Antoon Braeckman

Kant's famous essay Beantwortung der Frage. Was ist Aufklärung? has developed into the representative text of philosophical Enlightenment in the course of the past two hundred years. Yet most interpretations tend to assign a univocal meaning to Kant's text that is incompatible with its apparent polysemy. While taking the latter into account, this article wishes to closely investigate Kant's essay and offer a plausible interpretation if its meaning. On the basis of this reading, it becomes apparent that we should understand Kant's historical-philosophical interpretation of the Enlightenment in a normative sense. As a result, the emphasis in the text shifts from a historical-philosophical promise of a totally "Enlightened Age" to a precarious, risky "Age of Enlightenment" which Kant claims to live in. There is ample textual evidence that Kant, who was aware of the risky nature of the moment, wanted to intervene with this essay by cherishing the hope for a possibility of a bit more actual Enlightenment.

The aim of this article is to focus on a central element in Gauchet s diagnosis of our age, namely the tension between human rights and democracy. Since the second half of the nineteen seventies, the era of departing from religion' (la sortie de la religion) has been completed, and we now find ourselves in a ‘society of individuals’ (la société des individus). This goes along with an eclipse of the state and of public reason: the waning concern for the common good. The reason for the existence of politics and the state now seem to lie exclusively in their utility for individuals or interest groups within society. The symptom par excellence of this development is the human rights discourse. Gauchet s claim in this respect is that the unilateral emphasis on human rights threatens democracy as it inevitably obfuscates the necessary counterpart of the individual and its private sphere, i. e. the state. As a result, the individual loses track of its own ground of existence. From this viewpoint, democracy in the name of one of its major pillars (the rights of the individual) seems to destroy another major pillar (the state as the guardian of those rights)