Paul Hughes

Over the past decade or so political leaders around the world have begun to apologize for, and even seek reconciliation between perpetrators and victims of large-scale moral wrongs such as slavery, campaigns of ethnic cleansing, and official regimes of racial segregation. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is probably the most well-known example of such political efforts to effect what might be called moral healing within and between nations. In this essay, I canvass various senses of reconciliation, clarifying which are appropriate for understanding these recent political efforts to heal the wounds caused by state-sanctioned moral atrocities. I argue that interpersonal reconciliation is not likely to be a promising model for understanding political efforts to achieve moral closure for large-scale wrongs, and I close with some worries about the efficacy of state-sponsored attempts to reconcile victims to their wrongdoers.

For the past thirty-five years or so forgiveness has been of great interest to philosophers, and the recent spate of new books and scholarly essays on the topic is evidence that this interest continues unabated. David Konstan’s Before Forgiveness: The Origins of a Moral Idea is among the recent contributions to this literature. Konstan argues that none of the various ways in which people in the classical Greek and Roman world managed angry emotional states such as resentment constitute the modern phenomenon of forgiveness. And although forgiveness is prominent in the Hebrew and Christian Bibles, the main sense of that term refers to God’s forgiveness of human sin, and not to the contemporary notion of human interpersonal forgiveness, which typically refers to a moral transformation of the victim of wrong that involves, centrally, overcoming or forswearing resentment caused by and directed toward a wrongdoer, and doing so for moral reasons. This latter component refers to behaviors enga ..