Gottfried Schweiger

The issue of income justice in professional sports, while a topic of high ethical and social interest, is nevertheless not at the forefront of research. The differences between team and individual sports are significant, and this article will focus on team sports, where income is generally set by fixed contracts rather than bonuses or money prizes. First, I will illustrate the overall problem by presenting some figures on the relation of athletes' salaries from Major League Baseball (MLB) to the median income of the overall population in the USA. I will then outline a model of income justice based on David Miller's definition of social justice, and will discuss two separate claims against which player salaries ought to be justified: those of fellow US citizens and those of fellow MLB players. Incomes are just if they fulfill both demands. Finally, I conclude that the disproportionately high salaries of professional athletes such as those in MLB are socially unjust, and therefore should be limited either by the governing bodies of the respective leagues or by the state.

Obesity and poverty in childhood are widely studied phenomena and despite mixed results, some findings are without doubt: they come with various experiences of mental, physical and social harm, have therefore negative effects on the well-being of children, and they intersect in relation with race, class and gender. In this contribution we analyze child obesity and poverty from a philosophical social justice perspective, which has, to a large extent, so far neglected this topic. We show how they compromise social justice and argue that there is an obligation to implement structural changes to assist the affected children and their families. However, we make also clear that such interventions must not happen in accordance to the current neoliberal fitness and health ideology and its related narrow individualism.

This volume explores the questions related to the theory, practice, and policy of the well-being and well-becoming of children. It does so in a truly interdisciplinary way with a focus on the social sciences and philosophy, giving therefore justice to the growing insight that studying and promoting the well-being of children has a strong ethical component. It is dependent on the questions of good life, its conditions and cannot be separated from the concept of social justice and moral entitlements of children and their families. In this book, philosophers and social scientists, in close dialogue, shed light on some of the most challenging matters involved.

Justice for children and during childhood and the particular political, social and moral status of children has long been a neglected issue in ethics, and in social and political philosophy. The application of general, adult-oriented theories of justice to children can be regarded as particularly problematic. Philosophers have only recently begun to explore what it means to consider children as equals, what goods are especially valuable to them, and what are the obligations of justice different agents have toward children. In addition, while philosophers have extensively written about global poverty and inequality, the issue of disadvantages during childhood, especially child poverty, has only been superficially addressed. This also applies to the Capability Approach (CA) as a normative theory. Although the socio-scientific and economic literature on how to conceptualize capabilities and functionings of children and how to measure them in the context of poverty and wellbeing is steadily growing, the normative aspects of these issues are still under-theorized. The CA offers a unique framework to engage with both the topic of justice for children and questions concerning what justice implies and demands with regard to children living and growing up in disadvantaged circumstances. Furthermore, justice and disadvantage during childhood is a compellingly interdisciplinary topic that invites the combination of ethical and philosophical reasoning together with socio-scientific theories and empirical knowledge. In this special issue of Ethical Perspectives we bring together theoretical and empirically informed discussions that explore the CA in relation to children and the many disadvantages they can face in their lives.

Der Status subjektiver Erfahrungen von Betroffenen für eine normative Bewertung von Armut ist unklar. Exemplarisch lassen sich zwei Richtungen unterscheiden: (a) die These, dass arme Menschen keine zuverlässigen Auskunftsgeber über das moralische Gewicht ihrer Lebenssituation sind, also dass deren Einbezug eine normative Bewertung eher erschweren oder gar verfälschen und (b) die These, dass arme Menschen besonders gut über das moralische Gewicht ihrer Lebenssituation Auskunft geben können, ja eine normative Bewertung ohne diese subjektive Perspektive gar nicht adäquat möglich ist. Die erste These (a) kann als Entfremdungsthese bezeichnet werden, die zweite (b) als Partizipationsthese und auch wenn beide zumeist nicht in reiner Form auftreten, so markieren sie doch eine wichtige Differenz in einer normativen Bewertung der Armut ebenso wie in der Armutsforschung im Allgemeinen. In diesem Beitrag wird nun das Verhältnis beider im Rahmen einer spezifischen Konzeption von philosophischer Armutsforschung, die Armut als eine Verletzung von legitimen Gerechtigkeitsansprüchen versteht, herausgearbeitet. Die leitende These ist dabei, dass subjektive Erfahrungen ein notwendiger Bestandteil sowohl des Entdeckungs- als auch des Begründungszusammenhanges einer solchen Kritik der Armut sind, die jedoch durch intersubjektiv ausweisbare Kriterien gestützt werden müssen.

The capability approach, which is closely connected to the works of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, is one possible theoretical framework that could be used to answer the question as to why poverty is a problem from a moral point of view. In this paper we will focus on the normative philosophical capability approach rather than the social scientific and descriptive perspective. We will show that the approach characterizes poverty mainly as a limitation of freedom and that it is precisely this aspect, from its point of view, that makes poverty morally significant. This insight shifts the discussion away from questions regarding specific capabilities or lists of them-questions treated extensively in the literature-to the more general level of what constitutes the normative core of the capability approach. But as we will also discuss and argue, the role of freedom alone does not give us a complete picture of poverty but only presents us with one aspect relevant to evaluating it. A further aspect which we consider has not been adequately recognized and taken into account by most capability theorists is the experience of disrespect and humiliation, or to put it differently, a lack of recognition.

Die Bedeutung wechselseitiger Anerkennung für die Ausbildung von Identität und für das Verständnis gesellschaftlicher Formationen wurde seit der Reaktualisierung des Anerkennungsbegriffes durch Axel Honneth vielfach aufgenommen und diskutiert. Ein Aspekt, der hierbei bislang zu wenig systematisch untersucht wurde, ist die zeitliche Dimension sozialer Anerkennungsverhältnisse. Die hier vertretene These lautet, dass soziale Wertschätzung im wesentlichen nicht einfach aktual an eine gesellschaftlich für sinnvoll und nützlich erachtete Leistung oder Eigenschaft gekoppelt ist, sondern vielmehr eine in sich zeitliche Kategorie ist, die also im Rahmen eines Lebenslaufes kontinuierlich erworben wird. In anderen Worten: Will man soziale Wertschätzung als Strukturprinzip moderner esellschaften erfassen, so bedarf es keiner synchronen sondern vielmehr einer asynchronen Perspektive, die soziale Anerkennungsverhältnisse über die Zeit abbildet. Dies kann am Konzept des institutionalisierten Lebenslaufes und der mit ihm verbundenen Rahmenbedingungen gezeigt werden. Individuelle Leistung wird nicht einfach gegen gesellschaftlichen und sozio-ökonomischen Status getauscht, sondern vielmehr ist dieser an einen nachvollziehbaren Lebenslauf gebunden. Solcherart langfristige Orientierung wurde und wird durch ein System der betrieblichen wie auch (sozial)staatlichen Garantie, dass erbrachte Leistungen konserviert und belohnt werden, überhaupt ermöglicht und gestützt. Soziale Wertschätzung ist somit nicht nur abhängig von der Eingliederung in eine bestimmte Gesellschaftsformation, die Leistungen und Eigenschaften honoriert, sondern von der Dauerhaftigkeit dieser “Mitgliedschaft”. Ihren differenzierenden Charakter übt soziale Wertschätzung also wesentlich auch darüber aus, dass Diskontinuitäten im Lebenslauf sanktioniert werden.

In this paper I sketch a possible answer to the question of what professional athletes deserve for their sporting activities. I take two different backgrounds into account. First, the content and meaning of desert is highly debated within political philosophy and many theorists are sceptical if it has any value for social justice. On the other hand sport is often understood as a meritocracy, in which all prizes or wins should be solely awarded based on merit. I will distinguish three possible goods that can be deserved for doing professional sport – money, social status and appreciation – and show that athletes deserve them according to their achievements and that this justifies certain inequalities in their distribution. These legitimate disparities have nevertheless been embedded within a broader framework of social justice, which limits them based on a strong understanding of social equality.

The Financial Crisis in Europe puts pressure on welfare states and its tax systems as well as on considerations of social justice. In this paper, we would like to explore the status of the idea of progressive taxation and its justification (especially the ‘ability-to-pay’ principle) in times of a financial crisis. We will discuss it within a social justice framework following David Miller—using the principles of (i) need, (ii) merit, and (iii) equality. We will conclude that progressive taxation can be justified in the light of these three principles, even more so in the situation of a financial crisis that undermines decent living conditions for millions. The principle of need has to be given priority even if this move violates the principles of equality and desert.

In this paper, I will discuss a children’s rights-based argument for the duty of states, as a joint effort, to establish an effective program to help bring children out of conflict zones, such as parts of Syria, and to a safe haven. Children are among the most vulnerable subjects in violent conflicts who suffer greatly and have their human rights brutally violated as a consequence. Furthermore, children are also a group whose capacities to protect themselves are very limited, while their chance to flee is most often only slim. I will then discuss three counterarguments: the first counterargument would be that, instead of getting the children out of a particular country, it would be better to improve their situation in their home countries. A second counterargument could be that those states, which have such a duty to bring children to a safe haven, would be overburdened by it. Finally, the third counterargument I want to discuss states that such a duty would also demand a military intervention, which could worsen the situation even further.

In this paper, I present an analysis of the “windows into reality” that are used in theories of global justice with a focus on issues of epistemic injustice and the powerlessness of the global poor. I argue that we should aim for a better understanding of global poverty through acknowledging people living in poverty as epistemic subjects. To achieve this, we need to deepen and broaden the knowledge base of theories of global justice and approach the subject through methodologies of “thinking small” and “thick descriptions”, which are ways to give people living in poverty sufficient room to express themselves and have their voices heard, leading to “small” and “thick” knowledge claims.

Zusammenafssung: Dieser Beitrag untersucht das Konzept der relativen Armut, wie es im Rahmen der Europäischen Union politisch festgelegt wurde, im Kontext einer Theorie der Anerkennung. Dabei werden zwei Thesen entwickelt und verteidigt. (1) Die erste These dieses Beitrags lautet, dass relative Armut die Verweigerung sozialer Wertschätzung darstellt. Das heisst, dass mit ihr eine moralische Verletzung und Leid verbunden ist. (2) Die zweite These lautet, dass relative Armut eine soziale Pathologie darstellt. Damit ist gemeint, dass mit ihr nicht nur eine moralische Verletzung verbunden ist, sondern dass relative Armut auch eine signifikante gesellschaftliche Ausbreitung und entsprechende weitreichende Auswirkungen besitzt.

Empirical evidence clearly shows that child poverty is a growing concern in the industrialized world and that the well-being of children is deeply affected by growing up in poverty in at least two ways. On the one hand, a low socioeconomic status jeopardizes the access to goods and services that are necessary for the current well-being of children. On the other hand, growing up in poverty also, in various ways, negatively affects the well-being in later life. On the basis of the capability approach, we will show that the systematic protection and advancement of the wellbeing of children, and hence the reduction of child poverty, is a key task of social justice, which should therefore guide policy design and implementation. However, we will also discuss the special composition of the well-being of children and point out how it poses difficulties for state action in this regard. In particular, we will argue that the importance of love and affection for a child’s well-being limits considerably the possible political measures to provide fair life chances to all children. This again reflects the insight that poverty should not be reduced to economic inequality.

Unemployment is one of the greatest social problems all around the world including in modern capitalistic welfare states. Therefore its social critique is a necessary task for any critical social philosophy such as Axel Honneth's recognition approach, which understands social justice in terms of social conditions of recognition. This paper aims to develop an evaluation of unemployment and its moral weight from this perspective. I will lay out the recognition approach and present a moral evaluation of unemployment as socially unjust based on the knowledge of its negative consequences for those affected. I will then discuss two objections to this conclusion, namely that a mere correlation of suffering and moral wrongness is not enough and that there are legitimate differences in the experience of recognition which could justify the existence of unemployment as deserved. In the next section, I will then refute both objections and first show that unemployment can be understood as socially unjust based on the knowledge that it is involuntary and that the unemployed are not responsible for their condition. Then I will discuss the relationship between the idea of meritocracy and unemployment to examine the assumption of unemployment as being deserved. I will finally conclude that unemployment is not a necessary side effect of meritocracy and that there are good reasons to argue for a moral and justified obligation to provide an actual access to paid work for all who want to work. However, such changes face serious obstacles and are not likely to happen under the current interpretation of meritocracy and social esteem which are one-sided and flawed.