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12Review of Kent Greenawalt: Private Consciences and Public Reasons (review)Ethics 107 (2): 358-361. 1997.
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101Normative consent and authorityIn Peter Schaber & Andreas Müller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent, Routledge. 2018.
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93Prime justiceIn Kevin Vallier & Michael Weber (eds.), Political Utopias: Contemporary Debates, Oup Usa. 2017.
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121Replies to criticsPhilosophical Studies 178 (7): 2439-2472. 2020.I offer replies to critical comments on my book, Utopophobia: On the Limits of Political Philosophy, in four pieces appearing in the same issue of this journal.
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46Precis of Utopophobia: on the limits (if any) of political philosophyPhilosophical Studies 178 (7): 2359-2364. 2020.
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21Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political TheoryPhilosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (3): 821-825. 1996.
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25Review of James Fishkin: The Dialogue of Justice: Toward a Self-Reflective Society (review)Ethics 105 (1): 186-188. 1994.
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55Utopophobia: On the Limits (If Any) of Political PhilosophyPrinceton University Press. 2019.A leading political theorist’s groundbreaking defense of ideal conceptions of justice in political philosophy Throughout the history of political philosophy and politics, there has been continual debate about the roles of idealism versus realism. For contemporary political philosophy, this debate manifests in notions of ideal theory versus nonideal theory. Nonideal thinkers shift their focus from theorizing about full social justice, asking instead which feasible institutional and political chan…Read more
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DemocracyIn Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2005.
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27What is circumstantial about justice?Social Philosophy and Policy 33 (1-2): 292-311. 2016.:Does social justice lose all application in the condition in which people are morally flawless? The answer, I will argue, is that it does not — justice might still have application. This is one lesson of my broader thesis in this paper, that there is a variety of conditions we would all regard as highly idealistic and unrealistic which are, nevertheless, not beyond justice. The idea of “circumstances of justice” developed especially by Hume and Rawls may seem to point in a more realistic direct…Read more
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98On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy, by Philip Pettit: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, xii + 347, $24.99 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4): 799-802. 2014.
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31Book ReviewsRobert E. Goodin, Reflective Democracy.New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. 320. $46.79Ethics 115 (3): 609-614. 2005.
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3Book ReviewsSamuel Freeman,, ed. Cambridge Companion to Rawls.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. 598. $65.00 ; $24.00 (review)Ethics 114 (3): 608-615. 2004.
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44Book ReviewsCass Sunstein,. Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. 296. $35.00 ; $15.95 (review)Ethics 113 (4): 911-914. 2003.
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148The Ideal, the Neighborhood, and the Status Quo: Gaus on the Uses of JusticeEthics 127 (4): 912-928. 2017.
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37Debate: Liberalism, Equality, and Fraternity in Cohen’s Critique of RawlsJournal of Political Philosophy 6 (1): 99-112. 2002.
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1Review of James Fishkin: The Dialogue of Justice: Toward a Self-Reflective Society (review)Ethics 105 (1): 186-188. 1994.
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160What's So Rickety? Richardson's Non‐Epistemic DemocracyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1): 204-204. 2007.
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12Sex, Preference, and Family: Essays on Law and Nature (edited book)Oxford University Press USA. 1997.In this timely, provocative volume, essayists including Susan Moller Okin, Catherine A. MacKinnon, Cass Sunstein, Martha Minow, William Galston, and Sara McLanahan argue positions on sexuality, on the family, and on the proper role of law in these areas.
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947Introduction: Epistemic approaches to democracyEpisteme 5 (1). 2008.The papers published in this special issue can fairly be unified under the heading “Epistemic Democracy,” but there is more variety among them than this might indicate. They exhibit the broad range of ways in which epistemological considerations are figuring in contemporary philosophical discussions of democracy. The authors range from young and promising to established and distinguished. I'd like to introduce a few of the issues that run through the papers, sprinkling references to the actual p…Read more
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25What's So Rickety? Richardson's Non‐Epistemic DemocracyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1): 204-204. 2007.
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7There is a growing literature under the banner of "deliberative democracy," and Paul Weithman suggests that much of it is based on, or at least implies, a critique of the kind of theory of justice pioneered by Rawls 1. The issue at stake is whether a democratic political theory can admit independent normative standards that apply to and constrain democratic decisions. A certain kind of critic thinks independent standards are anti-democratic. Weithman's defense of Rawlsian theory against this cha…Read more
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14The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism: Kant, Rawls, and HabermasPolitical Theory 20 (4): 694-697. 1992.
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398Reply to Copp, Gaus, Richardson, and EdmundsonEthics 121 (2): 354-389. 2011.This piece is a response to four essays that critically discuss my book Democratic Authority. In addition to responding to their specific criticisms, it takes up several methodological issues that put some of the critiques in a broader context. Among the issues discussed are “normative consent,” which I offer as a new theory of authority; the “general acceptability requirement,” which advances a broadly Rawlsian approach to political justification; and methodological questions about theory build…Read more
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541Democracy & Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference, Geoffery Brennan and Loren Lomasky. Cambridge University Press, 1993, 225 + x pages (review)Economics and Philosophy 12 (1): 113. 1996.
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626Jeremy Waldron on law and disagreementPhilosophical Studies 99 (1): 111-128. 2000.Waldron argues that recent treatments of justice have neglected reasonable disagreement about justice itself. So Waldron offers a procedural account of democratic legitimacy, in which contending views of justice can be brought together to arrive at a decision without deciding which one is correct. However, if there is reasonable disagreement about everything, then this includes his preferred account of legitimacy. On the other hand, it is not clear that Waldron is right to count so much disagree…Read more
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588Democratic theoryIn Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 208--30. 2005.