Luis Gonzalez

Esta nota, que resume una conferencia pronunciada en octubre de 2011 en las Jornadas Nacionales de Liturgia de Barcelona, analiza y estudia la aportación de Sacramentum Caritatis al importante tema de la participación activa de los fieles en la liturgia. El autor concluye, entre otras cosas, que la sutil distinción entre condiciones personales para la participación y la participación misma enriquece el concepto de actuosa participatio acentuando sus dimensiones más hondas desde el punto de vista de la antropología sacramental.

Francez has suggested that connexivity can be predicated of connectives other than the conditional, in particular conjunction and disjunction. Since connexivity is not any connection between antecedents and consequents—there might be other connections among them, such as relevance—, my question here is whether Francez’s conjunction and disjunction can properly be called ‘connexive’. I analyze three ways in which those connectives may somehow inherit connexivity from the conditional by standing in certain relations to it. I will show that Francez’s connectives fail all these three ways, and that even other connectives obtained by following more closely Wansing’s method to get a connexive conditional, fail to be connexive as well.

Schools are an essential part of students’ lives and can promote and facilitate their well-being. Although research on well-being among school-aged children and adolescents has distinguished subjective well-being from social well-being, very few studies examined student’s social well-being at school. SWS is understood as students’ valuation of the circumstances and functioning of their school. This framework posits that the context of the schools can shape students’ perception of feeling integrated and making significant contributions to their schools. However, not much is known regarding the joint contribution of individual, family, and school characteristics to students’ SWS. This study analyzed these joint contributions in a nationally representative sample of 6,389 children and adolescents enrolled in 5th–11th grades. Findings show that being female and younger were individual predictors of SWS. Students’ satisfaction with their family and fewer changes of schools were also significant contributors. When students’ perceptions of their schools were incorporated, the individual and family characteristics decreased or lost significance. In the full model, the highest contribution to SWS was explained by the school-level aggregated perception of school climate. These findings call for integrated policies and practices to foster students’ sense of belonging, feeling integrated, and contribution to their schools, with a focus on school-level interventions to improve SWS through positive and engaging school climates that foster students’ sense of agency.

In her, Martínez-Ordaz puts forward an argument whose conclusion pretends to be a dilemma for selective realists: either selective realists cannot rule true contradictions out or the usual characterization of selective realism is incomplete. Then she argues that one should take the second horn and complete such a characterization with some logical constraints. In this note, I will defend that her argument for the dilemma is flawed at several steps and, moreover, that the dilemma is not dangerous and that her proposed completion of selective realism is not needed.

Alberic of Paris put forward an argument, ‘the most embarrassing of all twelfth-century arguments’ according to Christopher Martin, which shows that the connexive principles contradict some other logical principles that have become deeply entrenched in our most widely accepted logical theories. Building upon some of Everett Nelson’s ideas, we will show that the steps in Alberic of Paris’ argument that should be rejected are precisely the ones that presuppose the validity of schemas that are nowadays taken as some of the most trivial logical truths: (A∧B) → A and (A∧B) → B, i.e. Simplification.

Philosophy of logic is a fundamental part of philosophical study, and one which is increasingly recognized as being immensely important in relation to many issues in metaphysics, metametaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of language. This textbook provides a comprehensive and accessible introduction to topics including the objectivity of logical inference rules and its relevance in discussions of epistemological relativism, the revived interest in logical pluralism, the question of logic's metaphysical neutrality, and the demarcation between logic and mathematics. Chapters in the book cover the state of the art in contemporary philosophy of logic, and allow students to understand the philosophical relevance of these debates without having to contend with complex technical arguments. This will be a major new resource for students working on logic, as well as for readers seeking a better understanding of philosophy of logic in its wider context.

Nowadays there is a growing tendency in the philosophy of science to think that some phenomena cannot be exhaustively explained, or even described, by a single theory or a particular approach. Thus, we are occasionally required to use various approaches in order to give account of the phenomenon we are analyzing. And sometimes, we can appreciate this as an invitation to be pluralist in certain respects about our understanding of a particular aspect in science. During the last decade applications of pluralism have increased and led to several other relevant debates in the philosophy of science. By the strengthening of pluralism, new questions have emerged, and more importantly, new alternatives have been offered in dealing with problems about how to interpret the ontology and the ontological commitments of particular theories, or how to apply strategies to analyze and understand specific episodes from the history of science, or how to work within different, and sometimes incompatible, explanations about a particular phenomenon, among others. In general, pluralism seems to be a very rich and yet not enough explored path for the philosophy of science in general. Today, it is recognized that, at least for methodological purposes, the application of pluralism to the study of science can offer a great number of benefits. One of them would be the opportunity of analyzing the role that some epistemic virtues -such as scope, fruitfulness, consistency, and simplicity, to name just a few- play in the scientific activity. From the different pluralist positions, a lot has been said about empirical adequacy, refutability and explanatory power yet consistency power, yet, consistency has not been equally dealt with. As a matter of fact, the lack of consistency and its philosophical implications have been studied from an angle that does not necessarily involve a pluralism of any kind. At the moment, it is commonly accepted that inconsistencies are more frequent in scientific development that the traditional philosophy of science could have expected and the idea that inconsistency is not always a synonym of logical anarchy, as it was suggested in the classical literature of logic and the philosophy of science, has been gaining support. All this has been possible, mostly, thanks to the emergence of paraconsistent logics and the availability of case studies that show how inconsistency is not an uncommon phenomenon in science. But pluralism does not necessarily entail inconsistency toleration nor vice versa. Accordingly the main motivation for this volume is to explore the links between pluralism and inconsistency toleration in science, in order to connect the reflections on inconsistency toleration with broader and major issues in philosophy of science. In order to do so, we will suggest two different lines of investigation: first, to focus on the implication of some pluralistic accounts in the philosophy of science, regarding inconsistency; and second to analyze the implications of some paraconsistent approaches regarding pluralism in science.

I defend the idea that there are universal fictions, and that the Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner way of generating them – namely, with a story including deliberately and explicitly the proposition Everything is true – is still the best one. I reconstruct Wildman and Folde’s Finean criticisms to universal fictions a la Routley-Deutsch-Kapsner based on the idea that the universal quantifier in such fictions may not target the intended range of quantification, that is, all propositions. I show that Wildman and Folde’s argument does not succeed, for they fail to show that every universal sentence has to be understood as involving a restricted quantifier.

A menudo se discute cómo cifrar el alcance de la herencia de Kant en la metafísica de Schopenhauer. Del corazón y sustancia de su Tebas de las mil puertas, la ética, Aramayo cree oportuno tomarla como una radicalización del formalismo kantiano. A mi juicio, para delimitar qué hay de continuidad, y qué de ruptura, es necesario hacer un examen atento del puente que conduce de uno a otro. En este sentido, la crítica dedicada a Kant en Sobre el fundamento de la moral no ocupa un lugar accidental en su pensamiento único, pues contiene lo que le falta al apéndice crítico de su obra principal respecto al objeto que nos ocupa. Desde el análisis de conceptos hasta las lecturas genealógicas que se presentan en esta polémica, un mismo propósito subyace: la depuración del concepto de racionalidad práctica como solución a las aporías y los escollos del legado ético kantiano.

A imagem sugestiva "retorno do outro" ajuda a indicar o modo como a alteridade interpela no actual contexto de globalização. Esse "outro", o grande ausente da maior parte da história da filosofia ocidental, aparece com força renovada (ou, pelo menos, resiste aos embates da homo-geneização) frente à lógica económica, política e cultural, que pretende anulá-lo na imposição uniforme de um estilo de vida. O seu "retorno" abre possibilidades em várias perspectivas. Aqui apenas esboçamos o que significou este "retorno do outro" na irrupção do pensamento intersubjectivo, bem como as possibilidades que abre para a relação intercultural. The suggestive image, "turn to the other", gives an indication of how alterity challenges the current context of globalisation- This "other" is the great absent in the greater part of the history of Western philosophy. It appears with renovated strength (or at least resists the pressures of homogenisation) in the face of the economic, political, and cultural logic that seeks to annul it through the uniform imposition of a given lifestyle. Its return opens possibilities of varying kinds. Here we wish only to sketch the meaning of this "turn to the other" in the irruption of the inter-subjective thought and possibilities it opens for intercultural relations

La postura nietzscheana sobre la educación sufre un viraje considerable. En todo momento el individualismo es el centro de su pensamiento. Pero el acento de ese individualismo marca dos modos de abordar el problema. Lo la primera época parte de una noción de educación utópica de marcado carácter romántico y vinculado a un proyecto político. El ideal de educación es el heleno. La cultura consiste en el sometimiento a los dictámenes del individuo: el genio. En Schopenhauer como educador, Nietzsche manifiesta su ruptura tanto con Schopenhauer como consigo mismo y con la tradición. La crítica a la sociedad y al Estado se patentiza. La educación debe, para ser tal y no represión, partir de uno mismo

En este artículo tratamos de hacer plausible la hipótesis de que las conectivas de diferentes lógicas no necesariamente difieren en significado. Utilizando el tratamiento categorista de las conectivas, argumentaremos contra la tesis quineana de que la diferencia de lógicas implica diferencia de significado entre sus conectivas, y ubicamos el cambio de tema en la diferencia de objetos más bien que en una tal diferencia de significado. Finalmente, intentamos mostrar que ese tratamiento categorista es una forma de minimalismo semántico, de acuerdo con el cual no todos los elementos semánticos usuales son relevantes para determinar el significado de las conectivas