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M. J. Garcia-Encinas

University of Granada
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  •  206
    On Categories and A Posteriori Necessity: A Phenomenological Echo
    Metaphilosophy 43 (1-2): 147-164. 2012.
    This article argues for two related theses. First, it defends a general thesis: any kind of necessity, including metaphysical necessity, can only be known a priori. Second, however, it also argues that the sort of a priori involved in modal metaphysical knowledge is not related to imagination or any sort of so-called epistemic possibility. Imagination is neither a proof of possibility nor a limit to necessity. Rather, modal metaphysical knowledge is built on intuition of philosophical categories…Read more
    Modal Epistemology, MiscMetaphysical Necessity
  •  880
    The Role of Intuition in Metaphysics
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (3): 79-99. 2015.
    In this paper I consider the possibility of a kind of a priori cognition that serves the purposes of metaphysics, given that metaphysics involves the search for modal knowledge. Necessary or, better, modal knowledge is a priori; so metaphysical knowledge is likewise a priori. Here I argue that intuition is the route to modal knowledge in metaphysics, and I insist that conceivability or knowledge of conceptual truths does not lead towards the modal realm of metaphysics.
    Modal IntuitionConceivability, Imagination, and Possibility