Wilfrid J. Waluchow

This book assembles leading legal, political, and moral philosophers to examine the legacy of the work of Ronald Dworkin. They provide the most comprehensive critical treatment of Dworkin's accomplishments focusing on his work in all branches of philosophy, including his theory of value, political philosophy, philosophy of international law, and legal philosophy. The book's organizing principle and theme reflect Dworkin's self-conception as a builder of a unified theory of value, and the broad outlines of his system can be found throughout the book. The first section addresses the most abstract and general aspect of Dworkin's work--the unity of value thesis. The second section explores Dworkin's contributions to political philosophy, and discusses a number of political concepts including authority, civil disobedience, the legitimacy of states and the international legal system, distributive justice, collective responsibility, and Dworkin's master value of dignity and the associated values of equal concern and respect. The third section addresses various aspects of Dworkin's general theory of law. The fourth and final section comprises accounts of the structure and defining values of discrete areas of law.

The last decade has witnessed a particularly intensive debate over methodological issues in legal theory. The publication of Julie Dickson's Evaluation and Legal Theory (2001) was significant, as were collective returns to H.L.A. Hart's 'Postscript' to The Concept of Law. While influential articles have been written in disparate journals, no single collection of the most important papers exists. This volume - the first in a three volume series - aims not only to fill that gap but also propose a systematic agenda for future work. The editors have selected articles written by leading legal theorists, including, among others, Leslie Green, Brian Leiter, Joseph Raz, Ronald Dworkin, and William Twining, and organized under four broad categories: 1) problems and purposes of legal theory; 2) the role of epistemology and semantics in theorising about the nature of law; 3) the relation between morality and legal theory; and 4) the scope of phenomena a general jurisprudence ought to address.

This is a collection of essays based on papers read at a conference on freedom of expression held at McMaster University in May, 1990. Its contributors are philosophers and lawyers, each of whom brings his unique perspective to bear on issues surrounding the justification of free expression and the bases, both legal and moral, for restricting or broadening its scope. Joseph Magnet, Wayne Sumner, and James Weinstein discuss legal attempts in America and Canada to restrict hate literature, while David Richards brings a specifically American perspective to wider issues of free speech. Joseph Raz and Jan Narveson attempt to ground their theories of free speech in a wider political theory, while Leslie Green and Roger Shiner discuss more specific aspects of free expression, namely, the freedom to express oneself in the language of one's choice and freedom of commercial expression.

In this study, W. J. Waluchow argues that debates between defenders and critics of constitutional bills of rights presuppose that constitutions are more or less rigid entities. Within such a conception, constitutions aspire to establish stable, fixed points of agreement and pre-commitment, which defenders consider to be possible and desirable, while critics deem impossible and undesirable. Drawing on reflections about the nature of law, constitutions, the common law, and what it is to be a democratic representative, Waluchow urges a different theory of bills of rights that is flexible and adaptable. Adopting such a theory enables one not only to answer to critics' most serious challenges, but also to appreciate the role that a bill of rights, interpreted and enforced by unelected judges, can sensibly play in a constitutional democracy.

Like many recent works in legal theory, especially those focusing on the apparently conflicting schools of legal positivism and natural law, Waluchow’s Inclusive Legal Positivism begins by admitting a degree of perplexity about the field; indeed, he suggests that the field has fallen into “chaos”. Disturbingly, those working within legal theory appear most uncertain about what the tasks of their field are. Legal philosophers often seem to suspect strongly that at least their colleagues in the field are confused about those tasks. As a result, many recent books in legal theory are in large part exercises in legal metatheory, devoting many pages to attempts to define the purposes and goals of the field. Waluchow follows this trend and begins by expressing a desire to clarify the issues that separate those trying to give an account of the nature of law. His ultimate goal is to defend a version of legal positivism, inclusive legal positivism, that he thinks is at least implicit in H. L. A. Hart’s work.

Well and Good presents a combination of "classic" and little-known but real-life cases. Included are a range of cases involving nurses and other health professionals as well as many involving doctors. The cases in the main body of the book are accompanied by the editors' impartial discussions of the issues involved. The final section is comprised of unanalysed cases for further study. For the new edition, the introduction has been expanded to include discussions of feminist bioethics and of virtue ethics, alongside the Kantian, Rossian and utilitarian frameworks discussed in previous editions. Most of the existing cases have been updated to reflect these additional foci, and four analysed cases have been added. Several cases have been added to the group of unanalysed cases, which now includes questions for discussion. Among cases new to this edition are the "mercy killing" case of Robert Latimer, the assisted suicide of Sue Rodriguez, the pregnancy solvent-abuse case of Ms. G., and a case involving sex-selection and abortion on gender grounds

The Dimensions of Ethics offers a concise but wide-ranging introduction to moral philosophy. In clear and engaging fashion, the author first examines the scope of ethical theory, and explores central metaethical questions such as the issue of relativism, and the relationship between morality and religion. He then turns to an exploration of five theoretical approaches, in each case providing a consideration of various objections that have been advanced as well as a sympathetic exposition of the core principles of each approach. Throughout he uses a wide range of examples, and integrates references to issues in applied ethics with his discussions of ethical theory.

In his recent book, Harm to Others, Joel Feinberg addresses the question whether a person can be harmed after his or her own death, that is, whether posthumous harm is a logical possibility. There is a very strong tendency to suppose that harm to the dead is simply inconceivable. After all, there cannot be harm without a subject to be harmed, but when death occurs it appears to obliterate the subject thus excluding the possibility of harm. On the other hand, there is an inclination to believe that harmful events can indeed occur posthumously. As Aristotle observed, “a dead man is popularly believed to be capable of having both good and ill fortune—honour and dishonour and prosperity and the loss of it among his children and descendants generally—in exactly the same way as if he were alive but unaware or unobservant of what was happening”. Feinberg sides with Aristotle on this issue and develops an intriguing theory purporting to show how posthumous harms are possible. My intention in this paper is to argue that Feinberg's account meets with such serious difficulties that we must either develop an alternative theory or agree with those who claim that death logically excludes the possibility of harm. I shall begin in §2 with a brief sketch of Feinberg's provocative theory. This will be followed in §3 by my comments and criticisms. Section 4 will close with suggestions about where Feinberg's account goes wrong and how it might be repaired.

Well and Good presents a combination of "classic" and little-known cases in health care ethics. These cases, accompanied by information about the major ethical theories, give students a chance to grapple with the ethical challenges faced by health care practitioners, policy makers, and recipients. The authors' narrative style and leading questions provoke student interest and engagement, while allowing instructors the freedom to draw from the theoretical perspectives they consider most useful. This fourth edition includes an expanded discussion of feminist ethics, and new cases addressing pandemic ethics, humanitarian aid, the social determinants of health, research and aboriginal communities, and a number of other emerging issues