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29Reply to Cynthia MacdonaldPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3): 739-745. 1999.What is introspective know ledge of one’s own intentional states like? This paper aims to make plausible the view that certain cases of self-knowledge, namely the cogito-type ones, are enough like perception to count as cases of quasi-observation. To this end it considers the highly influential arguments developed by Sydney Shoemaker in his recent Royce Lectures. These present the most formidable challenge to the view that certain cases of self-knowledge are quasi-observational and so deserve de…Read more
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Anti-individualism and Psychological ExplanationIn Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. 1994.
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480The Epistemology of MeaningIn Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Millikan and her critics, Wiley. pp. 221--240. 2013.This chapter contains section titles: Introduction Section 1 Section 2 Conclusion.
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IntroductionIn Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in mind, Oxford University Press. 2010.
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737Emergence and Downward CausationIn Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in mind, Oxford University Press. 2010.
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173The metaphysics of mental causationJournal of Philosophy 103 (11): 539-576. 2006.A debate has been raging in the philosophy of mind for at least the past two decades. It concerns whether the mental can make a causal difference to the world. Suppose that I am reading the newspaper and it is getting dark. I switch on the light, and continue with my reading. One explanation of why my switching on of the light occurred is that a desiring with a particular content (that I continue reading), a noticing with a particular content (that it is getting dark), and a believing with a par…Read more
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183Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation (edited book)Blackwell. 1991.This volume provides an introduction to and review of key contemporary debates concerning connectionism, and the nature of explanation and methodology in cognitive psychology. The first debate centers on the question of whether human cognition is best modeled by classical or by connectionist architectures. The second centres on the question of the compatibility between folk, or commonsense, psychological explanation and explanations based on connectionist models of cognition. Each of the two sec…Read more
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66Self-knowledge and the First PersonIn Maureen Sie, Marc Slors & Bert van den Brink (eds.), Reasons of one's own, Ashgate. 2004.It is a familiar view in the philosophy of mind and action is that for a thought or attitude to constitute a reason for an action is for it to render intelligible, in the light of norms of rationality or reason, that action. However, I can make sense of your actions in this way by crediting you with attitudes that I myself do not hold. Equally, you can do this for my actions. So not all reasons for one’s actions are one’s own reasons. What more is involved in a reason’s being one’s own reason fo…Read more
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37Psychophysical Supervenience, Dependency, and ReductionIn Elias E. Savellos & Ümit D. Yalçin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 140--57. 1995.
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215Introspection and authoritative self-knowledgeErkenntnis 67 (2): 355-372. 2007.In this paper I outline and defend an introspectionist account of authoritative self-knowledge for a certain class of cases, ones in which a subject is both thinking and thinking about a current, conscious thought. My account is distinctive in a number of ways, one of which is that it is compatible with the truth of externalism
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Weak externalism and psychological reductionIn K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism, Oxford University Press. 1992.
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96Emergence in mind (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2010.The volume also extends the debate about emergence by considering the independence of chemical properties from physical properties, and investigating what would ...
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497Consciousness, self-consciousness, and authoritative self-knowledgeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3): 319-346. 2008.Many recent discussions of self-consciousness and self-knowledge assume that there are only two kinds of accounts available to be taken on the relation between the so-called first-order (conscious) states and subjects' awareness or knowledge of them: a same-order, or reflexive view, on the one hand, or a higher-order one, on the other. I maintain that there is a third kind of view that is distinctively different from these two options. The view is important because it can accommodate and make in…Read more
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563Tropes and Other ThingsIn Stephen Laurence & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics, Wiley-blackwell. 1998.Our day-to-day experience of the world regularly brings us into contact with middlesized objects such as apples, dogs, and other human beings. These objects possess observable properties, properties that are available or accessible to the unaided senses, such as redness and roundness, as well as properties that are not so available, such as chemical ones. Both of these kinds of properties serve as valuable sources of information about our familiar middle-sized objects at least to the extent that…Read more
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301Real metaphysics and the descriptive/revisionary distinctionIn Cornelis De Waal (ed.), Susan Haack: a lady of distinctions: the philosopher responds to critics, Prometheus Books. 2007.
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417What is Colour? A Defence of Colour PrimitivismIn Robert Johnson Michael Smith (ed.), Passions and Projections: Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn, Oxford University Press. pp. 116-133. 2015.
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30Perception and reasonAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1). 2002.Book Information Perception and Reason. By Bill Brewer. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1999. Pp. xviii + 281.
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63Theories of mind and 'the commonsense view'Mind and Language 17 (5): 467-488. 2002.It is widely believed that people are sometimes directly aware of their own psychological states and consequently better placed than others to know what the contents of those states are. This (‘commonsense’) view has been challenged by Alison Gopnik. She claims that experimental evidence from the behaviour of 3– and 4–year–old children both supports the theory theory and shows that the belief in direct and privileged knowledge of one’s own intentional states is an illusion. I argue (1) that the …Read more
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142Externalism and First-Person AuthoritySynthese 104 (1): 99-122. 1995.Externalism in the philosophy of mind is threatened by the view that subjects are authoritative with regard to the contents of their own intentional states. If externalism is to be reconciled with first-person authority, two issues need to be addressed: (a) how the non-evidence-based character of knowledge of one's own intentional states is compatible with ignorance of the empirical factors that individuate the contents of those states, and (b) how, given externalism, the non-evidence-based char…Read more
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Supervenient causationIn Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Blackwell. pp. 4-28. 1994.
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40Psychological type-type reduction via disjunctionSouthern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1): 65-69. 1992.
Manchester, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |