Gottfried Schweiger

Our concern is with the ethical issues related to girlhood and bodily integrity—the right to be free from physical harm and harassment and to experience freedom and security in relation to the body. We defend agency, positive self-relations, and health as basic elements of bodily integrity and we advocate that this normative concept be used as a conceptual tool for the protection of the rights of girls. We assume the capability approach developed by Martha Nussbaum as an ethical framework that enables us to evaluate girls’ well-being and well-becoming in relation to the potential, and often subtle, threats they face. The capability approach can be understood as a theory of justice, and, therefore, as an ethical and political approach. An enriched concept of bodily integrity can help in the design of better policies to address gender biases against girls because it could contribute to seeing them as active agents and valid participants

This paper is based on the assumption that the high incomes of some professional sports athletes, such as players in professional leagues in the United States and Europe, pose an ethical problem of social justice. I deal with the questions of what should follow from this evaluation and in which ways those incomes should be regulated. I discuss three different options: a) the idea that the incomes of professional athletes should be limited, b) the idea that they should be vastly taxed by the state, and c) the idea that there is a moral obligation for the athletes to spend portions of their incomes on good causes. I will conclude that in today’s circumstances there are good reasons to advocate both option one (limitation) and option two (taxation), but that priority should be given to taxation.

In this paper I explore the philosophical debate about poverty. Although there is a significant amount of philosophical research on poverty – especially on world wide and absolute poverty – there is little reflection on what philosophical poverty research could be as a distinct research agenda and also little reflection on certain questions regarding the concept and normative evaluation of poverty. Here, I explore two important questions: What is poverty, which relates to conceptual issues and the definition of poverty. How can poverty be evaluated, which brings forward the normative substance of poverty and its special relation to morality and ethics. In the last section I conclude with further remarks on such a philosophy of poverty.

Recognition and UnemploymentThis paper aims to explore the case of unemployment from the perspective of recognition theory as it was conceived by Axel Honneth. In the first part I present a shortened form of recognition theory and afterwards, in the second part, its take on work and labor in modern societies. Finally, the third part elaborates how unemployment can be understood and evaluated from this viewpoint. I argue that unemployment itself is not a form of misrecognition and therefore not moral evil. But what has to be criticized are the negative effects of unemployment and the degrading treatment of unemployed people.

Both the capability and the recognition approach are influential and substantial theories in social philosophy. In this contribution, we outline their main assumptions in their assessment of poverty. The two approaches are set in relation to each other, focusing mainly on (a) their moral evaluation of poverty, (b) issues of justification of their central normative claims, and (c) the role that is attributed to subjective experiences, feelings and emotions in these theories. This comparison reveals that in spite of significant differences, both lead to the claim that poverty can never be adequately assessed without putting it into the context of a comprehensive ethical theory about the nature and function of societies. Drawing on this result, we conclude that the critical function of social philosophy plays an irreducible role in the study and understanding of poverty.

Axel Honneth has highlighted the importance and role of mutual recognition for the development and sustainability of personal identity. His theory to reconstruct society as the institutionalization of different forms and modes of recognition has been widely discussed but one specific aspect has been left out so far: the temporal and institutional dimension of social esteem. In this paper I argue that social esteem is not simply earned for societal valuable features and achievements but rather gained within the framework of a certain life course. The social sciences discuss this as the institutionalization of life courses which is accompanied with certain social security systems to match the demands of the fordistic organization of labour. Social esteem is not randomly tied to work and labour but rather through a set of institutions as education, employment, social security and pension systems, that on the one hand sanction deviance and on the other hand provide security to pursue a good life. The institutionalized life course allows the individual to plan its future and provides her with a reference point for its legitimate claims. Overall, this provides further insights into the meaning of social esteem and its institutionalization in a modern working society without which the critical function and aim of social philosophy can not be fulfilled. For a social theory of recognition it is necessary to fill its words and concepts with the life the social sciences describe.Die Bedeutung wechselseitiger Anerkennung für die Ausbildung von Identität und für das Verständnis gesellschaftlicher Formationen wurde seit der Reaktualisierung des Anerkennungsbegriffes durch Axel Honneth vielfach aufgenommen und diskutiert. Ein Aspekt, der hierbei bislang zu wenig systematisch untersucht wurde, ist die zeitliche Dimension sozialer Anerkennungsverhältnisse. Die hier vertretene These lautet, dass soziale Wertschätzung im wesentlichen nicht einfach aktual an eine gesellschaftlich für sinnvoll und nützlich erachtete Leistung oder Eigenschaft gekoppelt ist, sondern vielmehr eine in sich zeitliche Kategorie ist, die also im Rahmen eines Lebenslaufes kontinuierlich erworben wird. In anderen Worten: Will man soziale Wertschätzung als Strukturprinzip moderner esellschaften erfassen, so bedarf es keiner synchronen sondern vielmehr einer asynchronen Perspektive, die soziale Anerkennungsverhältnisse über die Zeit abbildet. Dies kann am Konzept des institutionalisierten Lebenslaufes und der mit ihm verbundenen Rahmenbedingungen gezeigt werden. Individuelle Leistung wird nicht einfach gegen gesellschaftlichen und sozio-ökonomischen Status getauscht, sondern vielmehr ist dieser an einen nachvollziehbaren Lebenslauf gebunden. Solcherart langfristige Orientierung wurde und wird durch ein System der betrieblichen wie auch staatlichen Garantie, dass erbrachte Leistungen konserviert und belohnt werden, überhaupt ermöglicht und gestützt. Soziale Wertschätzung ist somit nicht nur abhängig von der Eingliederung in eine bestimmte Gesellschaftsformation, die Leistungen und Eigenschaften honoriert, sondern von der Dauerhaftigkeit dieser “Mitgliedschaft”. Ihren differenzierenden Charakter übt soziale Wertschätzung also wesentlich auch darüber aus, dass Diskontinuitäten im Lebenslauf sanktioniert werden.Axel Honneth naglasio je važnost i ulogu međusobnog priznanja za razvoj i održivost osobnog identiteta. O njegovoj teoriji društvene rekonstrukcije kao institucionalizacije različitih oblika i modusa priznanja naširoko se raspravljalo, no jedan specifičan vid dosad je bio izostavljen: vremenska i institucionalna dimenzija društvenog poštovanja. U ovom članku tvrdim da nije tako da se društveno poštovanje jednostavno zaslužuje zbog društveno vrijednih značajki i postignuća, nego se ono zadobiva unutar okvira određenog tijeka života. Društvene znanosti o tome raspravljaju kao o institucionalizaciji životnih tijekova koja je popraćena određenim sustavima socijalne sigurnosti kako bi se zadovoljili zahtjevi fordističke organizacije rada. Društveno poštovanje nije uz rad vezano nasumce, nego putem skupa institucija kao što su obrazovanje, zaposlenje, socijalna sigurnost i mirovinski sustavi, koji, s jedne strane, sankcioniraju zastranjenja i, s druge, omogućuju sigurnost u slijeđenju dobrog života. Institucionalizirani tijek života omogućuje pojedincu da planira svoju budućnost te mu pruža referentnu točku za svoje legitimne zahtjeve. Sve u svemu, to omogućuje daljnje uvide u značenje društvenog poštovanja i njegove institucionalizacije u modernom društvu bez kojih se kritička funkcija i cilj socijalne filozofije ne mogu ispuniti. Za društvenu teoriju priznanja nužno je da svoje riječi i pojmove ispuni životom što ga opisuju društvene znanosti

As a matter of justice children are entitled to many different things. In this paper we will argue that one of these things is positive self-relations (self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem), and that this implies that they must not be humiliated. This allows us to criticize poverty as unjust and to conclude that it should be alleviated. We will defend this claim in three steps: (1) we will introduce and examine three types of positive self-relations (self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem) and argue that children are entitled to all of these; (2) we will move on to examine the concept of humiliation and argue that acts of humiliating are unjust even if the victims do not experience them as humiliating; (3) finally, we will provide five arguments as to why it is humiliating for children to live in poverty. The five arguments presented in the last section are: (a) poverty is connected to other forms of injustice; (b) poverty is undeserved and represents an arbitrary feature of affected children for which they cannot be held responsible; (c) poverty is widespread among children; (d) poverty is imposed on children because they are part of a larger social group; (e) poverty is an enduring humiliation and not just an occasional incident.

Zusammenfassung: In diesem Beitrag wird der normative Gehalt von Armut und sozialer Exklusion im Wohlfahrtsstaat untersucht. Dazu wird der Grundriss der Gerechtigkeitstheorie von David Miller in Zusammenhang mit dem Konzept der materiellen Deprivation diskutiert, einem von der Europäischen Union verwendeten Indikator für soziale Exklusion. Kernthese ist dabei, dass materielle Deprivation sozial ungerecht ist, da sie die drei Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien des Bedarfs, des Verdienstes und der Gleichheit verletzt. Dieser Befund wird sowohl theoretisch als auch anhand ausgewählter empirischer Erkenntnisse expliziert. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird zum Anschluss dann das Verhältnis von Armutsforschung und Sozialphilosophie und politischer Philosophie diskutiert. Schlagwörter: soziale Gerechtigkeit, Armut, materielle Deprivation, David Miller Social Justice in the Welfare State. On the normative weight of material deprivation Abstract: This paper explores the normative relevance of poverty and social exclusion in the welfare state. I discuss David Miller's theory of social justice and one indicator of poverty and social exclusion utilized by the European Union, namely that of material deprivation. The main thesis is that material deprivation is socially unjust as it violates the three principles of social justice: need, desert, and equality. This finding will be explored on the theoretical level as well as considering empirical insights. Against this background, I will conclude with remarks on the possible contribution of social and political philosophy to poverty research.

Poverty is more than a ‘welfare status’ among others. In this paper I want to show that poverty is not only a failure of distribution of income but that it is a state of humiliation. In the first section I will examine poverty knowledge, how poverty is conceptualised and what norms are inherent in the measures of the poor. In the second section I will show that poverty is humiliating because it is bound to failure and deficiency. To be poor means to be unable to take care for oneself. In the third and final section I will turn to social critique and its relation to the subjects of poverty. There are good reasons to be sceptical of the poor and their judgements and to seek for objective criteria, but this cannot replace the subject and their experience.

Die progressive Besteuerung von Einkommen und Vermögen ist ein politisch viel diskutiertes, aber sozialethisch wenig reflektiertes Thema. In diesem Beitrag wird dargelegt, wie progressive Steuern auf Einkommen und Vermögen in einem Wohlfahrtsstaat aus Perspektive der sozialen Gerechtigkeit, wie sie von David Miller konzipiert wird, gerechtfertigt werden können. Um das Argument so einfach wie möglich zu gestalten, orientiert sich die Fragestellung dabei an der notwendigen Funktion der Bekämpfung von Armut, derer sich Wohlfahrtsstaaten als einer Forderung der sozialen Gerechtigkeit zu verpflichten haben. Progressive Steuern auf Einkommen und Vermögen sind somit genau dann und in genau jener Höhe gerechtfertigt, als sie zur Bekämpfung von Armut notwendig sind. Darüber hinaus kann gezeigt werden, dass die progressive Besteuerung von Einkommen und Vermögen einfach und effizient dieses Ziel erreichen kann, da sie, anders als Massensteuern oder die einheitliche Besteuerung von Einkommen und Vermögen, nicht wohlfahrtsstaatlich ausgeglichen werden müssen.

Health is certainly a valuable asset in the life of every human being and of particular relevance for a flourishing childhood. As empirical research concerning the social determinants of health shows, its distribution can, at least to a certain extent, be influenced by the way a society is arranged. Many philosophers now acknowledge that a fair distribution of health has to be a central part of a just society and they discuss to what extent a right to health can be justified. However, they do not typically distinguish between physical and mental health and neglect the special problems arising from these distinct, though related, perspectives. In this paper, we argue in favour of such a distinction and ask whether a minimally just society ought to include mental health among the goods that are to be distributed in a fair way among its children. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between mental health and happiness and ask whether making mental health a subject of justice implies that children are entitled not only to a healthy but also to a happy childhood. Despite the positive impact of happiness on the lives of children, we conclude that happiness cannot be incorporated into a functional theory of justice, since it does not fully meet the criteria of objectivity, measurability and influenceability.

Child poverty is one of the biggest challenges of today, harming millions of children. In this book, it is investigated from a philosophical social justice perspective, primarily in the context of modern welfare states. Based on both normative theory (particularly the capability approach) and empirical evidence, the authors identify the injustices of child poverty, showing how it negatively affects the well-being of children as well as their whole life course. But child poverty is not 'given by nature'. It is avoidable and there is certainly the moral duty to alleviate it. Therefore, Graf and Schweiger develop a normative theory of responsibilities, which clarifies the moral role of different agents in the poor child's environment: the family, the state and many others, that have so far been neglected in philosophical theories. They conclude their book by sketching how their theory can be extended to global child poverty and what it means to show equal respect and concern for every child - no matter where and in which context they were born.

Despite the increasing popularity of Axel Honneth's recognition theory across philosophy and the social sciences, there is almost no philosophical literature on the relation between recognition and poverty from this perspective. In this paper, I am concerned with three questions related to such a reflection. Firstly, I will examine whether and how the recognition approach can contribute to the understanding of poverty. This involves both conceptual and empirical questions and targets the ability of the recognition approach to propose a valid theory of the social world. Secondly, I am interested in figuring out whether and how the recognition approach can help to understand what is wrong about poverty. This means asking about the normative or ethical competence of the recognition approach in regard to poverty. Thirdly, the recognition approach claims to transcend theory and research, but also affect the social and political practice. Then the question arises as to whether and how it can help to design or implement poverty reduction or poverty alleviation practices and policies. In discussing these three matters, I aim to show that the recognition approach can in fact be a valuable and important contribution to poverty research and poverty politics. A pesar de la creciente popularidad de la teoría de reconocimiento de Axel Honneth tanto en filosofía como en las ciencias sociales, casi no hay literatura filosófica sobre la relación entre reconocimiento y pobreza desde esta perspectiva. En este artículo abordo tres cuestiones relacionadas con esta reflexión. Primero, examinaré si la teoría del reconocimiento puede contribuir a entender la pobreza y cómo puede hacerlo. En segundo lugar, me interesa establecer si la teoría del reconocimiento puede ayudar a entender qué está mal en relación con la pobreza y cómo puede hacerlo. En tercer lugar, la teoría del reconocimiento pretende trascender el ámbito teórico e investigativo y también incidir en las prácticas sociales y políticas. Entonces surge la pregunta sobre si es posible que ella contribuya a diseñar o implementar prácticas y políticas para la reducción de la pobreza y sobre cómo puede hacerlo. Al discutir estos tres asuntos trataré de mostrar que la teoría del reconocimiento puede efectivamente ser una valiosa e importante contribución a la investigación y a las políticas sobre la pobreza

The issue of income justice in professional sports, while a topic of high ethical and social interest, is nevertheless not at the forefront of research. The differences between team and individual sports are significant, and this article will focus on team sports, where income is generally set by fixed contracts rather than bonuses or money prizes. First, I will illustrate the overall problem by presenting some figures on the relation of athletes' salaries from Major League Baseball (MLB) to the median income of the overall population in the USA. I will then outline a model of income justice based on David Miller's definition of social justice, and will discuss two separate claims against which player salaries ought to be justified: those of fellow US citizens and those of fellow MLB players. Incomes are just if they fulfill both demands. Finally, I conclude that the disproportionately high salaries of professional athletes such as those in MLB are socially unjust, and therefore should be limited either by the governing bodies of the respective leagues or by the state.

Obesity and poverty in childhood are widely studied phenomena and despite mixed results, some findings are without doubt: they come with various experiences of mental, physical and social harm, have therefore negative effects on the well-being of children, and they intersect in relation with race, class and gender. In this contribution we analyze child obesity and poverty from a philosophical social justice perspective, which has, to a large extent, so far neglected this topic. We show how they compromise social justice and argue that there is an obligation to implement structural changes to assist the affected children and their families. However, we make also clear that such interventions must not happen in accordance to the current neoliberal fitness and health ideology and its related narrow individualism.

This volume explores the questions related to the theory, practice, and policy of the well-being and well-becoming of children. It does so in a truly interdisciplinary way with a focus on the social sciences and philosophy, giving therefore justice to the growing insight that studying and promoting the well-being of children has a strong ethical component. It is dependent on the questions of good life, its conditions and cannot be separated from the concept of social justice and moral entitlements of children and their families. In this book, philosophers and social scientists, in close dialogue, shed light on some of the most challenging matters involved.

Justice for children and during childhood and the particular political, social and moral status of children has long been a neglected issue in ethics, and in social and political philosophy. The application of general, adult-oriented theories of justice to children can be regarded as particularly problematic. Philosophers have only recently begun to explore what it means to consider children as equals, what goods are especially valuable to them, and what are the obligations of justice different agents have toward children. In addition, while philosophers have extensively written about global poverty and inequality, the issue of disadvantages during childhood, especially child poverty, has only been superficially addressed. This also applies to the Capability Approach (CA) as a normative theory. Although the socio-scientific and economic literature on how to conceptualize capabilities and functionings of children and how to measure them in the context of poverty and wellbeing is steadily growing, the normative aspects of these issues are still under-theorized. The CA offers a unique framework to engage with both the topic of justice for children and questions concerning what justice implies and demands with regard to children living and growing up in disadvantaged circumstances. Furthermore, justice and disadvantage during childhood is a compellingly interdisciplinary topic that invites the combination of ethical and philosophical reasoning together with socio-scientific theories and empirical knowledge. In this special issue of Ethical Perspectives we bring together theoretical and empirically informed discussions that explore the CA in relation to children and the many disadvantages they can face in their lives.

Der Status subjektiver Erfahrungen von Betroffenen für eine normative Bewertung von Armut ist unklar. Exemplarisch lassen sich zwei Richtungen unterscheiden: (a) die These, dass arme Menschen keine zuverlässigen Auskunftsgeber über das moralische Gewicht ihrer Lebenssituation sind, also dass deren Einbezug eine normative Bewertung eher erschweren oder gar verfälschen und (b) die These, dass arme Menschen besonders gut über das moralische Gewicht ihrer Lebenssituation Auskunft geben können, ja eine normative Bewertung ohne diese subjektive Perspektive gar nicht adäquat möglich ist. Die erste These (a) kann als Entfremdungsthese bezeichnet werden, die zweite (b) als Partizipationsthese und auch wenn beide zumeist nicht in reiner Form auftreten, so markieren sie doch eine wichtige Differenz in einer normativen Bewertung der Armut ebenso wie in der Armutsforschung im Allgemeinen. In diesem Beitrag wird nun das Verhältnis beider im Rahmen einer spezifischen Konzeption von philosophischer Armutsforschung, die Armut als eine Verletzung von legitimen Gerechtigkeitsansprüchen versteht, herausgearbeitet. Die leitende These ist dabei, dass subjektive Erfahrungen ein notwendiger Bestandteil sowohl des Entdeckungs- als auch des Begründungszusammenhanges einer solchen Kritik der Armut sind, die jedoch durch intersubjektiv ausweisbare Kriterien gestützt werden müssen.

The capability approach, which is closely connected to the works of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, is one possible theoretical framework that could be used to answer the question as to why poverty is a problem from a moral point of view. In this paper we will focus on the normative philosophical capability approach rather than the social scientific and descriptive perspective. We will show that the approach characterizes poverty mainly as a limitation of freedom and that it is precisely this aspect, from its point of view, that makes poverty morally significant. This insight shifts the discussion away from questions regarding specific capabilities or lists of them-questions treated extensively in the literature-to the more general level of what constitutes the normative core of the capability approach. But as we will also discuss and argue, the role of freedom alone does not give us a complete picture of poverty but only presents us with one aspect relevant to evaluating it. A further aspect which we consider has not been adequately recognized and taken into account by most capability theorists is the experience of disrespect and humiliation, or to put it differently, a lack of recognition.

Die Bedeutung wechselseitiger Anerkennung für die Ausbildung von Identität und für das Verständnis gesellschaftlicher Formationen wurde seit der Reaktualisierung des Anerkennungsbegriffes durch Axel Honneth vielfach aufgenommen und diskutiert. Ein Aspekt, der hierbei bislang zu wenig systematisch untersucht wurde, ist die zeitliche Dimension sozialer Anerkennungsverhältnisse. Die hier vertretene These lautet, dass soziale Wertschätzung im wesentlichen nicht einfach aktual an eine gesellschaftlich für sinnvoll und nützlich erachtete Leistung oder Eigenschaft gekoppelt ist, sondern vielmehr eine in sich zeitliche Kategorie ist, die also im Rahmen eines Lebenslaufes kontinuierlich erworben wird. In anderen Worten: Will man soziale Wertschätzung als Strukturprinzip moderner esellschaften erfassen, so bedarf es keiner synchronen sondern vielmehr einer asynchronen Perspektive, die soziale Anerkennungsverhältnisse über die Zeit abbildet. Dies kann am Konzept des institutionalisierten Lebenslaufes und der mit ihm verbundenen Rahmenbedingungen gezeigt werden. Individuelle Leistung wird nicht einfach gegen gesellschaftlichen und sozio-ökonomischen Status getauscht, sondern vielmehr ist dieser an einen nachvollziehbaren Lebenslauf gebunden. Solcherart langfristige Orientierung wurde und wird durch ein System der betrieblichen wie auch (sozial)staatlichen Garantie, dass erbrachte Leistungen konserviert und belohnt werden, überhaupt ermöglicht und gestützt. Soziale Wertschätzung ist somit nicht nur abhängig von der Eingliederung in eine bestimmte Gesellschaftsformation, die Leistungen und Eigenschaften honoriert, sondern von der Dauerhaftigkeit dieser “Mitgliedschaft”. Ihren differenzierenden Charakter übt soziale Wertschätzung also wesentlich auch darüber aus, dass Diskontinuitäten im Lebenslauf sanktioniert werden.

In this paper I sketch a possible answer to the question of what professional athletes deserve for their sporting activities. I take two different backgrounds into account. First, the content and meaning of desert is highly debated within political philosophy and many theorists are sceptical if it has any value for social justice. On the other hand sport is often understood as a meritocracy, in which all prizes or wins should be solely awarded based on merit. I will distinguish three possible goods that can be deserved for doing professional sport – money, social status and appreciation – and show that athletes deserve them according to their achievements and that this justifies certain inequalities in their distribution. These legitimate disparities have nevertheless been embedded within a broader framework of social justice, which limits them based on a strong understanding of social equality.

The Financial Crisis in Europe puts pressure on welfare states and its tax systems as well as on considerations of social justice. In this paper, we would like to explore the status of the idea of progressive taxation and its justification (especially the ‘ability-to-pay’ principle) in times of a financial crisis. We will discuss it within a social justice framework following David Miller—using the principles of (i) need, (ii) merit, and (iii) equality. We will conclude that progressive taxation can be justified in the light of these three principles, even more so in the situation of a financial crisis that undermines decent living conditions for millions. The principle of need has to be given priority even if this move violates the principles of equality and desert.