review of Lilian O’Brien’s Philosophy of Action (review)Metapsychology Online Reviews 21 (3). 2017.
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53Review of Bryce Huebner's Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality (review)Metapsychology Online Reviews 18 (32). 2014.
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74Review of Kirk Ludwig's From Individual to Plural Agency, Collective Action: Volume 1 (review)Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272): 626-628. 2018.Review of Kirk Ludwig, From Individual to Plural Agency, Collective Action: Volume 1.
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45Review of Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality: Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with his Responses, edited by Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017. 2017.
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177We‐Experiences, Common Knowledge, and the Mode Approach to Collective IntentionalityJournal of Social Philosophy 49 (1): 183-203. 2018.According to we-mode accounts of collective intentionality, an experience is a "we-experience"—that is, part of a jointly attentional episode—in virtue of the way or mode in which the content of the experience is given to the subject of experience. These accounts are supposed to explain how a we-experience can have the phenomenal character of being given to the subject "as ours" rather than merely "as my experience" (Zahavi 2015), and do so in a relatively conceptually and cognitively undemandin…Read more
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443Motor Intentions and Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action: A Standard StoryThought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3): 137-146. 2017.According to the standard story given by reductive versions of the Causal Theory of Action, an action is an intrinsically mindless bodily movement that is appropriately caused by an intention. Those who embrace this story typically take this intention to have a coarse-grained content, specifying the action only down to the level of the agent's habits and skills. Markos Valaris argues that, because of this, the standard story cannot make sense of the deep reach of our non-observational knowledge …Read more
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116Review of Michael Bratman's Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (review)Analysis 75 (2): 346-348. 2015.
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567Do socio-technical systems cognise?Proceedings of the 2nd AISB Symposium on Computing and Philosophy. 2009.The view that an agent’s cognitive processes sometimes include proper parts found outside the skin and skull of the agent is gaining increasing acceptance in philosophy of mind. One main empirical touchstone for this so-called active externalism is Edwin Hutchins’ theory of distributed cognition (DCog). However, the connection between DCog and active externalism is far from clear. While active externalism is one component of DCog, the theory also incorporates other related claims, which active e…Read more
Gothenburg, Sweden
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Collective Intentionality |
Collective Responsibility |
Moral Responsibility |
Moral Psychology |