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68Rethinking folk-psychology: Alternatives to theories of mindPhilosophical Explorations 11 (3). 2008.This Article does not have an abstract
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11Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary MetaphysicsWiley-Blackwell. 2008._Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics_ is about some of the most fundamental kinds of things that there are; the things that we encounter in everyday experience. A book about the things that we encounter in everyday experience. Contains a thorough and accessible discussion of the nature and aims of metaphysics. Examines a wide range of ontological categories, including both particulars and universals. Mounts a forceful and persuasive case for anti-reductionism
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672Mary Meets Molyneux: The Explanatory Gap and the Individuation of Phenomenal ConceptsNoûs 38 (3): 503-524. 2004.It is widely accepted that physicalism faces its most serious challenge when it comes to making room for the phenomenal character of psychological experience, its so-called what-it-is-like aspect. The challenge has surfaced repeatedly over the past two decades in a variety of forms. In a particularly striking one, Frank Jackson considers a situation in which Mary, a brilliant scientist who knows all the physical facts there are to know about psychological experience, has spent the whole of her l…Read more
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Externalism and Authoritative Self‐KnowledgeIn C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press. 1998.This paper defends a qualified observational model of authoritative self‐knowledge, which centres on two features of ordinarily observable characteristics that help explain a subject's direct awareness of them. The first is that they are basic, in that one does not have to know of any underlying fact in virtue of which they apply when they do; and the second is that it is generally necessary and sufficient for the application of such a characteristic that it seems to a normal observer, in normal…Read more
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158The identity theory of truth and the realm of reference: Where Dodd goes wrongAnalysis 69 (2): 297-304. 2009.In ‘On McDowell's identity conception of truth’ , we suggested that McDowell's Identity Theory, according to which a proposition is true if and only if it is identical with a fact, is only fully understood when we realize that there are two identity claims involved. The first is that, when one thinks truly, the content of a whole thought is identical with a Tractarian Tatsachen – a complex fact constituted by simple Sachverhalte – and the second is that these simple Sachverhalte are in turn iden…Read more
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99McDowell’s Alternative Conceptions of the WorldInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (1): 87-94. 2011.This Article does not have an abstract
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Vermazen, B. and Hintikka, M , "Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events" (review)Mind 94 (n/a): 632. 1985.
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11Berkeley, by George PitcherJournal of the British Society for Phenomenology 12 (1): 91-93. 1981.
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Tacit KnowledgeIn Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. 1994.
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6Externalism and Authoritative Self-KnowledgeIn C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 123-155. 1998.Externalism in the philosophy of mind has been thought by many to pose a serious threat to the claim that subjects are in general authoritative with regard to certain of their own intentional states.<sup>1</sup> In a series of papers, Tyler Burge (1985_a_, 1985_b_, 1988, 1996) has argued that the distinctive entitlement or right that subjects have to self- knowledge in certain cases is compatible with externalism, since that entitlement is environmentally neutral, neutral with respect to the iss…Read more
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Connectionism and EliminativismIn Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. 1991.
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679Self-knowledge and the "inner eye"Philosophical Explorations 1 (2): 83-106. 1998.What is knowledge of one's own current, consciously entertained intentional states a form of inner awareness? If so, what form? In this paper I explore the prospects for a quasi-observational account of a certain class of cases where subjects appear to have self-knowledge, namely, the so-called cogito-like cases. In section one I provide a rationale for the claim that we need an epistemology of self-knowledge, and specifically, an epistemology of the cogito-like cases. In section two I argue tha…Read more
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Philosophy of Psychology. Debates on Psychological ExplanationRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 187 (1): 110-111. 1997.
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6Explanation in HistoriographyIn Aviezer Tucker (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography, Wiley-blackwell. 2008.This chapter contains sections titled: 1 2 3 Acknowledgment Bibliography.
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23Externalism and NormsRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 273-301. 1998.We think that certain of our mental states represent the world around us, and represent it in determinate ways. My perception that there is salt in the pot before me, for example, represents my immediate environment as containing a certain object, a pot, with a certain kind of substance, salt, in it. My belief that salt dissolves in water represents something in the world around me, namely salt, as having a certain observational property, that of dissolving. But what exactly is the relation betw…Read more
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Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary MetaphysicsPhilosophical Quarterly 56 (224): 459-463. 2006.
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30Reply to Cynthia MacdonaldPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3): 739-745. 1999.What is introspective know ledge of one’s own intentional states like? This paper aims to make plausible the view that certain cases of self-knowledge, namely the cogito-type ones, are enough like perception to count as cases of quasi-observation. To this end it considers the highly influential arguments developed by Sydney Shoemaker in his recent Royce Lectures. These present the most formidable challenge to the view that certain cases of self-knowledge are quasi-observational and so deserve de…Read more
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Anti-individualism and Psychological ExplanationIn Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. 1994.
Manchester, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |