Wilfrid J. Waluchow

Courts are sometimes called upon to review a law or some other official act of government to determine its constitutionality, its reasonableness, rationality, or its compatibility with fundamental principles of justice. In some jurisdictions, this power of judicial review includes the ability to ‘strike down’ or nullify a law duly passed by a legislature body. This article examines this practice and various criticisms of it, including the charge that it is fundamentally undemocratic. The focus is on the powerful critique mounted by Jeremy Waldron, the foremost philosophical opponent of judicial review.

Part I. Furthering debate between leading theories of Law -- The Explantory Role of the Weak Natural Law Thesis -- In Defense of Hart -- Law's Authority is not a Claim to Preemption -- The Normative Fallacy Regarding Law's Authority -- The Problem about the Nature of Law vis-à-vis Legal Rationality Revisited : Towards an Integrative Jurisprudence -- Part II. The Power of Legal Systems -- Law as Power : Two Rule of Law Requirements -- A Comprehensive Hartian Theory of Legal Obligation : Social Pressure, Coercive Enforcement, and the Legal Obligations of Citizens -- Law and the Entitlement to Coerce -- Part III. Conceptual Analysis -- Farewell to Conceptual Analysis (in Jurisprudence) -- What Do We Want Law to Be? Philosophical Analysis and the Concept of Law -- Part IV. New Directions -- Legal as a Thick Concept -- Making Old Questions New : Legality, Legal System, and State -- Legal Disagreements and the Dual Nature of Law -- Is There One Right Answer to the Question of the Nature of Law?

In this study, W. J. Waluchow argues that debates between defenders and critics of constitutional bills of rights presuppose that constitutions are more or less rigid entities. Within such a conception, constitutions aspire to establish stable, fixed points of agreement and pre-commitment, which defenders consider to be possible and desirable, while critics deem impossible and undesirable. Drawing on reflections about the nature of law, constitutions, the common law, and what it is to be a democratic representative, Waluchow urges a different theory of bills of rights that is flexible and adaptable. Adopting such a theory enables one not only to answer to critics' most serious challenges, but also to appreciate the role that a bill of rights, interpreted and enforced by unelected judges, can sensibly play in a constitutional democracy.