Matthew C. Altman

This remarkably comprehensive Handbook provides a multifaceted yet carefully crafted investigation into the work of Immanuel Kant, one of the greatest philosophers the world has ever seen. With original contributions from leading international scholars in the field, this authoritative volume first sets Kant’s work in its biographical and historical context. It then proceeds to explain and evaluate his revolutionary work in metaphysics and epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, political philosophy, philosophy of history, philosophy of education, and anthropology. Key Features: • Draws attention to the foundations of Kant’s varied philosophical insights — transcendental idealism, logic, and the bridge between theoretical and practical reason • Considers hitherto neglected topics such as sexuality and the philosophy of education • Explores the immense impact of his ground-breaking work on subsequent intellectual movements Serving as a touchstone for meaningful discussion about Kant’s philosophical and historical importance, this definitive Handbook is essential reading for Kant scholars who want to keep abreast of the field and for advanced students wishing to explore the frontiers of the subject.

Konstantin Pollok's ambitious aim in this book is to formulate a unified theory of normativity that runs throughout Kant's three Critiques. Specifically, he argues that, on Kant's view, synthetic a priori principles structure "the space of reason" and determine the validity of our judgments. Such principles are constitutive of our epistemological, ethical, and aesthetic practices by setting the conditions for what makes a meaningful judgment in those areas, but they are also normative in that the particular judgments we make can be right or wrong depending on whether we successfully apply the principles. For example, to be making knowledge claims, we must use the pure concepts of the understanding to interpret our...

Although Kant defends a cosmopolitan ideal, his philosophy is problematically vague regarding how to achieve it, which lends support to the empty formalism charge. How Kant would respond to the crisis in Syria reveals that judgement plays too central a role, because Kantian principles lead to equally reasonable but opposite conclusions on how to weigh the duty of hospitality to refugees against a state’s duty to its own citizens, the right of prevention towards ISIS against the duty not to harm non-combatants, and the responsibility to protect the people of Syria against the duty of non-interference in its internal affairs.

This dissertation examines Fichte's critical idealism in an effort to formulate a compelling model of how we can be said to be free, despite our subjection to both rational and nonrational constraints. ;Fichte grounds idealism in a "drive to freedom" that involves two disparate strands of thought: the standpoint of idealism is said to be both the result of an absolutely free adoption of the principle of self-determination and conditioned by reason, to which the finite I is necessarily subject. However, if there is no reason prior to the choice of a first principle, the choice of idealism over dogmatism cannot be motivated, and so is not attributable to a responsible subject. And if there is a prior basis for the election of idealism, the constraints of reason already necessitate the I's attempt to consider itself to be independent and are, therefore, not self-legislated. Fichte's argument strategy thus yields the following question: How can there be an absolute election of the philosophical principle of one's life, when the adoption of such a standpoint is already a manifestation of who one is? Fichte confronts this issue by conceiving of the I as necessarily subject to an original limit and by radically subjectivizing the world in terms of the I's ethical and conceptual demands. ;By locating the tension between these positions, this dissertation reveals how philosophers indebted to Fichte as well as interpreters of the Wissenschaftslehre have mischaracterized Fichte's treatment of rational self-constraint. Fichte's synthesis of freedom and necessity constitutes a model of subjectivity according to which the normatively constrained structure of experience is impossible without my relating that experience to my practical activity, and the ways in which I am able to characterize that experience are answerable to what is practically required of me by that experience. Fichte shows the interdetermination of the givenness of the given and the autonomy of the I by qualifying each in terms of the other. As a description of this interdetermination, Fichte's striving doctrine establishes the tension involved in this mutually constitutive relation as a positive conception of human freedom.

The ticking bomb case is meant to challenge absolute prohibitions on the use of torture. In “Imaginary Cases,” Michael Davis attempts to show that such cases can only be legitimately employed within certain limited parameters. In this paper, I explain how the ticking bomb case, suitably revised, does not run afoul of Davis’s prohibition on impossible content. The fact that torture could elicit the necessary information is enough; we need not stipulate a guaranteed result. I also defend philosophers’ use of the case to identify our moral intuitions and to evaluate our theoretical assumptions. Although our responses to actual events are better at mapping our actual commitments, imaginary events can also reveal our pre-theoretic intuitions. Ultimately, however, I reject the use of the ticking bomb case on practical grounds, because the imaginary case distorts our moral reasoning in actual cases and leads to our acceptance of torture more generally.

In addition to preparing students for graduate school or emphasizing transferable skills that are useful in any career, philosophy departments ought to give majors the education and work experience that will train them to become ethics officers outside of academia. This is a growing field that allows students to engage non-philosophers in setting corporate policies and addressing morally significant social issues. Using a course in medical ethics as an example, I show how incorporating service-learning into philosophy classes benefits students both academically and professionally, and also demonstrates the value of philosophy to the community and to academic administrators.

_Kant and Applied Ethics_ makes an important contribution to Kant scholarship, illuminating the vital moral parameters of key ethical debates. Offers a critical analysis of Kant’s ethics, interrogating the theoretical bases of his theory and evaluating their strengths and weaknesses Examines the controversies surrounding the most important ethical discussions taking place today, including abortion, the death penalty, and same-sex marriage Joins innovative thinkers in contemporary Kantian scholarship, including Christine Korsgaard, Allen Wood, and Barbara Herman, in taking Kant’s philosophy in new and interesting directions Clarifies Kant’s legacy for applied ethics, helping us to understand how these debates have been structured historically and providing us with the philosophical tools to address them.

Kant is gaining popularity in business ethics because the categorical imperative rules out actions such as deceptive advertising and exploitative working conditions, both of which treat people merely as means to an end. However, those who apply Kant in this way often hold businesses themselves morally accountable, and this conception of collective responsibility contradicts the kind of moral agency that underlies Kant's ethics. A business has neither inclinations nor the capacity to reason, so it lacks the conditions necessary for constraint by the moral law. Instead, corporate policies ought to be understood as analogous to legal constraints. They may encourage or discourage certain actions, but they cannot determine a person's maxim - which for Kant is the focus of moral judgment. Because there is no collective intention apart from any intentions of the individual agents who act as members of the corporation, an organization itself has no moral obligations. This poses a dilemma: either apply the categorical imperative to the actions of particular businesspeople and surrender the notion of collective responsibility, or apply a different moral theory to the actions of businesses themselves. Given the diffusion of responsibility in a bureaucracy, the explanatory usefulness of collective responsibility may force business ethicists to abandon Kant's moral philosophy.

When examined critically, Kant's views on sex and marriage give us the tools to defend same-sex marriage on moral grounds. The sexual objectification of one's partner can only be overcome when two people take responsibility for one another's overall well-being, and this commitment is enforced through legal coercion. Kant's views on the unnaturalness of homosexuality do not stand up to scrutiny, and he cannot (as he often tries to) restrict the purpose of sex to procreation. Kant himself rules out marriage only when the partners cannot give themselves to one another equally – that is, if there is inequality of exchange. Because same-sex marriage would be between equals and would allow homosexuals to express their desire in a morally appropriate way, it ought to be legalized.

The conception of subjectivity that dominates the Western philosophical tradition, particularly during the Enlightenment, sets up a simple dichotomy: either the subject is ultimately autonomous or it is merely a causally determined thing. Fichte and Freud challenge this model by formulating theories of subjectivity that transcend this opposition. Fichte conceives of the subject as based in absolute activity, but that activity is qualified by a check for which it is not ultimately responsible. Freud explains the behavior of the self in terms of biological drives and social pressures, yet both forces are actively interpreted by the subject itself. The tensions that arise from these very different approaches show that both Fichte and Freud are trying to overcome this deeply imbedded dichotomy between freedom and determinism. Although some would respond to these tensions by trying to forge a Hegelian synthesis, such a resolution covers over the paradoxical nature of finite subjectivity.

Anthropocentric biases manifest themselves in two different ways in research on animal cognition. Some researchers claim that only humans have the capacity for reasoning, beliefs, and interests; and others attribute mental concepts to nonhuman animals on the basis of behavioral evidence, and they conceive of animal cognition in more or less human terms. Both approaches overlook the fact that language-use deeply informs mental states, such that comparing human mental states to the mental states of nonlinguistic animals is misguided. In order to avoid both pitfalls -- assuming that animals have mental lives just like we do, or assuming that they have no mental lives at all -- I argue for a functional methodological approach. Researchers should study animal cognition by identifying environmental inputs, the functional role of internal states, and behavioral outputs. Doing so will allow for cross-species comparisons in a way that the use of folk psychological terms does not.

Requiring that a woman who is seeking an abortion be given the opportunity to view an ultrasound of her fetus has spread from anti-abortion “pregnancy resource centers” to state laws. Proponents of these laws claim that having access to the ultrasound image is necessary for a woman to make a medically informed decision. In this paper, we argue that ultrasound examinations frame fetuses visually and linguistically as persons and interpellate pregnant women as mothers, with all of the cultural meaning invested in those two normative concepts. Presenting these judgments as medical information is misleading. Because women are being subjected to these cultural expectations unknowingly, mandatory ultrasound laws in fact undermine women’s autonomy. Fully informed consent would include a critical engagement with social norms around femininity and a recognition that such laws are meant to advance the state’s interest in preserving potential life.

Fichte develops his idealism through a higher-level critique: only through the Fichtean fact of reason can one justify a systematic transcendental idealism, thereby making possible the self-sufficiency of theoretical reason. By examining the metaphilosophical implications of our immediate consciousness of the moral law, Fichte is able to assert the necessary metaphilosophical primacy of practical reason for any possible wissenschaftlich philosophy as well as the philosophical unity of theory and practice within such a system.