Gottfried Schweiger

In this paper, I will discuss a children’s rights-based argument for the duty of states, as a joint effort, to establish an effective program to help bring children out of conflict zones, such as parts of Syria, and to a safe haven. Children are among the most vulnerable subjects in violent conflicts who suffer greatly and have their human rights brutally violated as a consequence. Furthermore, children are also a group whose capacities to protect themselves are very limited, while their chance to flee is most often only slim. I will then discuss three counterarguments: the first counterargument would be that, instead of getting the children out of a particular country, it would be better to improve their situation in their home countries. A second counterargument could be that those states, which have such a duty to bring children to a safe haven, would be overburdened by it. Finally, the third counterargument I want to discuss states that such a duty would also demand a military intervention, which could worsen the situation even further.

In this paper, I present an analysis of the “windows into reality” that are used in theories of global justice with a focus on issues of epistemic injustice and the powerlessness of the global poor. I argue that we should aim for a better understanding of global poverty through acknowledging people living in poverty as epistemic subjects. To achieve this, we need to deepen and broaden the knowledge base of theories of global justice and approach the subject through methodologies of “thinking small” and “thick descriptions”, which are ways to give people living in poverty sufficient room to express themselves and have their voices heard, leading to “small” and “thick” knowledge claims.

Zusammenafssung: Dieser Beitrag untersucht das Konzept der relativen Armut, wie es im Rahmen der Europäischen Union politisch festgelegt wurde, im Kontext einer Theorie der Anerkennung. Dabei werden zwei Thesen entwickelt und verteidigt. (1) Die erste These dieses Beitrags lautet, dass relative Armut die Verweigerung sozialer Wertschätzung darstellt. Das heisst, dass mit ihr eine moralische Verletzung und Leid verbunden ist. (2) Die zweite These lautet, dass relative Armut eine soziale Pathologie darstellt. Damit ist gemeint, dass mit ihr nicht nur eine moralische Verletzung verbunden ist, sondern dass relative Armut auch eine signifikante gesellschaftliche Ausbreitung und entsprechende weitreichende Auswirkungen besitzt.