Gottfried Schweiger

Both the capability and the recognition approach are influential and substantial theories in social philosophy. In this contribution, we outline their main assumptions in their assessment of poverty. The two approaches are set in relation to each other, focusing mainly on (a) their moral evaluation of poverty, (b) issues of justification of their central normative claims, and (c) the role that is attributed to subjective experiences, feelings and emotions in these theories. This comparison reveals that in spite of significant differences, both lead to the claim that poverty can never be adequately assessed without putting it into the context of a comprehensive ethical theory about the nature and function of societies. Drawing on this result, we conclude that the critical function of social philosophy plays an irreducible role in the study and understanding of poverty.

Zusammenfassung: In diesem Beitrag wird der normative Gehalt von Armut und sozialer Exklusion im Wohlfahrtsstaat untersucht. Dazu wird der Grundriss der Gerechtigkeitstheorie von David Miller in Zusammenhang mit dem Konzept der materiellen Deprivation diskutiert, einem von der Europäischen Union verwendeten Indikator für soziale Exklusion. Kernthese ist dabei, dass materielle Deprivation sozial ungerecht ist, da sie die drei Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien des Bedarfs, des Verdienstes und der Gleichheit verletzt. Dieser Befund wird sowohl theoretisch als auch anhand ausgewählter empirischer Erkenntnisse expliziert. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird zum Anschluss dann das Verhältnis von Armutsforschung und Sozialphilosophie und politischer Philosophie diskutiert. Schlagwörter: soziale Gerechtigkeit, Armut, materielle Deprivation, David Miller Social Justice in the Welfare State. On the normative weight of material deprivation Abstract: This paper explores the normative relevance of poverty and social exclusion in the welfare state. I discuss David Miller's theory of social justice and one indicator of poverty and social exclusion utilized by the European Union, namely that of material deprivation. The main thesis is that material deprivation is socially unjust as it violates the three principles of social justice: need, desert, and equality. This finding will be explored on the theoretical level as well as considering empirical insights. Against this background, I will conclude with remarks on the possible contribution of social and political philosophy to poverty research.

As a matter of justice children are entitled to many different things. In this paper we will argue that one of these things is positive self-relations (self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem), and that this implies that they must not be humiliated. This allows us to criticize poverty as unjust and to conclude that it should be alleviated. We will defend this claim in three steps: (1) we will introduce and examine three types of positive self-relations (self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem) and argue that children are entitled to all of these; (2) we will move on to examine the concept of humiliation and argue that acts of humiliating are unjust even if the victims do not experience them as humiliating; (3) finally, we will provide five arguments as to why it is humiliating for children to live in poverty. The five arguments presented in the last section are: (a) poverty is connected to other forms of injustice; (b) poverty is undeserved and represents an arbitrary feature of affected children for which they cannot be held responsible; (c) poverty is widespread among children; (d) poverty is imposed on children because they are part of a larger social group; (e) poverty is an enduring humiliation and not just an occasional incident.

Poverty is more than a ‘welfare status’ among others. In this paper I want to show that poverty is not only a failure of distribution of income but that it is a state of humiliation. In the first section I will examine poverty knowledge, how poverty is conceptualised and what norms are inherent in the measures of the poor. In the second section I will show that poverty is humiliating because it is bound to failure and deficiency. To be poor means to be unable to take care for oneself. In the third and final section I will turn to social critique and its relation to the subjects of poverty. There are good reasons to be sceptical of the poor and their judgements and to seek for objective criteria, but this cannot replace the subject and their experience.