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171Replies to Critics (on Utopophobia)Moral Philosophy and Politics 2023 (2): 321-336. 2023.I reply to several pieces of commentary on my recent book.
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161Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic Dimension of Democratic AuthorityIn James Bohman & William Rehg (eds.), Deliberative Democracy. pp. 173-204. 1997.
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160What's So Rickety? Richardson's Non‐Epistemic DemocracyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1): 204-204. 2007.
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148The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy (edited book)Oxford University Press USA. 2012.This volume includes 22 new pieces by leaders in the field on both perennial and emerging topics of keen interest to contemporary political philosophers.
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148The Ideal, the Neighborhood, and the Status Quo: Gaus on the Uses of JusticeEthics 127 (4): 912-928. 2017.
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146G. A. Cohen’s critique of the Original PositionIn Timothy Hinton (ed.), The Original Position, Cambridge University Press. 2015.
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141I Will If You Will: Leveraged Enhancements and Distributive JusticeIn Brian Feltham & John Cottingham (eds.), Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the Wider World, Oxford University Press. 2010.
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141What Good Is It? Unrealistic Political Theory and the Value of Intellectual WorkAnalyse & Kritik 33 (2): 395-416. 2011.Suppose justice depends on some very unlikely good behavior. In that case the true (or correct, or best) theory of justice might have no practical value. But then, what good would it be? I consider analogies with science and mathematics in order to test various ways of tying their the value of intellectual work to practice, though I argue that these fail. If their value, or that of some political theory, is not practical then what is good about them? As for political theory, I consider the quest…Read more
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121Replies to criticsPhilosophical Studies 178 (7): 2439-2472. 2020.I offer replies to critical comments on my book, Utopophobia: On the Limits of Political Philosophy, in four pieces appearing in the same issue of this journal.
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113Reply to WiensEuropean Journal of Political Theory 15 (3): 353-362. 2016.In Human Nature and the Limits of Political Philosophy, I argued that justice might require things of people that they cannot bring themselves to do. A central step was to argue that this does not entail an inability to ‘do’ the putatively required thing. David Wiens challenges that argument of mine, and this piece is my reply.
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104Democracy and the Real Speech SituationIn Samantha Besson & Jose Luis Marti (eds.), Deliberative Democracy and Its Discontents, Ashgate. pp. 75-92. 2006.
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103Making Truth Safe For DemocracyIn David Copp, Jean Hampton & John Roemer (eds.), The Idea of Democracy, Cambridge University Press. pp. 71-100. 1993.
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101Normative consent and authorityIn Peter Schaber & Andreas Müller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent, Routledge. 2018.
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101Epistemic Proceduralism and Democratic AuthorityIn Raf Greenens & Ronald Tinnevelt (eds.), Does Truth Matter? Democracy and Public Space, Springer. 2008.
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98On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy, by Philip Pettit: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, xii + 347, $24.99 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4): 799-802. 2014.
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95Deliberation Down and Dirty: Must Political Expression Be Civil?In Thomas Henley (ed.), The Boundaries of Freedom of Expression and Order in American Democracy, Kent State University Press. pp. 49-67. 2001.
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93Prime justiceIn Kevin Vallier & Michael Weber (eds.), Political Utopias: Contemporary Debates, Oup Usa. 2017.
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87Who's Afraid of Deliberative Democracy? The Strategic / Deliberative Dichotomy in Recent Constitutional JurisprudenceTexas Law Review 71 (1992-1993): 1437-1477. 1993.
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85What’s Unjust about Structural Injustice?Ethics 134 (3): 333-359. 2024.Structural injustice is either wrong or not. A deontic view, on which there is no injustice except agents’ wrongdoing, may have trouble reaching such intuitive cases as structural sexism, and especially structural class inequality. An alternative telic approach, on which injustice is bad but not wrong, can reach those cases. But how could injustice in that telic sense warrant resentment or righteous anger, as it seems injustice must? I press the dilemma to scrutinize not only the current idea of…Read more
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76Reply to three commentators (symposium on "Democratic Authority")Iyyun, The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 58 (January 2009): 73-88. 2009.
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70The Visit & The Video: Publication and the Line Between Sex and SpeechIn David Estlund & Martha Nussbaum (eds.), Sex, Preference, and Family, Oxford University Press. 1997.
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69The Truth in Political LiberalismIn Andrew Norris & Jeremy Elkins (eds.), Truth and Democratic Politics, University of Pennsylvania Press. 2010.
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67Democracy CountsIn Jon Elster & Hélène Landemore (eds.), Collective Wisdom, Cambridge University Press. 2012.