Gottfried Schweiger

This book offers a broad and diverse reflection of the ways in which child poverty could be conceptualised, and the ways in which it is intertwined with childhood as a specific social condition. Furthermore, the responsibilities towards children and the possible mechanisms required for dealing with this condition will be analysed and clarified. This is the first volume on philosophy and child poverty. Despite the increasing number of publications on poverty, the particular phenomenon of poverty during childhood has not received much philosophical attention. This is surprising, given the severity and depth of child poverty around the globe. This volume brings together various philosophical approaches and how they understand and tackle child poverty. This is an important addition to the philosophical literature, which is also of wider interest to scholars working in the social sciences and with an interest in child poverty.

Das Ziel einer gerechten oder zumindest gerechteren Welt scheint angesichts der täglichen Nachrichten über Armut, Ausbeutung, Unterdrückung, Gewalt, Krieg und Flucht ein fernes Ideal. Das Wissen darum, dass es so, wie es ist, nicht gerecht ist, ist aber erst ein vager Hinweis darauf, wie eine gerechte Welt aussehen würde. Dafür gibt es vielmehr eine ganze Reihe an Vorschlägen. Innerhalb der philosophischen Literatur hat die Debatte darüber, was globale Gerechtigkeit ausmacht und wie sie zu erreichen wäre, in den letzten Jahrzehnten deutlich zugenommen. Der Fokus auf den einzelnen Staat als Ort der Gerechtigkeit wurde nach und nach in immer mehr philosophischen Theorien in Frage gestellt und kosmopolitisch erweitert, wenn dies auch nicht unbestritten geblieben ist.

Wenn im Folgenden von sozialer Gerechtigkeit die Rede ist, dann sind damit vier Einschränkungen verbunden: Erstens, geht es um Gerechtigkeit in einem mehr oder weniger geschlossenen, staatlich verfassten Gebilde. Davon zu unterscheiden wäre also einerseits globale Gerechtigkeit, die sich auf alle Kinder, unabhängig davon, wo sie sich befinden, bezieht und andererseits Gerechtigkeit zwischen solchen staatlichen Gebilden. Zweitens wird soziale Gerechtigkeit hier nicht auf einen bestimmten Staat bezogen, sondern allgemein thematisiert.

In Austria, foster parents are screened and selected by local child and youth welfare services, and then they are required to complete several weeks of training. This essay is a personal reflection on this training, which I completed with my wife in early 2022. However, I am also writing this personal reflection from an ethical perspective informed by my work as an ethicist and philosopher at the university. Topics that concern me are the understanding of child and youth welfare, the parental role of foster parents, the focus of the training on practical knowledge from experience, and the relationship between experts and foster parents.

Adolescence is a valuable phase of life, not just because it is the phase of learning in school and preparing for a working life. During the COVID-19 pandemic it became clear that the rights, experiences, and lifeworlds of adolescents are considered less important than the needs of school, work, and productivity. However, there is an ethical claim for people to have a good adolescence, and this means that the losses of social contact, experiences, time, and space demanded of adolescents, in order to protect older and vulnerable groups during the COVID-19 pandemic, should be taken seriously. A distinctive quality of adolescence is that it cannot be repeated, nor can these experiences be replicated as adults. First experiences of independence, friendship, love, informality, recklessness, and youthful exuberance are intrinsically valuable and cannot be substituted for later in life. It is therefore not surprising that adolescents have sought and found their own spaces during the pandemic, some of them forbidden, because lock downs and closed social spaces have relegated them to the confines of their childhood bedrooms. In this paper, I explore an ethic of a good adolescence, which was impacted on by the COVID-19 pandemic, and consider what can be learned from this situation. Adolescents are to be taken seriously, their experiences are no less valuable than those of adults, and the losses they have suffered for the benefit of others should be honored. As far as possible, young people should be supported to have a voice in public discourse and in finding spaces to be adolescents.

Adolescence is a valuable phase of life, not just because it is the phase of learning in school and preparing for a working life. During the COVID-19 pandemic it became clear that the rights, experiences, and lifeworlds of adolescents are considered less important than the needs of school, work, and productivity. However, there is an ethical claim for people to have a good adolescence, and this means that the losses of social contact, experiences, time, and space demanded of adolescents, in order to protect older and vulnerable groups during the COVID-19 pandemic, should be taken seriously. A distinctive quality of adolescence is that it cannot be repeated, nor can these experiences be replicated as adults. First experiences of independence, friendship, love, informality, recklessness, and youthful exuberance are intrinsically valuable and cannot be substituted for later in life. It is therefore not surprising that adolescents have sought and found their own spaces during the pandemic, some of them forbidden, because lock downs and closed social spaces have relegated them to the confines of their childhood bedrooms. In this paper, I explore an ethic of a good adolescence, which was impacted on by the COVID-19 pandemic, and consider what can be learned from this situation. Adolescents are to be taken seriously, their experiences are no less valuable than those of adults, and the losses they have suffered for the benefit of others should be honored. As far as possible, young people should be supported to have a voice in public discourse and in finding spaces to be adolescents.

Den Sozialismus als Alternative zum Liberalismus in einem philosophischen Handbuch darzustellen, ist mit zwei gravierenden Schwierigkeiten verbunden. Erstens gibt es nicht den Sozialismus als einheitliche Denkschule, sondern eine Tradition, in der sich unterschiedliche Varianten herausgebildet haben, die sich teils heftig bekämpften. Es gibt einen „klassischen“ Sozialismus ausgehend von MarxMarx, Karl, aber auch anarchistische und religiöse Sozialismen genauso wie sozialdemokratische und liberale Strömungen, die sich noch dem Sozialismus und seiner Idee verpflichtet sehen.

Weltweit leben auch heute noch – je nach Messung – hunderte Millionen Kinder in Armut, und Kinderarmut ist sowohl in reichen wie auch armen Ländern zu finden. Gemäß der Zahlen der Weltbank mussten 2013 fast 400 Millionen Kinder weltweit mit weniger als 1,90$ am Tag auskommen, und die offizielle Statistik für die EU spricht für das Jahr 2016 von fast 25 Millionen Kindern, die in Europa in armutsgefährdeten Haushalten leben. Diese Zahlen zeigen ein ethisches Problem an, sie geben aber noch keine Auskunft darüber, welche Fragen Kinderarmut für die Philosophie und insbesondere eine Philosophie der Kindheit aufwirft. Obwohl Armut schon seit längerem innerhalb der Philosophie thematisiert wird, gibt es erst sehr wenige Arbeiten, die sich explizit mit Kinderarmut auseinandersetzen.

Anerkennung hat sich in den letzten Jahren als ein zentrales Konzept in der politischen Philosophie und Sozialphilosophie etabliert. Ausgehend von seiner Verwendung bei Fichte und Hegel und insbesondere durch seine Aktualisierung im Werk von Axel Honneth, aber auch bei Denker*innen wie Nancy Fraser oder Charles Taylor, wird Anerkennung zur Analyse und Kritik sozialer Verhältnisse herangezogen. Das Vorhaben, soziale Verhältnisse als Anerkennungsverhältnisse sowie soziale Probleme und Konflikte als Kämpfe um Anerkennung zu verstehen und zu beschreiben, wird er auch in den empirisch arbeitenden Sozialwissenschaften vorangetrieben, in denen es detaillierte Studien zu unterschiedlichen Feldern wie Arbeit, Armut oder der Sozialen Arbeit gibt. Im Vordergrund dieses Kapitels aber steht Anerkennung als normatives Konzept, welches dazu geeignet ist, Elemente einer gerechten Gesellschaft festzulegen.

In this short introduction, I highlight the relation between recognition and migration and explore the potentials of a critical theory of recognition. Migration in all its forms and its causes is by no means a new phenomenon, but it has become more intense in some parts of the world, and, especially in Europe, its perception by politics and the population has changed. Migration is also widely discussed in ethics and political philosophy. So what contribution can a critical theory of recognition make here? Recognition is an analytical concept, which can also be employed in empirical research to better understand the claims and living conditions of migrants. Recognition is also a normative and ethical concept, which helps to formulate what a just society owes migrants and to conceptualize their moral rights. Finally, I will also say a few words about the relation of recognition and migration before the background of the COVID-19 pandemic.

ABSTRACT Based on Honneth's distinction of recognition in love, respect and social esteem, the social suffering of refugees is criticized in this contribution as an experience of disrespect. In the first part, I will address the fact that moral claims to recognition have a temporal dimension. Then I will ask what role the duration of their flight, the waiting in camps and until admission play for the social suffering of refugees. I will highlight the particular vulnerability of refugees during this time and distinguish different forms of disrespect - with regard to love, social esteem, and respect and rights - faced by them. In the final section, I pose the question which individuals and institutions are responsible for enabling conditions of recognition for refugees.

This book brings together philosophical, social-theoretical and empirically oriented contributions on the philosophical and socio-theoretical debate on migration and integration, using the instruments of recognition as a normative and social-scientific category. Furthermore, the theoretical and practical implications of recognition theory are reflected through the case of migration. Migration movements, refugees and the associated tensions are phenomena that have become the focus of scientific, political and public debate in recent years. Migrants, in particular refugees, face many injustices and are especially vulnerable, but the right-wing political discourse presents them as threats to social order and stability. This book shows what a critical theory of recognition can contribute to the debate. The book is suitable for researchers in philosophy, social theory and migration research. "A profound examination of how states and societies struggle to recognize migrants as fellow human beings in all their fullness. The contributions are exceptional for combining astute philosophy and social theory with a discussion of actual politics and real lives." Dr. Hugo Slim “This impressive and timely volume offers an innovative way of understanding the issues of migration and integration by using a critical theory of recognition. Recognition theory has rich potential for effectively responding to the issues of autonomy, identity, integration, and empowerment that are at the core of the current public debates on mass migration, displacement, and the refugee crisis. By examining the normative and policy implications of recognition as they apply to migration, the book offers a pathbreaking look at the human dimension of the debate.” Dr. Helle Porsdam

In this paper, we aim to clarify two central assumptions, which allow to specify what justice for children implies in the Capability Approach. First, we argue that an adequate currency of justice for children consists in a bundle of functionings, which develops into a bundle of capabilities in the course of childhood; the currency of justice for children is dynamic, not static. Second, we discuss how the respective functionings and capabilities should be selected. In particular, we suggest four criteria. They imply that there is not only a change through time from a bundle of functionings to a bundle of capabilities as the currency of justice for children, but that the composition of the bundle itself gets modified.

ZusammenfassungIn diesem Text werde ich zwei Thesen entfalten: Erstens, dass romantische Liebe Teil einer guten Jugend ist. Liebe als Teil einer guten Jugend hat mehrere Bestandteile: Jugendliche sollten romantische Liebe erleben können, wenn sie es wollen. Sie sollten das Wissen und die Fähigkeiten erlangen, romantische Liebe zu verstehen und adäquat mit den positiven Potentialen und auch den Risiken umgehen zu können. Jugendliche sollten lernen, die möglichen Enttäuschungen, die mit romantischer Liebe verbunden sein können, adäquat zu verarbeiten und darin gegebenenfalls Unterstützung erfahren. Jugendliche sollten darin befähigt werden, die sozialen und kulturellen Normen und Praktiken, die die Vorstellungen romantischer Liebe prägen, zu reflektieren und zu hinterfragen. Zweitens ist zu klären, welche moralischen Rechte und Pflichten die Eltern und staatliche Institutionen haben. Ich plädiere dafür, diese so zu verstehen, dass sie Jugendliche in der Erlangung und adäquaten Auslebung romantischer Liebe unterstützen und ihnen bei der Entwicklung dieser Fähigkeiten die notwendigen Ressourcen zur Verfügung stellen sollten.

Die philosophische Forschung zu Fragen der Armut hat zuletzt auch im deutschsprachigen Raum zugenommen. Im Fokus stehen dabei zumeist Fragen der Ethik und politischen Philosophie, etwa jene danach, worin das moralische Übel der Armut besteht oder nach der individuellen, kollektiven und institutionellen Verantwortung gegenüber Menschen in Armut. Die Aktualität der Armutsfrage ist dabei unbestritten sowohl im Hinblick auf ihr globales Ausmaß und die teils verheerenden Folgen für die betroffenen Personen als auch im Hinblick auf das Politikum Armut in entwickelten Wohlfahrtsstaaten. Das Ziel des Handbuchs ist es, den aktuellen Stand der philosophischen Forschung umfassend abzubilden. Dabei werden nicht nur die klassischen Fragestellungen der politischen Philosophie und Ethik behandelt, sondern auch jene aufgegriffen, die bislang weniger intensiv diskutiert wurden. Das betrifft etwa ethische Fragen der Armutsforschung oder die Verhandlung der Armut in den verschiedenen historischen Epochen und Strömungen.

This book brings together philosophical approaches to explore the relation of recognition and poverty. This volume examines how critical theories of recognition can be utilized to enhance our understanding, evaluation and critique of poverty and social inequalities. Furthermore, chapters in this book explore anti-poverty policies, development aid and duties towards the (global) poor. This book includes critical examinations of reflections on poverty and related issues in the work of past and present philosophers of recognition. This book hopes to contribute to the ongoing and expanding debate on recognition in ethics, political and social philosophy by focusing on poverty, which is one highly important social and global challenge. “If one believed that the theme of “recognition” had been theoretically exhausted over the last couple of years, this book sets the record straight. The central point of all the studies collected here is that poverty is best understood in its social causes, psychic consequences and moral injustice when studied within the framework of recognition theory. Regardless of how recognition is defined in detail, poverty is best captured as the absence of all material and cultural conditions for being recognized as a human being. Whoever is interested in the many facets of poverty is well advised to consult this path-breaking book.” Axel Honneth, Columbia University.