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13Is prediction possible in general relativity?Foundations of Physics 38 (4): 317-321. 2008.Here we briefly review the concept of "prediction" within the context of classical relativity theory. We prove a theorem asserting that one may predict one's own future only in a closed universe. We then question whether prediction is possible at all (even in closed universes). We note that interest in prediction has stemmed from considering the epistemological predicament of the observer. We argue that the definitions of prediction found thus far in the literature do not fully appreciate this p…Read more
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6Time machinesStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 48 (2): 124-127. 2014.
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4Here, we show that one may "time travel" in Gödel spacetime with less total acceleration than was previously known. This answers a question posed by Malament.
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31Epistemic “Holes” in Space-TimePhilosophy of Science 83 (2): 265-276. 2016.A number of models of general relativity seem to contain “holes” that are thought to be “physically unreasonable.” One seeks a condition to rule out these models. We examine a number of possibilities already in use. We then introduce a new condition: epistemic hole-freeness. Epistemic hole-freeness is not just a new condition—it is new in kind. In particular, it does not presuppose a distinction between space-times that are “physically reasonable” and those that are not.
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46The Geometry of ConventionalityPhilosophy of Science 81 (2): 233-247. 2014.There is a venerable position in the philosophy of space and time that holds that the geometry of spacetime is conventional, provided one is willing to postulate a “universal force field.” Here we ask a more focused question, inspired by this literature: in the context of our best classical theories of space and time, if one understands “force” in the standard way, can one accommodate different geometries by postulating a new force field? We argue that the answer depends on one’s theory. In Newt…Read more
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17On the existence of “time machines” in general relativityPhilosophy of Science 76 (5): 1020-1026. 2009.Within the context of general relativity, we consider one definition of a “time machine” proposed by Earman, Smeenk, and Wüthrich. They conjecture that, under their definition, the class of time machine spacetimes is not empty. Here, we prove this conjecture. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Washington, Box 353350, Seattle, WA 98195‐3350; e‐mail: [email protected].
Irvine, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
General Relativity |
Areas of Interest
General Relativity |
PhilPapers Editorships
General Relativity |