Kevin Gray

This paper delineates the thrust of Augustine's theodicy against the broader background of his Christian Neoplatonic outlook. We examine Augustine's initial Manichean influences and see how these beliefs carry over to his mature thought, which is evident in the seventh book of the Confessions. After Augustine's time with the Manicheans, we look at how he was so influenced by the books of the Platonists (libri platonicorum). Although Augustine's position regarding the problem of evil shifts, his idea of the primacy of the soul is still evident in his thought process. To wit, Augustine posits that evil must be considered a privation of the Good, so much so as to reach the point of complete nonentity. Human beings' ability to be corrupted by evils rests in their position as being created ex-nihilo by God. With this creation also comes an inherent mutability. Due to human mutability, Augustine believes that God is not responsible for such evil actions. This paper also contrasts this belief with modern empiricist David Hume's idea regarding God's responsibility for human actions. Hume argues that the volition of all human actions rests in God as Creator of the world. As creator, Hume claims that God places human beings in a position to act. If humans are predisposed to perform evil actions, they cannot be faulted. Augustine would counter that argument by claiming that evil is not a substance. Not being a substance, evil is there not ascribable to God. Ultimately, Augustine's theodicy is based upon the goodness of God.

Taking Habermas’s Die nachholende Revolution as a foil, I contend that in his discussions of 1989, Habermas has misunderstood the nature of the anti-Communist revolutions. Comparing them to his writings on the public sphere and the student protest movements in Germany, I argue that the revolutions do not represent the triumph of capitalism anymore than they represent the triumph of Western democracy. Calling the events catch-up revolutions is to frame the events as the expansion of modernity and nothing more. Rather, the revolutions show that the revolutionaries in Eastern Europe were grappling with the same problem, namely the control of technical subsystems, that the students and revolutionaries of 1968 were. Viewed in the light of Habermas’s writings from the 1960s, we end up better understanding the twin extremes of capitalism and bureaucratic-totalitarianism.

In this paper, I consider the difficult relationship between Rawls, religion and the values that religious believers might consider important in order to lead the good life. Contrary to many of Rawls’ defenders, I argue that at least some of the values that religious citizens are likely to hold cannot be accounted for under Rawls’ theory or under his conception of the good life. I argue that the model of goods which Rawls takes to be part of a thin theory of the good is tied to his belief that under the Original Position justice can be derived from calculations of self-interest alone. To perform my critique, I consider the paradigmatic case of honour in so-called traditional societies. I argue that the way Rawls thematizes primary goods in A Theory of Justice , including concepts like esteem, cannot account for the way honour manifests itself inside traditional communities. I conclude the paper by considering how Rawls might be able to defend his theory against my objection, by considering the relationship between Rawls’ theory, and the rationalization and secularization of society.

Taking Habermas’s Die nachholende Revolution as a foil, I contend that in his discussions of 1989, Habermas has misunderstood the nature of the anti-Communist revolutions. Comparing them to his writings on the public sphere and the student protest movements in Germany, I argue that the revolutions do not represent the triumph of capitalism anymore than they represent the triumph of Western democracy. Calling the events catch-up revolutions is to frame the events as the expansion of modernity and nothing more. Rather, the revolutions show that the revolutionaries in Eastern Europe were grappling with the same problem, namely the control of technical subsystems, that the students and revolutionaries of 1968 were. Viewed in the light of Habermas’s writings from the 1960s, we end up better understanding the twin extremes of capitalism and bureaucratic-totalitarianism